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Notes from the Editor 
 
In this issue of Homeland Security Affairs we offer one essay that outlines some 
of the important homeland security issues of 2008 and a set of essays that 
describes a potentially significant change in the national homeland security 
architecture. This edition also has two essays about homeland security 
technology.  One applies coevolutionary theory to the strategic question of how to 
defend against an adaptive adversary; the other discusses policy and technology 
changes that could improve aviation safety. We present an article that 
demonstrates how to determine the benefits and costs of homeland security 
spending and an article that discusses threats from China to American 
corporations and to homeland security. The issue concludes with an analysis of 
how Community Health Centers can be an integral part of the nation’s public 
health preparedness. 
In our second annual “Changing Homeland Security: Year in Review – 2008” 
Christopher Bellavita reports on what a selected group of homeland security 
professionals considered 2008’s top stories. Their survey responses included the 
presidential election and its impact on homeland security, the terrorist attack in 
Mumbai, the domestic and international economic meltdown, chaos on the 
southern border, the continued quest to define homeland security, and an 
expanding threat spectrum. Bellavita also includes three candidates for the 
“Homeland Security Image of the Year.” 
Should the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and the National Security 
Council (NSC) merge?  As we prepare to publish, most signs indicate the merger 
will take place. Christine E. Wormuth and Jeremy White present the argument in 
support of the merger. In “Merging the HSC and NSC: Stronger Together,” the 
authors note that at the federal level homeland security is essentially an 
interagency activity. White House leadership is the only practical way to ensure 
unity of effort among federal agencies. Merging the NSC and the HSC into one 
organization can end the bifurcation of national security and homeland security.  
A single council will give the president a way to develop and implement 
homeland security policy that is integrated with other national security 
initiatives. 
Paul N. Stockton, in “Beyond the HSC/NSC Merger: Integrating States and 
Localities into Homeland Security Policymaking,” agrees that merging the NSC 
and the HSC seems inevitable. But the change brings risk. Stockton argues that if 
the councils are combined, administration officials will need to pay special 
attention to a number of issues, including the danger that homeland security will 
take a back seat to traditional national security priorities. The president and the 
newly structured council will also need to address significant challenges of 
horizontal integration (i.e., across federal agencies) and vertical integration – the 
inclusion of state and local representatives in the work of the council. Stockton 
reviews the possible problems with a merger and suggests solutions. 
In “Technology Strategies for Homeland Security: Adaptation and Coevolution 
of Offense and Defense,” Brian A. Jackson frames the dynamic between terrorist 
groups and security forces as a coevolutionary process. Highlighting the use of 
technology by both homeland security organizations and terrorists, Jackson 
describes how terrorists adapt to defensive technologies and how homeland 
security organizations must then develop measures to counter those adaptations.  
He argues that trying to create impenetrable defenses for every target is futile.  
Instead he suggests that defensive technology strategies should exploit 
evolutionary dynamics by shaping adversary choices and by using defensive 
approaches that are insensitive to terrorist adaptation strategies. 
Anthony M. Fainberg’s essay, “The Terrorist Threat to Inbound U.S. Passenger 
Flights: Inadequate Government Response,” illustrates the interface between 
technology, politics, and security. He writes that the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) seems reluctant to focus on security for aircraft flying into 
the United Sates from abroad. Reviewing the decades-long history of terrorist 
attacks on commercial aviation, Fainberg notes how al Qaeda has tried more than 
once to simultaneously destroy several U.S. aircraft, in flight, by using suicide 
bombers ticketed as regular passengers. He argues that countries from which 
inbound flights depart should agree to security standards that match those 
applied to domestic flights, including using explosive trace detectors to inspect 
passengers and their carry-on items. 
In “Just How Much Does That Cost, Anyway? An Analysis of the Financial 
Costs and Benefits of the ‘No Fly’ List,” Marcus Holmes offers a unique financial 
cost and security benefit analysis of the United States government’s “no fly list.” 
On September 11, 2001 the no fly list contained sixteen names of terrorists and 
other individuals deemed threatening to the states. Since then, the list has had 
more than 755,500 names. Holmes writes that while there has been considerable 
interest in the social costs of the list, there has been little attention paid to the 
financial costs relative to the benefits. He claims it is unclear how one can create a 
strategy for how national security dollars should be spent without knowing how 
many dollars are involved and where they are going. Holmes’ study is a path-
setting step in asking and answering an important question: what are the costs, 
relative to the benefits, of anti-terrorism policies and security strategies?  
Robert C. Slate is the author of “Innovating with Intelligence: New Directions 
in China’s Quest for Intangible Property and Implications for Homeland 
Security.” He argues Chinese corporations that use intellectual property theft and 
infringement in their business model are significant threats to the intangible 
property of the American corporate world and pose a serious threat to homeland 
security. Slate describes how Chinese corporations, universities, and research 
institutions use intelligence principles to help China become an economic 
superpower. He calls for the U.S. intelligence community to rethink its traditional 
approach to collecting and analyzing information about China.  
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 21 outlines a new approach to public 
health and medical preparedness in the United States. In “Community Health 
Centers: The Untapped Resource for Public Health and Medical Preparedness,” 
Karen M. Wood writes that the more than 1,200 community health centers (CHC) 
in the nation are well-positioned to play a significant role in that effort. Wood 
describes how CHCs can improve biosurveillance, countermeasure distribution, 
mass casualty care, and community resilience. She argues that aggressive 
investment in the centers and their emergency management programs can make 
public health emergency management more accessible to special-needs 
populations and support many of the objectives identified in HSPD 21.   
We hope you find the articles in this issue of Homeland Security Affairs 
informative and thought provoking. As always, we invite you to contribute your 
own research and ideas to the continuing conversation about homeland security. 
 
The Editor 
Changing Homeland Security: The Year in Review – 2008 
Christopher Bellavita 
Everything we hear is an opinion, not a fact. Everything we see is a 
perspective, not the truth.  
-Marcus Aurelius (121-180) 
 
What events and trends shaped the homeland security terrain last year?  
In December we asked members of the Naval Postgraduate School's extended 
homeland security network1 to respond to two questions: 
• From your perspective – and using whatever criteria you'd like – what would 
you say was a top homeland security-related issue or story in 2008?  And why?  
• Please identify something you consider to be an emerging homeland security 
issue. (For the purposes of this question, emerging issues are embryonic 
concerns that may develop into significant problems or opportunities in the 
future.) 
Their responses highlighted the 2008 presidential election, the terrorist attack in 
Mumbai, the economic meltdown, the chaos on the southern border, the continued 
quest to define homeland security, and an expanding threat spectrum, including the 
cyber threat – possibly the year's most underreported homeland security issue. 
Taken together, the responses from the NPS community of practitioners and 
academics who work in and think about homeland security everyday tell a story about 
the field’s continuing evolution. Before presenting the full survey results, here is the 
summary of the 2008 story. 
THE YEAR IN BRIEF 
Barack Obama's election portends changes in homeland security and in the Department 
of Homeland Security. The changes might be foundational – for example separating 
FEMA from DHS – or they may emerge from the muddle of disjointed incrementalism.  
Homeland security was not an important issue during the campaign. This and other 
evidence suggests homeland security has become a second-tier policy issue, more 
important to a small group of bureaucrats, elected officials, corporations and scholars 
than to the electorate. One respondent said the public will not pay attention "until we 
bleed again." 
The Mumbai attack reminded us that the bad guys are still around. They do not need 
nuclear or biological weapons. Low-tech attacks on soft targets in the U.S. can create 
high-consequence events. Weapons of mass destruction continue to pose a threat to the 
nation.2 But attention to WMD threats may distract state, local, and federal agencies 
from the training, resources, or focus appropriate to prevent Mumbai-like attacks. 
The economy presents another challenge to homeland security. The same state and 
local agencies we rely on to prevent and respond to homeland security incidents face 
significant budget cuts. Public safety agencies must decide how to provide basic services 
to their constituents. Increasingly the issue is which people to layoff and which services 
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to no longer provide. Homeland security is becoming a "nice-to-have" service in a 
growing number of communities. 
Obama has proposed a multi-billion dollar initiative to create jobs and revitalize the 
nation's infrastructure. Depending how security concerns are incorporated, the program 
could mitigate or amplify basic homeland security challenges. 
Some good things happened in 2008.3 It was one more year the nation was not 
successfully attacked at home.4 The response to the Gulf hurricanes, the Midwest floods 
and the western wildfires was improved when compared with similar incidents in prior 
years. Borders are less porous. The numbers of illegal immigrants did not increase 
substantially and – for a variety of reasons – may even have decreased. Port security has 
been enhanced. Resiliency has taken on increasing importance. Even the DHS efforts to 
have September treated seriously as National Preparedness Month may be taking root in 
the nation.   
Americans continue to support government efforts to prevent terrorist attacks. But, 
as one respondent phrased it: "There does seem to be a sense that America must 
maintain its moral compass and not alienate itself from the rest of the world…. Being the 
leader by example of democratic principles for the world is still important."  
Coordination and information sharing among federal, state, and local agencies 
continues to improve. Some of our respondents believe critical problems remain in this 
domain. One person noted that the Maryland State Police admission that they 
conducted improper surveillance on Americans could have national implications for 
fusion center operations. 
The homeland security threat spectrum widened in 2008. In part, that may reflect an 
empirical reality. It may also be the aggregated perception of people whose job is to find 
threats and prevent them from being realized. More people were killed last year in the 
Mexican drug wars than died on September 11, 2001. The instability of the southern 
border presents new opportunities for terrorist safe havens. The specter of homegrown 
terrorism has not abated. Naturalized citizens of Somali descent traveled to Africa for 
jihad. One Minneapolis man, Shirwa Ahmed, blew himself up in a suicide attack in 
Northern Somali. The election of the first black American president may reignite the 
racial hatred of more traditional domestic terrorist groups.  
Secretary Chertoff called cyber security the nation's "last major vulnerability."5 Cyber 
is also a global threat. Last year saw an increase in the number of efforts to penetrate 
government and private sector networks. The penetrations could be reconnaissance 
probes before a wider domestic operation. According to one of our respondents, during 
the Russian invasion of Georgia "a criminal network believed to be operating in Russia 
was conducting cyber attacks against the Georgian government from computer servers 
located in the United States." 
The international scene highlights additional threats. Afghanistan remains Al Qaeda's 
incubator. In addition to Mexico, trends in China, India, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Russia, 
Africa, and Venezuela remind us that attending to homeland security does not mean 
looking only within the country's border. The number of nations with a presence in 
space is growing. There are homeland security implications to this development. 
Climate change, economic security, food, water, and energy security are seen by some 
of our respondents as meta hazards that could have a more significant impact on 
domestic security than terrorism.   
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The public health and emergency health infrastructure remains inadequate to prevent 
and respond to significant mass casualty incidents, biological attacks, drug resistant 
infectious diseases and related threats. Chemical security remains a national problem.  
Pirates and their small boats have moved from Disney amusement to global menace.   
Thomas Jefferson wrote that a politician looks forward only to the next election; a 
statesman looks forward to the next generation. American elections provide the 
opportunity to rejuvenate the nation. The year 2009 brings new women and men to 
responsible homeland security positions. They have the opportunity to review and learn 
from the work of the statesmen and women who came before them. Based on what has 
and has not worked, the nation’s new homeland security leaders at all levels of 
government can write the next chapter in our continue efforts to, in Jefferson’s words, 
"insure domestic Tranquility, [and] provide for the common defence." 
TOP HOMELAND SECURITY STORIES OF 2008 
The people who responded to this year's survey did not mention every major issue.6 The 
findings are as much a function of the interests of people who took the time to respond 
to a survey during the holidays as they are an unfiltered reflection of empirical reality.  If 
themes you consider important are not mentioned here, you are invited to submit, via 
email, your thoughts for inclusion in the next issue of Homeland Security Affairs. 
The survey respondents' observations that follow are arranged in the following 
categories: 
• The Promise of Obama: The Ambiguity of Change 
• The Attack in Mumbai: "This could easily happen anywhere in the US." 
• The Economic Crisis: "Bin Laden's victory over America?" 
• The Nature of Homeland Security: Now a Second Tier Policy Issue?  
• Organizing for Homeland Security: Possible Futures, Emerging Issues 
• The Department of Homeland Security: Time of Opportunity 
• The Federal Emergency Management Agency: Will You Stay or Will You Go? 
• The Good Things 
• The Threat: Are We More Vulnerable Now than We’ve Been in the Past Decade? 
o The Southern Border 
o Domestic Threats 
o Cyber Threats 
o Threats From Other Nations 
o Public Health Threats 
o Other Threats 
• The Culture of Preparedness: “Waiting until we bleed again” 
• Meta Hazards: Things We Do To Ourselves 
• Funding Concerns 
• Professionalization of Homeland Security 
• Information and Intelligence 
• Critical Infrastructure: Jobs And Security 
• Criminal Justice and Homeland Security 
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The article closes with three candidates for the “Homeland Security Image of the Year.”  
But first, here is what our respondents considered to be significant trends and themes 
for 2008 and the future. These responses are direct quotations, lightly edited for clarity 
and presented without attribution; each paragraph represents one individual’s thoughts.  
The Promise of Obama: The Ambiguity of Change 
The campaign for and election of the U.S. president represents the top homeland 
security issue for 2008. The two candidates articulated very different visions for 
the ongoing war in Iraq. One candidate presented as the man who would 
continue the fight until it was concluded and the enemy vanquished. The other 
candidate argued for a quick end to U.S. involvement. Domestic and economic 
issues – and virtually all talk of terrorism and homeland security – overshadowed 
this entire issue. Whether this was because of the issue attention cycle, threat 
fatigue, or economic worry, it was clear that the threat of terrorism was not on 
the front burner for American voters.  
♦♦♦ 
In 2008, the American people voted for a "new narrative" in homeland security 
and the so-called war on terror. President Obama's statements indicate he 
understands the current "military only" approach to fighting terrorists is 
incomplete and counterproductive. Instead, his approach seems to be to meld the 
hard power of the military, designed to destroy terrorism's hard core, with the so-
called soft power of diplomacy, economic assistance, education, and information, 
designed to strengthen the mainstream in Muslim countries. Opinion polls in the 
Muslim world indicate the majority of Muslims believe the current war on terror 
is really a war on Islam by the United States and the West. We will never beat the 
terrorists until that perception is changed. Mr. Obama promises to make a major 
address in a Muslim country in the first 100 days of his administration explaining 
that we are not at war with Islam, but that we are fighting a common enemy: 
violent radical extremists who seek to hijack Islam and terrorize us all. He 
appears ready to reverse the cowboy diplomacy of "my way or the highway," with 
a search for common ground that can stop radicalization in its tracks. The success 
of this new narrative will determine the security of our homeland for decades to 
come.  
♦♦♦ 
In the national elections of 2008, the American public demonstrated a turning of 
the popular will against that part of the war on terror represented by the war in 
Iraq, by changing the executive branch of government from Republican to 
Democrat, and by increasing the Democrats’ majority control of the Congress….  
Despite claims by the outgoing administration that the war in Iraq is critical to 
the war on terror, these results indicate that, similar to the Vietnam War, the 
administration has failed to mobilize and sustain the popular will of its 
constituents. It remains to be seen what war on terror, homeland defense, and 
homeland security policies the incoming administration will implement.  
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The primary issue in the 2004 election was the threat of terrorism. The 2008 
election seemed to revolve around getting revenge against the president and the 
other people who have been in charge of the global war on terrorism.  
♦♦♦ 
The top story was the one that did not happen during the presidential campaign: 
the lack of homeland security as an issue for debate. Homeland security was 
never on the radar screen and seemed to be intentionally not an issue, so the 
Republican candidate could not get any traction on a substantial tide-turning 
issue. Just as the economic downturn provided the pivotal momentum for 
President Obama's success, a terrorist-related event could have turned the 
outcome to a success for Republicans. Timing is everything in life.   
♦♦♦ 
The top story was the lack of focus on homeland security during the campaign 
and transition. In an attempt to separate candidates from the current 
administration, both candidates downplayed homeland security issues, with one 
or two minor exceptions. Some candidates published their [homeland security] 
positions online. Those documents are no longer available. Other candidates 
dismissed the issue altogether. Like it or not, homeland security is a major issue 
at this time in history. While it may not be on the forefront in the public eye, it 
requires much more attention than it has received.  
♦♦♦ 
The election of the first president since the DHS was formed has and will 
continue to significantly influence the world of homeland security.  
♦♦♦ 
The election will bring in a new set of players who will set a new standard for 
homeland security.  
♦♦♦ 
In the latter half of 2008, a number of organizations involved with homeland 
security focused on political and government transition. There are a number of 
groups working on documents for President Obama to read. These documents are 
designed to educate and influence Obama and other newly elected or appointed 
officials. Are these documents consistent with current direction or are they 
recommending change? Is there consistency in the message from these multiple 
documents? One would guess no. A concern that many in DHS and their 
homeland security partners share is the constant "crazy quilt patchwork" of 
direction that seems to permeate the overall homeland security effort. Will 
consistency in direction eventually be achieved and will these [transition] 
documents be helpful or hinder the efforts of pulling together for the common 
purpose of securing the homeland?  
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The Obama administration may move to limit the duplicative bureaucracies the 
Department of Homeland Security has created since its inception. The new 
administration may move to decentralized DHS offices and programs out of their 
cocoon in Washington, DC.  
♦♦♦ 
Our homeland security is critically impacted by what other countries (and their 
citizens) think about the intentions and behavior of the United States. If this new 
administration can keep the international momentum that has already started, it 
could have an effect on reducing future threats.  
♦♦♦ 
How will Obama treat homeland security? Where will his leadership take us? Will 
he reconsider describing the fight against terrorists as a "war?" 
♦♦♦ 
The [new] administration has already set the tone of debate and what is in the 
best interest of the country. Those vested with an interest in homeland security 
should examine their views from the lens of ensuring continued economic 
prosperity of the nation and preserving the freedoms and liberties set forth in the 
U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, as opposed to maintaining a positional 
stance.  
♦♦♦ 
The administration change will bring new priorities shaped from a liberal 
socialist rather than a neoconservative perspective. I'm interested to see what the 
difference is once the politicos fully understand the available intelligence.  
♦♦♦ 
The scary thing about the election of Obama is a potential for the revival of 
domestic terrorists. I would hate to see how we as a nation would respond to the 
assassination of a president by domestic terrorists.  
The Attack in Mumbai: "This could easily happen anywhere in the U.S." 
The recent attacks in Mumbai demonstrate that this form of attack is possible in 
the U.S.A. It appeared to be relatively inexpensive, did not require extensive 
planning, and the terrorists were able to accomplish their goal – instilling fear 
and terror in support of their cause. While we look at potential threats, such as 
nuclear, chemical, bio, and other types of attacks, we should not take our eyes off 
of this emerging threat of simultaneous "Mumbai style" attacks in various parts 
of the U.S.A.  
♦♦♦ 
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The top story was the bombing in Mumbai. This incident marks the evolution of 
complex attacks in the revival of a fifteen-year-old plan of execution for the 
terrorist. This incident creates new attack environments for communities to 
prepare for.  
♦♦♦ 
The Mumbai attack certainly has to be considered for placement on the list 
because of the effectiveness of the methods used (low-tech, soft target, high 
consequence), intelligence warning of the attacks (apparently heeded for a few 
days, then "back to normal" just prior to the attacks), and the apparent lack of 
readiness by local responders to quickly neutralize the situation (adequately 
prepared responders were hours away). I'm sure we all thought the same thing 
when the news broke: "This could easily happen anywhere in the U.S. today."  
♦♦♦ 
What do the Mumbai attacks mean for the future of anti-terrorism and future 
terrorist tactics?  
♦♦♦ 
The Mumbai attack in India demonstrated again the urban vulnerability to a 
small band of attackers.  
♦♦♦ 
The Mumbai attacks showed that asymmetric tactics used by a small, determined 
group can have devastating effect.  
♦♦♦ 
On the maritime side, the top story was the increasing concern relating to the 
small boat threat; this threat increased even more after the Mumbai incident. 
♦♦♦ 
The tactics used in India were identified by our [NPS] students repeatedly over 
the last five years as likely next steps by terrorists. I'm interested to see if it 
actually brings a change in tactics or if this was just a one-off.  
♦♦♦ 
It is too early to see if Mumbai will lead to new trends in attacks, but it seems 
likely that more quasi-military attacks will be conducted in the future.  
♦♦♦ 
The Mumbai attacks were noteworthy because of the tactics employed. There 
were no explosives, youthful perpetrators, suicidal bent, technologically advanced 
means and methods, prolonged implementation... all continue to indicate that 
the face of terrorism is changing. Relate this to Columbine, the Moscow theater, 
and the Beslan school killings. We may be directing our training and education 
efforts to the wrong threats. The local police departments will assume a much 
larger role than previously anticipated, and they are not ready.  
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There were several points where the attacks could have been disrupted had 
people been more sensitized to what was going on (or were less apathetic) or if 
the police and security forces had more capacity: hijacking of fishing vessels, 
transfer to small boats, walking from small boats up the pier to get in a cab. The 
attackers could have been disrupted during each of those steps. Once the attacks 
began, local law enforcement didn't have the resources to stop the attack, and it 
took several days for the higher end forces to get into position and be ready to 
assault. Why did it take so long? For us, could a similar attack happen? And what 
capabilities or capacity do we have to prevent or disrupt such an attack?  
♦♦♦ 
The Mumbai attacks were a demonstration of the continued preparation and 
planning that is ongoing by terrorists. The terrorists continue to attack the U.S. 
even though it is not on our soil. This is a message to the rest of the world, an 
attempt to turn U.S. allies and their people against the West.  
♦♦♦ 
Mumbai has caused all of us to refocus on preventing and responding to low-tech, 
high-consequence activities by committed terrorists and criminals in the United 
States. We have devoted substantial resources towards detection, prevention, and 
response of many WMD events. But if terrorists plan to use low-tech events in the 
United States (and I don't see any reason why they would not, especially given the 
apparent difficulty in conducting IED/WMD events), we will all have to rethink 
our surveillance and prevention activities if we are to effectively address them.  
Stop these incidents before they happen; stop them if they happen. This will 
become an even greater challenge, at least in the short-term, as we all struggle to 
address the fallout from very difficult economic times – hiring freezes, furloughs, 
reduction in forces, and so on.  
♦♦♦ 
Mumbai: for those doubters, the threat is still here!  
The Economic Crisis: "Bin Laden's victory over America?" 
The top issue for me is the economy this past year, and how events starting from 
September 2001 have shaped our financial standing with the world.  
♦♦♦ 
I think the top homeland security related issue is bin Laden's victory over America. 
After all, he said his goal was "... bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy...." 
Okay, okay, so I realize we did a lot of this to ourselves with unsound and risky 
banking and loan policies, but one can't help but wonder what impact this 
economic crisis will have on our national security.  
♦♦♦ 
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I believe the top homeland security-related issue in 2008 is the meltdown of the 
United States and the world economy. I think it directly affects our national 
security in several respects. Psychological fear created by the economy further 
erodes the nation's confidence in the government to take care of any business ….  
There is less money available for the military, State Department, all hazards and 
security. … As if we have not forgotten 9/11 and Katrina enough already, this 
further takes our eyes off of the ball.  As some shrewd politician once said, it is the 
economy stupid.  
♦♦♦ 
The top story is the impact of the economy on homeland security and the 
sustainment of current capabilities.  
♦♦♦ 
The top story was the financial downturn. Public safety agencies at the state and 
local level are increasingly pressed to maintain basic services, let alone prepare for 
low-frequency, high-impact operations such as homeland security. Funding is 
increasingly needed to sustain basic public safety operations, let alone homeland 
security functions.  
♦♦♦ 
The nation's economic downturn is definitely starting to impact homeland 
security. Many local and state governments have experienced budget cuts that 
directly affect homeland security capabilities. It is predicted the economy may get 
worse or maintain its dismal state for a year or more before it will rebound. If this 
turns out to be true, even greater budget cuts can be expected. The challenge that 
we currently face is how we will be able to ensure homeland security with a 
dramatic decrease in resources. A perfect example is a reduction of the public 
safety workforce through layoffs due to budget cuts. Can prevention occur when all 
resources are expended on response? Can a timely and effective response occur?  
♦♦♦ 
Fire service involvement in homeland security is being affected by the failure to 
recognize the cost of that involvement. Current fiscal practices require 
departments to make decisions about the importance of what they should and can 
be involved in based on constrained funding. Failure to acknowledge personnel 
costs, which can be ongoing, will affect involvement. Equipment needs can be met, 
but backfill costs are stripping departments of day-to-day resources, unlike other 
agencies.  
♦♦♦ 
The obvious choice for the top story is the financial meltdown. We cannot run an 
effective government on any level without the financial machine to sustain it. This 
creates an opportunity for terrorists.  
♦♦♦ 
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The economic crisis plays a role in diminishing our deterrence. It has an ongoing 
impact on funding and preparedness.  
♦♦♦ 
The big story is the effect of the economic downturn on the ability of government 
to provide funds or prioritize funds for homeland security purposes.  
♦♦♦ 
The looming world economic collapse is going to affect all aspects of our homeland 
security and defense initiatives.  
♦♦♦ 
The economy will limit our budgets and make us more vulnerable as many of our 
own newly unemployed population become desperate and/or sick.  
♦♦♦ 
The economic and fiscal crisis will exasperate an already challenged homeland 
security mission and will force the question of how the nation should optimize its 
security investment, given its declining strength in the world community. Hard 
choices will need to be made across government and every organization will fight 
for survival – especially the active components of the military.  
♦♦♦ 
I think an emerging homeland security issue is how the nation is going to balance 
expensive national security initiatives with the more pressing social and economic 
concerns of the citizenry.  
♦♦♦ 
The economy will be the primary driver of emerging definitions of the homeland 
security mission space in 2009.  
The Nature of Homeland Security: Now a Second Tier Policy Issue?  
Has the bar for national discourse been raised beyond the need for reflective 
thinking and strategic discussions as it relates to the concept of homeland 
security? I suggest the top homeland security-related issue of 2008 is that the 
general concept of homeland security is no longer a compelling national story that 
provides an impetus for the topic to be discussed in any substantive detail. The 
presidential election, downturn in the economy, Iraq, and Afghanistan appear to 
have consumed the nation's attention and left little room for discussions relating to 
numerous other issues of importance – including homeland security. While this 
lack of national discourse could be viewed positively – oftentimes such discussions 
only arrive after a dramatic man-made or natural disaster grabs the nation's 
attention – it might be argued that such discussions should occur during times of 
crisis and calm. In September 2008, the third most destructive U.S. disaster, 
Hurricane Ike, was responsible for eighty-five deaths and caused $27 billion in 
damage. Yet, like the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, little national attention has 
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been given to the slow recovery efforts for tens of thousands of citizens who 
continue to be displaced from their communities. Based on the enormity and 
complexity of the issues our nation faces – continuing deaths in a trillion-dollar 
global war on terror, coupled with a trillion-dollar government bailout and 
economic stimulus package – I wonder if the nation has become conditioned to 
giving sustained attention solely to the most significant issues of the day, with 
homeland security destined to return to the public forum only after the next 
catastrophic failure.  
♦♦♦ 
The most pressing issue in homeland security in 2008 was not an event, but rather 
the continuing confusion and lack of clarity surrounding the term "homeland 
security." There is a dysfunctional absence of understanding about what 
constitutes "national security" and "homeland security," to say nothing of the fact 
that emergency management finds itself, at the federal level and within some 
states, buried within departments of homeland security, but not part of the 
national homeland security strategy (which deals exclusively with terrorism). 
There has been no national dialogue and consensus regarding the responsibilities 
of the federal government vis-à-vis state and local jurisdictions in terms of 
"homeland security." There has been no movement on a workable, comprehensive 
program that addresses illegal immigration issues, the borders remain porous, and 
our seaports, rail systems, and other infrastructure remain largely unprotected 
while the Secretary of Homeland Security has become an expert on the behavior of 
cyclonic advance and levee construction.  
♦♦♦ 
The top story is the emerging requirements of first defining and then structuring 
exactly what homeland security is. Is it economic, physical, environmental, health, 
energy... or all of those, with no practical gravitas placed on any one sector? We 
must nationally identify and modify our current behavior and expectations if we 
are going to actually have a policy or just another dance with money and innuendo.  
♦♦♦ 
Homeland security, conceptually, is about redefining. It is not about the organic 
creation of inherent value. This is demonstrated by observing that the lessons 
learned from Katrina were applied to Gustaf and Ike. The preparation and the 
recognition of responsibility were the two big homeland security milestones in 
2008 for the federal government.  
♦♦♦ 
Homeland security has become second tier to other issues, such as the new 
administration, the economy, and housing, just to name a few. This will cause 
homeland security departments and professionals to compete for attention to get 
funding support for their programs.  
♦♦♦ 
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The emerging homeland security issue is a conceptualization of homeland security 
as a bureaucratic paradigm not a unique theoretical discipline. The value of 
homeland security is the avenue it creates for government personnel to act non-
possessively and, of course, the impetus to act at all.  
♦♦♦ 
The drawdown of forces in Iraq will actually cause a surplus of military personnel 
in the U.S. We are already seeing that trend in efforts to redefine the military's 
domestic role. As the active component competes for domestic relevance with the 
National Guard, you may see these two giants try to remodel homeland security for 
their own benefit. Some of this is already happening.  
♦♦♦ 
The important emerging issue is the future role of DHS in relation to national 
security. Think tanks, members of the U.S. Congress, and professional 
associations, for example, have two basic opposing views on emergency 
management, the role of FEMA, and responsibility for terrorism, border, and 
immigration control. In sum, the debate continues about the future organizational 
structure best suited nationally to deal with these issues. Some states are 
concerned that removal of FEMA would further erode its ability to deal with 
disasters. Others think better focus will come with a separate entity reporting to 
the president. Since Congress neither debated the creation of DHS nor the 
appropriate organizational government response to 9/11, I predict that 2009 will 
be the watershed year for debating major homeland security structural, policy, and 
budgetary changes with the new administration. The new team owes Congress the 
first ever quadrennial homeland security review, which requires an assessment of 
homeland security and recommendations for priorities.  
♦♦♦ 
The key emerging issue will be keeping the momentum going in the face of relative 
calm. We are fortunate not to have had strategic attacks on the homeland since 
9/11. In the face of this calm, other competing interests will emerge such as the 
immigration/border issue, and an increase in global partners pushing back against 
U.S. requests. The predominant issue (absent an emergency) should be identifying 
a concise mission for DHS. I feel DHS needs to be engaged in preventing strategic 
level attacks on the U.S. and not preoccupied with disaster response. Move FEMA 
out.  
♦♦♦ 
The emerging issue is perception versus reality in terms of to what degree the 
federal government can or should provide a "national 911." Rather than focusing 
resources on building capacity at state and local levels, there is a perception (often 
fostered by self-serving appointees) that FEMA and DHS will "be there for you." 
This has led to misunderstandings at all levels and the under-funding of state 
agencies by state legislatures that, in the coming year, will result in diminished 
capacity to respond.  
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The time is now to think outside the box, deconstruct unnecessary bureaucracy, 
develop essential capabilities, and strengthen our communities at the core level.  
Organizing for Homeland Security: Possible Futures, Emerging Issues 
The biggest questions to emerge are how the new administration will handle 
homeland security, whether budgets will remain at current levels, and whether 
FEMA will stay in DHS.  
♦♦♦ 
The top emerging issue is the collapse of homeland security systems designed and 
built over the last few years. We've spent billions on homeland security-related 
issues, building capabilities and capacity on top of those capabilities. We are slowly 
eroding away the capacity and will be chipping away at capability very soon, 
capabilities which will take years to rebuild once they are lost.  
♦♦♦ 
An emerging issue is the level of interest and funding support for homeland 
security in the new administration. Public support and interest is at an all-time low 
and recent polls indicate that over 70 percent of the public feels safe and believes 
there will not be another terrorist attack. With the Department of Homeland 
Security barely five years old, this could be a make or break period for the whole 
concept. Look at the mounting political pressure to remove FEMA from DHS. 
Short of another attack I see homeland security losing both funding and status. 
This situation requires a clear perception and expression of homeland security's 
value by the new president. It also requires a strong commitment to strengthen the 
leadership and capabilities at DHS.  
♦♦♦ 
Because of economic constraints, we should expect more effective collaboration 
between the federal government and the local governments.  
♦♦♦ 
Expect to see more restructuring of homeland security efforts from separate 
operations into an integrated part of day-to-day operations. This will happen 
because it is a financial necessity.  
♦♦♦ 
A major emerging uncertainty is the future of state and local homeland security-
specific offices. Most of them were created in the immediate aftermath of 
September 11, 2001. As the mission of many homeland security offices has begun 
to "creep" into the arena of existing state and local emergency management offices, 
there seems to be increasing discussion about what the future mission of the 
offices of homeland security should be.  
♦♦♦ 
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The concept of a "DHS" is fine and there is value to a cabinet level agency with 
oversight of the U.S. effort. Unfortunately, the turf wars continue and involve the 
FBI, CIA (and the entire intelligence community), as well as DHS. I doubt there is 
enough political will to properly align the agencies. The bright spot of the DHS is 
its legacy components and their mission focus.  
♦♦♦ 
A top issue according to several think tanks is merging the Homeland Security 
Council and the National Security Council (NSC). The announcement of a national 
security team by the president-elect included no person for a Homeland Security 
Council role. Merging the two entities would focus national policies and priorities 
on national security so federal departments and agencies would have a single 
entity in the White House. It would also focus discussions with Congress, perhaps 
leading to a reduction in the eighty-six committees and subcommittees dealing 
with the Department of Homeland Security. And if the incoming administration 
has an entity within the NSC dealing with homeland security, the governors would 
have a direct line on homeland security matters and understand the relationship 
between those issues and national security for budgetary and program decisions.  
♦♦♦ 
We are closer than ever to being attacked. Our adversaries will want to test a new 
president, and terrorism is not his number one agenda item. Jobs for Americans 
are number one. His national security team is a good one, but without his interest 
they will not have the success the current administration has not gotten credit for. 
The emerging issue will be: assuming we are attacked and the administration and 
Congress will again want to take some action, what should the Department of 
Homeland Security look like after a reorganization that is intended to better 
address the threat?  
The Department of Homeland Security: Time of Opportunity 
The DHS transition is an emerging issue. A radical change at this point will, in my 
view, waste a lot of money and time while making the country more vulnerable. 
That transition strikes me as the issue for the next year.  
♦♦♦ 
The change in administration represents the first time that another administration 
will take over DHS and the impending change and speculations about change 
represent a major issue for this embryonic agency. It is a tremendous opportunity 
to determine what works, what does not work, and how DHS may be structured 
and operated moving forward.  
♦♦♦ 
I think the issue continues to be the demarcation line between the role of the states 
and the role of big DHS. DHS does not have a large impact on the states except for 
the grant money. The [Michael] Sheehan book, Crush the Cell, said it well when 
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supporting the idea of moving the grant function out of DHS and back to a smaller 
entity. DHS still needs to decide what the department's core mission is. The all 
hazards approach is fine when all is quiet. But when the weather event occurs it 
draws away from the reason DHS was formed: to deter bad guys from doing bad 
things. The components that comprise DHS are the true success story. The big 
DHS is nowhere near as relevant.  
♦♦♦ 
Having a new homeland security secretary could change the future of homeland 
security.  
♦♦♦ 
The central question is which aspects of DHS and FEMA policy and structure will 
be maintained, modified, or overthrown by the new administration?  
♦♦♦ 
The election has created an opportunity to look at the Department and mission in a 
new and innovative way. Good homeland security is fueled by new thought. 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency: Will You Stay or Will You Go? 
The top story was the discussion regarding whether to move FEMA out from DHS 
and have it as a stand-alone agency.  The discussion took on new energy with the 
upcoming change in the executive branch.  
♦♦♦ 
There is a specter that FEMA may be removed from the United States Department 
of Homeland Security. This is a significant homeland security concern.  
♦♦♦ 
The top story of the year was the resurgence of FEMA. By proving that the "new" 
FEMA is not the Katrina FEMA, it has practically insured its continued 
organizational placement within DHS.  
♦♦♦ 
The lack of attention being paid to the aftermath of the Gulf hurricane season was 
a top story. I think I would call it Katrina fatigue. The perceived failures of FEMA 
are getting little traction in the media, not because they are not failures, but 
because people are too tired of hearing about debris removal and the lack of 
housing. Of a similar ilk, I am shocked at how little attention we seem to be paying 
to bin Laden and al Qaeda. The same kind of fatigue dynamic is at play perhaps.  
♦♦♦ 
The issue to watch for is the effort to remove FEMA from the Department of 
Homeland Security. As DHS is restructured in the new administration, separating 
FEMA from traditional emergency management might be a defining moment.  
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At the 2008 International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) meeting in 
Kansas City, the group coalesced around the idea of making FEMA a separate 
stand-alone department again (separate from DHS). There is evidence that law 
enforcement is trying to become a solo part of homeland security. And with this 
development, emergency management agencies think they should be separate too. 
I am seeing early signs of increasingly fractured homeland security planning focus 
at the local level. Disciplines want their money and they don't want to be bothered 
by anyone while they spend it.  
♦♦♦ 
FEMA will stay and remain with DHS. What the [Obama] transition team has 
realized is that if FEMA were removed from DHS, DHS would essentially become a 
law enforcement and counterterrorism agency. The result to both agencies and to 
the homeland security ecosystem would be less collaboration, less resiliency, less 
flexibility and greater turf issues and resources battles.  In fact, maybe DHS should 
become more FEMA-like.7 
♦♦♦ 
The question of "FEMA, in or out," has centered mainly on which bureaucratic 
organizational arrangement best serves the need for an effective agency to lead 
federal efforts to support state and local governments during major disasters. 
While it is apparent to me that FEMA and its representatives in the field will never 
again have either credibility or authority within either the interagency or 
intragovernmental worlds while buried deep within DHS, this is not the pivotal 
issue. The more important issue is to what degree does having FEMA in DHS 
detract from the secretary's primary role of preventing the next terrorist attack 
and protecting the nation? Having the secretary spending three nights in a joint 
field office during a major hurricane event, with a great probability of being unable 
to disengage because of the storm, and focused on hurricane behavior and levee 
construction makes no sense. Governor Napolitano should focus on her 
responsibilities for our protection and let the FEMA administrator deal with 
preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and mitigating the effects of any 
event, man-made or natural.  
The Good Things  
The lack of a major terrorist incident in the United States was a significant 
homeland security issue in 2008. 
♦♦♦ 
The top issue was that George W. Bush exited the world stage without getting any 
credit for keeping us safe for over seven years, and especially in the run-up to the 
2008 election where terrorists could have influenced the American public into 
voting for John McCain.  That would have provided better opportunities for them 
to fundraise against someone they have wrongly considered to be an evil president.  
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The response to the Gulf hurricanes (as well as the Midwest floods, and the 
Western wildfires) was considerably improved from past disasters. While not of 
the magnitude of Katrina, the level of coordination and response helped to restore 
the confidence in government to handle such problems.  
♦♦♦ 
The top story is the protection of our nation from dangerous people by effectively 
controlling the borders. DHS has strengthened the screening processes at border 
crossings to keep dangerous people out, yet balanced this so as not to hinder 
commerce and those who seek to come to the United States through legal 
channels.  
♦♦♦ 
A top story is the concept of having a deployable police force that can respond 
within or outside the state as the need arises. FEMA is studying the Illinois Law 
Enforcement Assistance System (ILEAS), which was used to deploy over 300 
officers to Katrina and 100 to the Republican national convention in St. Paul 
Minnesota. It is an exciting concept, and to my knowledge no other state has such 
a versatile law-enforcement group equipped and trained to respond as a single 
unit. As forest fires, floods, and other such events continue, deployable response 
forces from the states that can assist in the disaster will, I believe, grow in 
importance.   
♦♦♦ 
Private sector and personal preparedness are getting better. I think September as 
the DHS preparedness month is getting traction and it needs to catch on faster. 
 
♦♦♦ 
Homeland security has become more than a department or mission. It is a part of 
everyone's daily life. Even on cable TV, from the news to the food network, the 
need to take responsibility for protecting yourself and those around you has 
become the new culture. It has been a good thing.  
 
♦♦♦ 
Americans are more sophisticated and knowledgeable than they are sometimes 
given credit for. It seems that Americans still fear terrorist attacks, and support 
broad efforts at the local, state, and federal level to prevent them. But there does 
seem to be a sense that America must maintain its moral compass and not alienate 
itself from the rest of the world. Honesty by its government remains important, 
and being the leader by example of democratic principles for the world is still 
important. The emerging issue may be that Americans want strength against 
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terrorism. But evenhandedness in policy and government accountability is very 
important to Americans. 
The Threat: Are we more vulnerable now than we've been in the past 
decade? 
I believe we are more vulnerable now than we've been in the past decade. The 
administration change will reduce our capabilities, but even more important, our 
economic condition makes us an even more inviting target.  
♦♦♦ 
The Southern Border 
Mexican border security is the top homeland security issue. Currently Mexico is 
being destabilized by drug cartels. More than 4,000 people were killed in 2008 in 
Mexican drug wars. This leaves our southern border at risk. The instability of 
Mexico presents opportunities for safe havens for terrorists to emerge from our 
southern neighbor.  
♦♦♦ 
The escalating violence along the U.S. and Mexican border is a threat. Further 
excursions and continued drug violence may result in greater opportunities for 
terrorists and the inevitable presence of federal and military forces. I view border 
control as a priority focus for the next administration.  
♦♦♦ 
The top issue is the Mexican drug war and its possible nexus to terrorism.  
♦♦♦ 
The threat to the U.S. southern border by gangs working in cooperation with 
criminal organizations may become a concern relative to human smuggling as an 
avenue for terrorists to penetrate the U.S. 
♦♦♦ 
Violence in Mexico is an emerging threat. The U.S. does not seem overly concerned 
about our next-door neighbor's deteriorating security and the inability of the 
Mexican government to maintain a monopoly of force. The U.S. counter-narcotics-
focused policy for Mexico is inadequate to the task and replicates the disastrous 
mistakes made in Colombia during the 1990s. The U.S. spent billions of dollars in 
the counter-drug operations in Colombia without significant results in reducing 
drug trafficking or increasing security in that country. It was not until the U.S. 
government changed the focus of the policy to security and reestablishing the 
Colombian government's sovereignty over its territory (in 2001) that the situation 
was brought under control. Mexico has become the main avenue for drug 
trafficking into the United States. Therefore, there are billions of dollars in play, 
which is giving the traffickers the means to outman and outgun the Mexican 
government. If the present trends continue and the Mexican government loses 
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control of its northern border, the United States will have a major security 
challenge on its hands. An unstable border increases the potential for violence 
spilling over into the United States, provides smuggling opportunities to terrorists, 
and increases demand for security resources at the expense of other areas. The 
Merida Plan will not work until it focuses on increasing the capabilities of the 
Mexican government to reestablish sovereign control over its territory.  
Domestic Threats 
The top story of the year was U.S. citizens of Somali descent traveling to the corner 
of Africa to participate in jihad.  
♦♦♦ 
The top story was the growing radicalization of Muslim enclaves in the United 
States.  
♦♦♦ 
I feel that the prison radicalization of terrorists is an emerging threat to the U.S.A. 
These prisoners are locked up in our jails and then left there to be forgotten, "out 
of sight, out of mind." Only later do we find out they are being radicalized in our 
system. When they are released they are emboldened to cause terror in our 
communities. This must be dealt with sooner rather than later.  
♦♦♦ 
An emerging issue is the American born and bred terrorists like the KKK and 
paramilitary groups that will proliferate following the elevation to presidency of a 
black man. They are the next generation of Timothy McVeighs and Nazi skinheads.  
Cyber Threats 
Emerging to me means maybe we have known about it before, but it has never 
gone mainstream. I think nonviolent threats such as cyber attacks and financial 
influence for the purposes of creating fear are emerging homeland security issues.  
♦♦♦ 
Cyber security is the top issue in the most underreported story of homeland 
security today. There has been some press about the Chinese and quasi-
independent entity efforts to penetrate the United States government and private-
sector networks. Many of these efforts have been successful and represent a 
significant threat to homeland and national security. Given the fact that the U.S. is 
totally dependent on cyber technology to run the security, defense, economy, and 
infrastructure of the nation, there should be a major synchronized national effort 
to address vulnerabilities. The cyber realm offers tempting opportunities for 
sophisticated state and non-state actors to damage the U.S. in the physical, 
psychological, and economic domains. One needs only to look at Hollywood’s 
rendition of cyber warfare in the movie Live Free or Die Hard to imagine the 
potential damage that can be inflicted to our nation. Granted, there have been 
some government efforts in this area, but not the focus and resources that we place 
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on WMD or terrorist attacks. What keeps me awake at night is that these 
penetrations are not seeking to do damage now. Instead, they may be opening 
doors for future coordinated attack that may inflict severe damage on the nation. If 
we apply al Qaeda tactics to this domain, these penetrations could be seen as 
probes, reconnaissance before the big operation.  
♦♦♦ 
Information security is a top concern. Currently the United States government 
does not have a synchronized and unified means to secure the systems that enable 
all our command and control, operations, administration, and resource 
management for homeland security.  
♦♦♦ 
The cyber security issue is nearly as nebulous and complex as the environment in 
which it lives. It spans the intersection between the public and the private sectors.  
♦♦♦ 
Cyber security and critical infrastructure protection are issues that have received 
some attention, but I think they will be the next major issues for DHS. 
Threats from Other Nations 
Global issues other than terrorism are significant. Although terrorism is 
important, there are other longer-range issues we need to pay attention to, such 
as the emerging powers China and India. Russia is rearing its head too. Although 
these countries probably will not attack us, they do represent security concerns. 
They are shifting the balance of power. Proliferation of WMDs – materials and 
knowledge – is also a concern related to these countries, especially Russia. We 
may need Russia to help us counterbalance China one day.  
♦♦♦ 
American foreign and security policy and concerns tend to be shortsighted. While 
these are important, we need to look ahead to mid- to longer-range concerns as 
well. India, Russia, and China (especially) fall into this category. Space security is 
starting to emerge as an area of concern. More countries, some with WMD, are 
getting "up" there (in space).  What policies and strategies do we have? And also, 
how are we going to counterbalance China in the future as it is emerging as a 
"great” power? China is investing in Africa – an area we have long ignored. 
♦♦♦ 
A significant emerging trend is the continued evolution from the bipolar world of 
the Cold War to a post 9/11 "multi- bipolar" or even a "non-polar" world. This has 
resulted in a rise in the number of actors able to compete with or threaten the 
interests of the United States across the foreign and domestic divide in homeland 
defense and security. They range from great power nation states (emerging peer 
competitors), or even lesser nation states, to "sovereignty-free" actors (criminal, 
terror networks, super empowered groups, and super empowered individuals). 
BELLAVITA, CHANGING HOMELAND SECURITY 
  
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
21 
An example of the emerging capabilities of these new actors occurred with the 
Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. On the same day that the American 
president went on national television to voice support for Georgia against 
invasion by Russian conventional military forces, a criminal network believed to 
be operating from Russia was conducting cyber attacks against the Georgian 
government from computer servers located in United States. This action 
completely shattered any notion of a foreign-domestic divide in homeland 
defense and security.  
♦♦♦ 
Asymmetric wars, as opposed to asymmetric warfare, may be our greatest threat. 
With so many nations, factions, religions, and assorted scoundrels who hate the 
U.S., the possibility exists of combined nation state financial war, nation state 
traditional war, WMD by non-state actors, asymmetric warfare by non-state 
actors, all against the U.S. These will be wars that take advantage of the 
opportunity of mutual hatred and actions.  It could be a feeding frenzy on a much 
larger, but wounded shark.  
♦♦♦ 
The instability of Pakistan remains a top concern. Pakistan is important because 
we don't want to provoke another war; two fronts is enough. But we need to deal 
with the insurgents who use it as a staging area. This is a very tricky balancing 
act. We are being spread too thin in the Middle East. The strain is showing. We 
are on a precipice here, and we need to handle this one very carefully so we don't 
exacerbate our overextension, yet still maintain our security and our credibility.  
♦♦♦ 
A critical issue is the potential civil war or war between India and Pakistan. 
♦♦♦ 
The instability of Pakistan, while now a concern, is really just starting to emerge 
in its seriousness.  
♦♦♦ 
I believe that Russia and Venezuela partnering together is a potential problem for 
the U.S. The economic downturn may have temporarily mitigated this threat.  
♦♦♦ 
The stability of Iraq is a critical emerging issue for homeland security and is 
largely dependent upon the U.S. Army successfully mentoring the Iraqi security 
forces to operate under rule of law. The underlying issue here is the Army's ability 
to learn and use civilian law enforcement methods.  
♦♦♦ 
I really believe the threat (poison and hazards) posed by Chinese imports is 
bubbling under the surface. This is further amplified by the world economy. I 
believe our government – the FDA – is impotent to really do anything to correct 
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Chinese behavior because of the sheer volume of the imports, the low cost of 
products from China, and our insatiable appetite for cheap products.  
Public Health Threats 
A top homeland security related story for public health is the ongoing discussion of 
implementation of the Pandemic and All Hazards Preparedness Act. The Act will 
require a match and maintenance of funding support from the states for programs 
that had previously not required state funding support at any level. The 
implementation process has been awkward, with great resistance from the states. 
The maintenance of funding has a floating target that consists of the average of the 
funding from the previous two years. There is concern that the required match 
would then be rolled into the previous year's maintenance of funding numbers, 
requiring different match sources to be found. Discussions about these issues 
continue among ASTHO (Association of State and Territorial Health Officials), 
DHHS (Department of Health and Human Services), ASPR (Assistance Secretary 
for Preparedness and Response), and CDC (Centers for Disease Control), as well as 
staffers from Congress.  
♦♦♦ 
The FBI revelations related to the anthrax letter attacks count as a top homeland 
security issue for 2008. Considering this was the nation's sole data point for an 
actual bioterrorism event, it is highly significant that the attack originated from 
inside the U.S. bio defense apparatus. Added significance lies in the fact the event 
was perpetrated by a U.S. Army scientist responsible for the testing of the anthrax 
vaccine and that, according to the FBI, the motive was that the vaccine program 
was "failing" and about to be canceled at the time of the attacks. Considering these 
facts, the most compelling aspect of this event remains the fact that no one from 
the government has directed a review of the vaccine program as a result of the FBI 
revelations, but instead ordered more vaccine, which secures the story as the top 
homeland security issue of 2008 and likely the decade.  
♦♦♦ 
This problem is not exactly emerging, but it is still a big problem that is getting 
bigger: the public health and emergency health infrastructure of this nation is 
inadequate and it is shrinking every year. We don't have enough beds for a mass 
casualty incident involving tens of people. Hurricane Ike wiped out UTMB 
[University of Texas Medical Branch, at Galveston], the level one trauma center 
covering Texas City and Galveston. Should there be an event even a fraction of the 
size of the Texas City disaster, those casualties would need to be airlifted or driven 
fifty miles north to Houston for treatment. What other trauma centers are being 
lost due to budget issues, especially given the economic downturn?  
♦♦♦ 
I think the bioterror lab standard issue is going to loom large in the next year or 
two.  
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While threats from intentional use of traditional biological weapons (in particular 
anthrax) remain a concern, the dramatic increase in drug-resistant infectious 
diseases adds a different dimension to the bio threat. Such "hardened bugs" (e.g., 
MRSA, XDR-TB) present a potential threat to the nation (and beyond). This might 
come through a naturally emerging infection or through an intentional 
introduction of the pathogen as a terrorist weapon. In either case, the lack of novel 
antimicrobial therapy for these organisms is a concern and has significant 
homeland security implications. 
Other Threats 
The recently released WMD prevention report ["World at Risk: The Report of the 
Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism"8] cited 
rumors of the potential for a tactical nuclear weapons event on domestic soil. As 
this was the first government-related source I encountered that mentions the 
possibility, I believe this ranks up there as a significant emerging threat.  
♦♦♦ 
One thing emerging is the issue of pirate activity off the coast of Africa. If this 
catches on worldwide, it could have a significant impact on trade and a snowball 
effect with other industries (such as oil).  
♦♦♦ 
There remains a problem with small boats. It is especially related to the continued 
success of pirates and the increased successful use of semi-submersible vessels by 
drug smugglers. Success in both these areas could embolden terrorists to copy and 
use those tactics to attack the United States.  
♦♦♦ 
I believe that as the economic crisis continues domestic acts of piracy and sabotage 
will likely increase. Homeland security needs to pre-identify [those threat] 
patterns with an eye toward prevention and response.  
♦♦♦ 
The relationship among illegal immigration, extended economic upheaval, and 
unemployment are ingredients for a "recipe" of significant unrest and fear.  
♦♦♦ 
Seeing how Congress and DHS initially made common cause on chemical security 
issues, only to break ranks, highlights the lack of a consistent approach and the 
subordination of security issues to petty politics  
♦♦♦ 
From a local perspective, the top homeland security story was the terrorist 
firebombing attacks in Santa Cruz. Members of an animal rights group were the 
suspected perpetrators. This was a significant event for the area unrelated to 
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Muslim extremist organizations. And yet the attacks did not result in any 
significant alarm for the region.  
♦♦♦ 
Election security was the top issue. Based on the candidates, there was an 
increased potential for domestic attack intended to disrupt the presidential 
election. That attack did not happen. Why not?  
♦♦♦ 
An emerging issue is the implications of the potential encroachment of Sharia-
compliant banking into world economic systems, particularly our own. Our 
collective greed does not differentiate between sources of money, even when 
potentially threatening national security. Our own government is likely to be 
complicit in advancing this bastardized form of banking and therefore fall prey to 
the weaknesses it could exploit. The integration of religious zealotry with banking 
has potentially far-reaching implications: the implementation of subtle strategies 
to replace capitalism being one of them.  
The Culture of Preparedness: “Waiting Until We Bleed Again”  
I'm concerned about the incident attention syndrome – our inability to stay 
focused on the threats. I fear that we are just starting out on our journey with 
homeland security. Perhaps we will not start paying attention until we bleed again. 
♦♦♦ 
I think that the arrests and conviction of the individuals planning an attack at Fort 
Dix in New Jersey was the top homeland security-related story in 2008. It was a 
great example of the use of citizens as points of information, local police as 
information gatherers, and a federally-led task force to investigate and intercept 
the attackers before they could complete their plan.  
♦♦♦ 
While not widely reported, the fact that the terror alert color-coded level has been 
stuck on orange for the whole year in the absence of any specific threat makes a 
mockery of the entire system of alerts and citizen engagement in the so-called "war 
on terrorism." We need to change the war metaphor to "The Global Challenge of 
Terrorism."  
♦♦♦ 
Resiliency seems to be the emerging issue: both how to build resiliency and how to 
sustain resiliency for responder communities in the nation at large.  
♦♦♦ 
Based on discussions and meetings I've attended, the 2008 themes appears to be 
about building a culture of preparedness with a focus on improved resiliency. 
Building resiliency includes developing a disaster mental health focus as well as 
training and education for responder communities.  
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What have Americans been asked to sacrifice in combating terrorism at home and 
abroad?  
♦♦♦ 
The further we get away from 2001, the harder it is to get people to care about 
preparedness or spending time and money to make the nation more secure. We – 
the government – do a horrible job of conveying the message to the people that we 
need to stay vigilant, that we need to take preparedness activities to heart. It is a 
more basic problem than that: we have not figured out an effective way to get our 
message through to the public so that they will actually listen to what is being said 
and act accordingly. We do a good job of scaring people; so good that people are 
ignoring the message, or taking it very cynically. We need to find a way to 
effectively, realistically, and honestly convey the true risk so that people will 
believe it, understand what is in it for them, and take the appropriate action. Or 
perhaps we should just write off this generation and concentrate on the kids, just 
like we did with seatbelts and bike helmets.  
Meta Hazards – Things We Do To Ourselves  
The top issue has to do with economic security and infrastructure – water, food, 
and energy shortages. The implications of an economic fall due to a lack of food, 
energy, or water are huge. We need to do a better job of addressing these issues 
long-term.  
♦♦♦ 
Economic security and food, water, energy shortages: I think these issues have the 
potential to cause more harm than all forms of terrorism if they are not addressed.  
♦♦♦ 
The fluctuations in the price of oil, the continued instability in the Middle East, 
and the increasing maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa have highlighted the 
importance of energy security to U.S. national security and homeland security. The 
recent drop in oil prices will probably cause most Americans to forget about this 
threat and, unfortunately, the opportunity to rapidly develop alternatives to 
foreign oil imports may be lost.  
♦♦♦ 
Global warming may have a significant impact on our current all-hazards 
homeland security environment.  
♦♦♦ 
Climate change is the next top story. Its effects on our sources of energy, new 
international conflicts over natural resources, and migration flows due to sea level 
rise and desertification will have a direct effect on the security of the United States.  
♦♦♦ 
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The issue of water is in an embryonic state. Whatever the cause of climate changes, 
many large population centers, especially in California, are going to be defined by 
the utilization and access to water. As water becomes more contested, security of 
the homeland will be more tenuous.  
♦♦♦ 
The emerging issue will be natural disaster preparedness, mitigation, response, 
and recovery. I believe the severity of storms will increase because of climate 
warming.  
Funding Concerns 
A reemerging homeland security issue is the prioritization of funding for 
prevention, preparation, response, and recovery in an environment where 
available funds are decreasing. Threat analysis, needs assessments, and the 
prioritization of resource needs are becoming increasingly important.  
♦♦♦ 
The top story is the bastardization of the UASI [Urban Areas Security Initiative] 
program by successful law enforcement lobbyists at the federal level. Law 
enforcement lobbyists carved a 25 percent earmark for law enforcement in the 
UASI grant program by providing questionable information to grant guidance 
writers and to Congress. It never” made the papers" that, in many cases, this has 
had a negative impact at local levels.  
Professionalization of Homeland Security 
The top story is the absence of a professional development system for homeland 
security warriors that would serve to develop a homeland security culture and lead 
to the effective assimilation of the twenty-two disparate legacy agencies into a 
common culture, while recognizing differences in specific roles and missions 
(much as the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force have differences). At 
present there is no real capability for such a professional development system, 
despite some well-meaning efforts by the executive branch. For there to be a 
coherent homeland security culture, encompassing federal, state, local, and 
private-sector players, there must be a system developed that is based on 
established doctrine, education, training, and field and Washington experience. At 
present, Washington insiders and youthful staffers have developed plans, 
procedures, and doctrine based on a total absence of real world experience, 
understanding of how both the interagency and intergovernmental worlds actually 
work, and with an arrogance born of ignorance. In the military, admirals and 
generals become senior leaders and policymakers based on careers of field and 
headquarters experience and professional education, not totally on political 
affiliations. The development of such a [homeland security] system will not be 
accomplished overnight. It will require vision and commitment by Congress and 
the executive branch to make such a system a reality.  
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The Department of Defense failed again for the second straight year to use the $3.5 
million Congress approved to establish the nation's first homeland security and 
homeland defense PhD program. Failing to develop a credentialed cadre of 
competent leaders to educate the current and next generation of homeland 
security professionals may be the most profound strategic mistake made in 2008.  
Information and Intelligence 
Overall the term "information sharing" has become more of a buzzword than a 
reality. There are still too many competing efforts to share information between 
federal and “state and local” entities (state and local are not the same).  
♦♦♦ 
I believe information sharing and intelligence tops the list of homeland security 
concerns in 2008. Two examples include the lack of information sharing during 
the Democratic and Republican national conventions. An example of 
improvements needed in the intelligence field is the recent attacks in India. 
Similar attacks could happen anywhere in the U.S.A.  
♦♦♦ 
The tragedies of 911 have meant the world now has a dramatically different view of 
national security. Governments must recognize the critical need to share and 
disseminate information, particularly spatial information across agencies and 
jurisdictions both efficiently and economically.  
♦♦♦ 
I believe there is a critical misunderstanding about the value of information 
sharing among government as well as private agencies. The lack of communication 
has reached critical mass.  
♦♦♦ 
The top story is the admission by the Maryland State police that they improperly 
conducted surveillance on activists in Maryland. The lawsuits that result from this 
issue could have national implications for the operation of state and local 
intelligence units nationwide. It is not a nationwide story yet, but it will be when 
the legal proceedings get underway.  
Critical Infrastructure: Jobs and Security 
A significant aspect of President Obama's economic stimulus plan is to request 
Congress appropriate hundreds of billions of dollars towards revitalizing the 
nation's infrastructure. While much of this money will be devoted to improving 
existing infrastructure, new energy-conserving and environmentally friendly 
projects are also being proposed. This program may have positive results for the 
nation's economy and critical infrastructure viability.  But it is conceivable that 
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these same efforts could introduce predictable and unforeseen homeland security 
challenges.  
♦♦♦ 
The projected investment in infrastructure renewal by the new administration 
should be planned in accordance with prioritized national critical infrastructure 
and security concerns. The concern is not to haphazardly push funding projects for 
the sake of stimulating the economy.  
Criminal Justice and Homeland Security 
I feel the top homeland security issue is the inability to identify what the 
differences are between terrorism and criminal activity and how to deal with 
people who are involved.  
♦♦♦ 
I think there is going to be a very clear nexus between domestic criminal activity 
(such as fraud, identity theft, and narcotics trafficking) and terrorist activity. 
Separating the two activities would be a mistake since important indicators may be 
missed during investigations.  
♦♦♦ 
The top issue is how to deal with detainees held at Guantánamo Bay. Any method 
of dealing with these folks, whether bringing them to the United States for trial or 
returning them to their native countries, will have substantial homeland security 
implications.  
♦♦♦ 
Risk management continues to be an emerging issue. Risk management is the 
process of identifying, analyzing, assessing, and communicating risk and 
accepting, avoiding, transferring, or controlling it to an acceptable level at an 
acceptable cost. Homeland security risks are complex and cross-cutting. No single 
entity is able to effectively balance these risks independently. Instead risk 
management depends on being able to integrate a wide range of homeland security 
activities. In most cases, there are no integrated frameworks in place to ensure a 
collaborative approach to the analysis, assessment, and management of risks.  
♦♦♦ 
An emerging issue within law enforcement is the standards the National Tactical 
Officers Association has promoted for SWAT teams. These "national standards" 
will eliminate SWAT teams in small- to medium-sized jurisdictions, unless there is 
regionalization, which is fraught with political, training, equipment, response time, 
and procedural challenges. The elimination of these small SWAT teams will affect 
homeland security when an event is well outside a large metropolitan or UASI 
area.  
♦♦♦ 
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Security clearances for non-law-enforcement personnel continue to be an issue.  
The absence of clearances limits information sharing. The goal of timely clearances 
needs to be achieved to allow better review of information by affected agencies. 
THE IMAGE OF HOMELAND SECURITY 
This review of homeland security in 2008 closes with three graphics that are candidates 
for the Homeland Security Image of the Year. The first image portrays in strikingly non-





Source: Booz Allen Hamilton, Mission Blueprint (Washington, DC: DHS Office of Operations 
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The second picture, from a RAND study, depicts the current U.S. domestic intelligence 
enterprise. It is an image to be viewed, for the aims of this article, more for its 
complexity than its detail. The report from which it is derived, along with a very 











The final picture is the Transportation Security Administration's visualization of its 
twenty layers of security.  Additional information about the logic behind the strategy is 
also available elsewhere.11 
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ONE LAST LOOK AT 2008 
As noted in last year's review,12 a tag cloud is an image that displays a set of words.  The 
size of each word is proportional to the frequency with which it appears. The bigger the 
word in the cloud, the more frequently it appeared in the article. The following tag cloud 
depicts the semantic field created from the responses to this year's survey.13 It 
represents one integrated perception of homeland security in the year 2008. You are 
invited to construct, and share, your own story. 
 
“Every person takes the limits of their own field of vision for the limits of the world.”  
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1 The seventy-four people who responded to this survey included graduates and current participants in the 
Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security’s (CHDS) master’s degree and 
executive leaders programs, CHDS faculty, Mobile Education Team members, NPS staff, and other people 
who periodically participate in CHDS homeland security activities.  In large measure they are the authors 
of this review, and I am the amanuensis.  However, none of the people who participated in this survey are 
responsible for my interpretations of their responses; nor do their observations necessarily represent 
anything other than their personal, not their official, views. 
2 Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, World at Risk: The Report of the 
Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism (Vintage., 
2008). 
3 See “Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at the 2008 End of the Year Address,” 
at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1229632529576.shtm.  
4 D. Boyd, L. Dunn, L., and others, Why Have We Not Been Attacked Again? Competing and 
Complementary Hypotheses for Homeland Attack Frequency. Defense Threat Reduction Agency and 
Science Applications International Corporation (June 2008).  
5 Chertoff, Remarks. 
6 Topics not mentioned include the sentencing of Jose Padilla, Amtrak’s and Washington Metro’s decision 
to randomly screen carry on baggage, the DNI threat assessment about al Qaeda’s improved ability to 
attack within the United States by recruiting and training new operatives, organizational clashes between 
the FBI and the New York City police department over counterterrorism programs, political 
accommodations in the REAL ID program, the appointment of Kenneth Wainstein as the president’s 
homeland security adviser (replacing Frances Townsend), changes in the terrorist watch list, the release of 
more information about the legal opinions that informed the first years of the Bush administration’s 
terrorism strategy, states and cities objecting to federal security funding program emphasis on terrorism, 
successes and difficulties with constructing the fence along the Mexican border, an American Association 
of State Highway and Transportation Officials report indicating that one in four American bridges need 
major repairs or upgrades, the delay of the proposed Air Force cyberspace command, an active duty Army 
brigade assigned to NORTHCOM, a conviction in the Holy Land Foundation trial, unsafe produce, Google 
using web searches to track the spread of flu activity, and homeland security set to become a reality 
television show in January.  There are many other topics that could have been covered.  It was a busy year. 
7 This “response” was not generated by the survey.  Someone who interviewed a member of the transition 
team brought it to my attention.  I included it in this section for its unique insight into the FEMA and 
DHS issue. 
8 Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, World at Risk. 
9 CORRECTION, February 9, 2009: Thank you to Derek Rieksts for providing the source information for 
this diagram, which is from a 2006-2007 study, Mission Blueprint,  commissioned from Booz Allen 
Hamilton by the Office of Operations Coordination (OPS) at the Department of Homeland Security. 
10 Gregory F. Treverton, Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence: Assessing the Options (Washington, 
DC: RAND, October 20008), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG767/    
11 Kip Hawley, “Strengthening Security Through a Layered Approach,” Layers of Security: What We Do 
(TSA Website), http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/index.shtm.  
12 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: The Year in Review — 2007,” Homeland Security 
Affairs IV, no. 1 (January 2008), http://www.hsaj.org/?article=4.1.1R  
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13 The list used for the 2008 tag cloud was refined by eliminating common words (e.g., “is,” “the”) and 
words not directly related to homeland security (such as “ago,” “biggest,” “recently,” et al.).  I also 
eliminated the term “Homeland Security” since it appeared so frequently.  The cloud was produced from 
the online resources at http://www.tagcrowd.com. 
 
Beyond the HSC/NSC Merger: Integrating States and Localities 
into Homeland Security Policymaking  
Paul N. Stockton 
 
The Obama administration has the opportunity to fix a crippling flaw in the homeland 
security policymaking process. When President Bush established the Homeland Security 
Council (HSC) to develop policies and integrate U.S. homeland security institutions, 
White House officials emphasized the importance of including state and local 
government representation in the council. Their inclusion is vital. Homeland security 
fundamentally differs from national security in that states and localities play the leading 
role in many homeland security missions, as opposed to federal agencies. Yet the Bush 
administration ended up excluding state and local representatives from the HSC and 
built only weak mechanisms to include their input in Department of Homeland Security 
policymaking. That exclusion helped produce a string of failures in policy development 
and institutional integration. Now, regardless of whether President Obama decides to 
merge the HSC with the National Security Council (NSC), he has the opportunity to 
make a vital change: the creation of an effective, institutionalized way for states and 
localities to help shape the policies and programs they implement. 
Merging the NSC and HSC is not without risk. I argue that if the councils are 
combined, administration officials will need to pay special attention to the span of 
control issues raised by the merger and the danger that homeland security will take a 
back seat to traditional national security priorities. I also argue that integrating 
homeland security across the federal bureaucracy – that is, horizontal integration – 
poses unique challenges that a merged council would need to address.  
These problems will be relatively easy to solve, however, compared to the challenge of 
building effective vertical integration between a merged council and state and local 
governments. The National Security Council system never created a mechanism to 
provide for state and local input into security policymaking, because those levels of 
government played virtually no role in providing for national security. The Bush 
administration recognized the need to create such mechanisms for homeland security. I 
will argue, however, that the administration left behind a homeland security system that 
is fundamentally mismatched with the leading roles that states and localities play in 
protecting the United States from all hazards. Scholars and policymakers have only 
begun to examine how to take better advantage of state and local expertise in the 
policymaking process, and include those levels of government not only in shaping the 
details of plans and programs, but the overall strategies and priorities that will guide 
homeland security for years to come. I examine a range of options to institutionalize 
such a role, regardless of whether the HSC and NSC merge, and propose criteria to help 
policymakers chose between them.  
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THE PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION 
President George W. Bush’s creation of the HSC in 2002 was part of much broader 
change in the way the United States is organized for security. Before 9/11, the 
Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) were largely responsible for U.S. security and were coordinated by the National 
Security Council. After 9/11, Bush built a parallel security system to protect the United 
States from terrorist attack. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is only part of 
that system. The Bush administration has also assigned terrorism prevention functions 
to the Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Health and Human Services, Interior, and 
over a score of other federal institutions that have never before played such significant 
roles in securing the United States from attack.1 Bush established the Homeland 
Security Council to direct and coordinate this far-flung security system, led by the 
assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism.2   
Numerous recent studies argue that the next president should subsume the 
Homeland Security Council (HSC) in the National Security Council (NSC), and 
strengthen the way the White House develops U.S. policy and oversees its execution.3  
Merger advocates focus on two problems with the Bush-era council system. The first 
problem lies in the weakness and understaffing of the HSC compared to the NSC. When 
President Bush created the HSC, White House officials said it would have a staff 
comparable in size to the NSC, with the authority and political backing from the 
president to coordinate the agencies under its purview.4 The HSC actually ended up with 
a staff one-fifth the size of the NSC’s and had to labor under much more stringent 
budget and salary constraints.5 Whether or not the councils are merged, the staff 
responsible for homeland security issues needs to be adequately sized and resourced.   
The second problem lies in the integration of the domestic and international 
components of security policy. Merger advocates contend that by creating two councils 
and their supporting staffs, the White House has bifurcated its approach to national 
security issues, even though the issues themselves frequently hinge on interrelated 
domestic and international factors.6 Effective policy integration across domestic and 
international lines is indeed essential, and merging the staffs would be a good way to 
facilitate such integration. But if President Obama were to keep the HSC independent, 
closer policy integration would still be possible. The NSC and National Economic 
Council (NEC) forged an effective collaborative relationship across their respective 
jurisdictional lines during the Clinton administration. Nothing precludes the NSC and 
HSC from building an equally effective relationship, as long as President Obama and his 
homeland and national security advisers make doing so a priority. 
However, merger advocates have focused far less attention on the integration 
problems the HSC was created to solve – problems that pose especially urgent 
challenges today. Those challenges lie in the integration of homeland security efforts 
across the federal bureaucracy and between federal, state, and local governments.   
Horizontal Integration 
When President Bush created the HSC on October 29, 2001, he tasked it to “ensure 
coordination of all homeland security-related activities among executive departments 
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and agencies,” as well as promote the effective development and implementation of 
homeland security policies.7 The council retained that coordination responsibility even 
after Congress and the president established the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). Indeed, in creating DHS, Congress codified the existence of the HSC into law 
and specified its responsibility for “effectively coordinating the policies and interests of 
the United States government relating to homeland security” and other functions as 
directed by the president.8  
Congress and the president had good reason to assign that coordination 
responsibility to the HSC. The federal homeland security system consists of an 
astounding number of institutions. Over thirty departments and independent agencies 
perform homeland security functions, creating an almost limitless array of interagency 
seams and coordination requirements.9 Making the HSC responsible for meeting these 
coordination challenges, rather than putting dozens of new agencies under the purview 
of the National Security Council, limited the risk that the national security advisor 
would be overwhelmed by span-of-control problems. Merging the two councils would 
bring span-of-control issues to the fore once again.   
The novelty of the security functions performed by these thirty institutions creates 
further problems for interagency planning and coordination. Until 9/11, departments 
such as USDA had never served significant security functions; now they play critical 
roles in protecting U.S. populations and infrastructure from attack. Melding the new 
security responsibilities of these agencies into an integrated system creates innovation 
challenges quite different from those posed by the departments overseen by NSC, which 
have been handling security issues for decades. The institutions under the Homeland 
Security Council’s purview also share a distinctive internal problem the National 
Security Council’s departments lack. DOD, the CIA and the State Department focus 
almost exclusively on security-related issues. Departments such as DHS, USDA and 
DOJ must not only help secure the United States from attack, but also perform their 
traditional domestic functions unrelated to (and sometimes in funding and 
programmatic competition with) their post-9/11 responsibilities. The NSC has never had 
to deal with such difficult intra-agency tradeoffs between security and non-security 
functions.  Yet agency tradeoffs will need special attention as the Obama administration 
builds its homeland security policies, especially as budget pressures intensify conflicts 
over agency priorities.  
This is not to argue that the HSC has been fully successful in meeting its federal 
coordination responsibilities. The Obama administration has inherited an array of 
unresolved conflicts over department roles and responsibilities for homeland security, 
including disputes between DHS and the Department of Justice over terrorism 
prevention and response;10 between DHS and the Department of Energy over preparing 
cities against nuclear or radiological attack,11 and – more recently – over which agency 
should have primary responsibility to safeguard U.S. bioterrorism research facilities 
from rogue employees.12 The administration has also inherited significant gaps in 
interagency planning for pandemics and other catastrophic incidents.   
Merging the NSC and HSC will not automatically solve any of these coordination 
problems. On the contrary: unless the administration takes special care to avoid span-
of-control problems for the national security advisor, providing sufficient attention and 
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political leverage to resolve agency turf wars and build a better integrated system will 
become more difficult. Those problems are eminently solvable. For example, if the 
merged council includes a deputy advisor for homeland security and counterterrorism, 
ensuring that the deputy has direct access to and strong support from the president for 
dealing with such issues will greatly aid in their resolution. It is far less clear, in 
contrast, how Congress and the Obama administration should fix the most serious 
failing of the HSC system: the integration of federal, state, and local homeland security 
efforts.  
Vertical Integration and the Paradox of Homeland Security 
The need for integration between different levels of government represents a crucial 
difference between homeland security and national security issues, and between the 
coordination challenges confronting the HSC and NSC. National security policies rarely 
depend on state and local implementation; DOD and other federal departments carry 
them out. In contrast, state and local governments (and police, firefighters, public 
health workers, and other professionals they employ) are absolutely vital to homeland 
security, making vertical coordination more important as a consequence.  
The two policy realms also differ in the president’s authority to solve coordination 
problems.  Scholars are fond of noting how little de facto control the president exercises 
over the federal bureaucracy.13 Nevertheless, in the national security system, where the 
primary coordination challenge lies in integrating the work of DOD, the State 
Department and the CIA, the chief executive – i.e., the president – exercises at least 
formal authority over that system and can fire department heads who resist 
coordination. The political context of homeland security is very different. Governors do 
not work for the president. They are independently elected and are the sovereign chief 
executives of their states. Homeland security thus entails a paradox. The integration 
between federal, state, and local governments is vastly more important in the homeland 
security system than in its national security counterpart. Yet the president has 
remarkably little authority to impose such vertical integration, especially in comparison 
with his command over national security institutions.     
The Bush administration sought to deal with this paradox when it created the 
Homeland Security Council. In late September 2001, then-White House Chief of Staff 
Andrew Card promised that state and local governments would be represented on the 
council.14 That representation would help the HSC bring state and local perspectives to 
bear on building an integrated homeland security system, and would give states and 
localities a say over the plans and programs they would need to implement. Including 
state and local representatives also offered a politically astute way to compensate for the 
president’s lack of command authority over them. By making states and localities party 
to the decisions the HSC hammered out, the White House could also increase the 
likelihood that they would support those policies. 
The Bush administration’s fulfillment of this pledge on state and local representation 
fared even worse than its promise of robust HSC staffing. Bush did establish a 
President’s Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC) to make recommendations to 
the HSC and included state and local officials in that panel, along with private sector 
leaders, academics, and myriad other participants.15 The HSAC has issued a number of 
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insightful policy recommendations, including ones that highlight the need for stronger 
integration in the homeland security system.16 But those recommendations are purely 
advisory and the HSAC lacks any authority over HSC decisions that would affect its state 
and local members.   
In the absence of effective mechanisms for vertical integration within the HSC, the 
Department of Homeland Security took on increased responsibility to integrate state 
and local efforts with federal policymaking. The Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination and Preparedness gave the first secretary of DHS, Governor Tom Ridge, 
an organization thoroughly dedicated to building effective vertical collaboration.  
Ridge’s successor, Michael Chertoff, abolished that office and assigned its functions to a 
DHS Grants and Training organization with many other responsibilities.17 Yet, the 
Obama administration has inherited problems for state and local integration that go 
beyond organizational wiring diagrams. The most important problem is that DHS never 
built a sustained, institutionalized approach to giving states and localities a voice in the 
policies they would implement. The development of the National Response Framework 
(NRF) is a case in point. The NRF is the key plan for melding federal, state, and local 
agencies into a disaster response system more effective than the one that 
catastrophically failed in Hurricane Katrina. DHS officials invited state and local 
representatives to help shape the initial NRF draft, then totally cut them out of the 
revision process (during which DHS officials made drastic changes), only to reverse 
course and invite them back into the process when faced with congressional hearings on 
their exclusion.18 The Bush administration then failed to meet statutory requirements to 
provide for state and local coordination as further revisions go forward.19  
Similarly ad hoc practices have hobbled other DHS policy development efforts, with 
predictable consequences for programmatic effectiveness. Across an array of initiatives, 
the Bush administration permitted only limited and sporadic state and local input, 
producing federal policies and programs that conflict with the requirements of the non-
federal agencies crucial to the success of those policies and programs. The Homeland 
Security Information Network (HSIN) typifies the results of this flawed process. The 
network is DHS’ key system for sharing homeland security data with states and localities 
and was supposed to be relied on by state and local officials nationwide. Yet DHS did 
not coordinate with those officials to develop effective joint policies and procedures, 
integrate HSIN with existing information sharing systems, and ensure the network 
would meet state and local requirements.20 DHS is now replicating the same 
coordination mistakes in its effort to replace the failed network with the HSIN Next 
Generation program.21  Similar coordination failures have produced gaps in U.S. plans 
for preparedness against pandemic flu;22 for integrating federal, state and local response 
efforts against nuclear attack;23 and for an array of other plans and programs.24 The 
overall assessment provided by the National Sheriffs’ Association, the National 
Emergency Management Association, and a dozen other nationwide associations 
representing state and local homeland security concerns: the federal government 
follows “top down” approaches to policymaking that are “uncoordinated and create 
unintended negative cascading effects.”25 
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SOLVING THE PROBLEMS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION: NOVEL 
APPROACHES TO AN UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE 
The Obama administration can only provide for better-integrated policies, plans, and 
programs by institutionalizing a role for states and localities in shaping them. A variety 
of means exist for representatives of state and local governments to play this role either 
in the HSC or in a merged council, including the use of mechanisms authorized by the 
Intergovernmental Personnel Act.26 Three problems, however, must be overcome to 
make such a system work.   
The first is cultural. Placing state and local representatives in the merged National 
Security Council would, at least initially, produce a bizarre clash of political cultures and 
professional competencies. NSC staffers are vastly more likely to know the name of the 
president of Georgia (abroad) than the governor of Georgia (at home). That is a good 
thing. The NSC staff has enormous expertise in dealing with international security 
issues, and Russia’s military incursion into Georgia is a reminder of how dangerous a 
place the world remains.   
But the state of Georgia also involves policy challenges of great importance. Georgia’s 
cities face threats of catastrophic hurricanes and other natural hazards. Mohammed 
Atta took flying lessons in Georgia before applying those skills to kill thousands of 
Americans.27 To protect against both types of threats, it will be essential for the Obama 
administration to build more effectively integrated local, state, and federal capabilities 
for homeland security. A merged council would need to be staffed with professionals 
who speak fluent “state and local,” and for whom a governor’s sovereignty is second 
nature rather than an oddity to maneuver around. 
A second and more serious problem is that of state and local capacity to provide 
representatives. Unlike the Department of Defense, state and local homeland security 
organizations lack a “float” of personnel who are not currently engaged in operations 
and can be assigned to other duties. Governors, mayors, and county executives need 
their homeland security staff available on a sustained basis; there is very little excess 
capacity to spare for other purposes. The solution – more easily said than done in 
current budgetary times – is to build that capacity so that state and local representatives 
could serve in the White House on a rotating basis. Given the importance of providing 
for state and local input into homeland security policy, that ought to become a federal 
priority, just has DHS has supported state capacity building for intelligence.  
That brings us to the third and thorniest question: how state and local personnel 
would be selected to help shape policy in the White House. A broad range of associations 
that represent state and local governments and agencies – from the National League of 
Cities, to the National Association of County Executives, to the Governors’ Homeland 
Security Advisors Council – have called for a stronger, more institutionalized role for 
those levels of government in shaping homeland security policy.28 But none of these 
associations has yet specified how that role ought to be structured, or how state and 
local representatives ought to be chosen. That question is crucial. With over 80,000 
state and local jurisdictions in the Untied States, representing all such jurisdictions in 
the White House is a non-starter. Moreover, on many issues – most notably that of 
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federal grant distribution – states, localities, and the associations that represent 
different first responder agencies frequently clash over homeland security issues.     
The November 2008 report by the Project on National Security Reform has offered 
the most fully-developed proposal to date for the selection process.  That report suggests 
that under a merged “President’s Security Council,” a homeland security collaboration 
committee would be established to provide for vertical integration. The president would 
appoint six of the fourteen members of this committee; four each would be provided by 
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, and four by the 
House Committee on Homeland Security.29  That proposal has the virtue (and vices) of 
“kicking the can down the road.” The question of which representatives of state and 
local governments to select would be left to legislators and the president, rather than 
specifying up front the criteria that would be used in that selection process.  
I propose a different approach, which offers a different mix of advantages and 
disadvantages. The Homeland Security Advisory Council that President Bush 
established in 2002 was limited in its impact not only by its lack of authority, but also by 
Bush’s insistence that he select the council’s members. It seems reasonable that the 
president would have final say over who serves on his White House staff. However, it 
would also be desirable to have him select from a pool of candidates selected by states 
and localities. Following that path would bring a more fully-representative perspective 
to bear on policymaking, and would be more likely to ensure state and local buy-in of 
the policies their representatives helped develop.   
To create the pool of candidates, the Obama administration might capitalize on the 
fact that states and localities have already organized into associations to build consensus 
amongst their members and represent their views. These associations are uniquely well-
positioned to judge the professional excellence of potential candidates. Of course, the 
associations can be counted on to bring conflicting preferences to bear on White House 
policymaking, just as they do in seeking to influence congressional decision making on 
grant assistance and other homeland security issues. But since 9/11, those associations 
have also engaged in far more collaborative work than ever before, starting with the 
creation of the National Homeland Security Consortium. That Consortium has united to 
call for a stronger state and local role in homeland security policymaking. Now is the 
time to embrace that recommendation and restructure the U.S. policymaking system to 
meet the unique integrative challenges of homeland security.  
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Merging the HSC and NSC: Stronger Together 
Christine Wormuth and Jeremy White 
At the federal level, homeland security is inherently and fundamentally an interagency 
undertaking. The quality of interagency relationships and processes is central to the 
success or failure of federal – and national – homeland security activities. Short of 
giving a single Cabinet secretary directive authority over other Cabinet secretaries 
during major domestic incidents (which is unlikely given traditional forms of American 
government) the only way to ensure effective unity of effort at the federal level is to 
exercise strong leadership from the White House. This kind of leadership is needed not 
just during an actual catastrophe but also when the government is engaged in the day-
to-day activities of working to prevent, protect against, and prepare for such 
catastrophes. In recent years the White House has not played this role, in large part 
because of the bifurcation of national security issues into a National Security Council 
and a Homeland Security Council. One of the most important and most necessary 
changes the new administration should make is to merge these organizations into a 
single council with a largely shared professional staff. This newly merged Council should 
exercise forceful leadership on behalf of the president of the United States in developing 
homeland security strategy and policy and should closely oversee its implementation.  
Why a Merger is Needed 
There are three main reasons that the existing Homeland Security Council (HSC) and its 
staff have not been particularly effective. The first, and perhaps most important, is 
structural: by establishing a separate council and associated staff to address homeland 
issues, the White House artificially bifurcated its approach to national security issues, 
although the issues themselves frequently have both domestic and international aspects 
that are interrelated. For example, effectively combating terrorism involves targeting 
terrorists and their support networks overseas, but also addressing the potential for 
radicalization of individuals inside the United States.  Effectively addressing 21st century 
security challenges requires an integrated approach that considers both sides of a given 
problem – but such an approach is very difficult to achieve when two different 
organizations inside the White House are involved. Both council staffs work in the Old 
Executive Office Building, but they share little more than a mailing address. Each 
council has a different organizational structure, each staff reports to a different adviser 
to the president, and each has its own executive secretariat, with separate systems for 
convening meetings and designating lead directorates on specific issues. The two council 
staffs don’t even work on the same e-mail system: while the NSC staff does most of its 
work on the classified e-mail system, the HSC staff works mostly on the “low side,” or 
the unclassified network. Some coordination between the two staffs does take place, but 
it occurs largely through the initiative of individual staff members, who must overcome 
the hurdles presented by the bifurcated structure. 
A second major reason for the ineffectiveness of the HSC on many issues is 
organizational: it is relatively weak, particularly compared to the NSC. A host of dry, 
technical personnel and budget issues have contributed significantly to this problem. 
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Unlike the NSC and its staff, the HSC and its staff do not constitute a separate 
organization inside the Executive Office of the President; as a result, HSC personnel 
numbers count against the overall personnel ceiling for White House staff and so there 
is pressure to minimize the size of the HSC organization. While the NSC has more than 
240 staff members, the HSC on average has only forty-five.1 Moreover, as a consequence 
of HSC’s administrative status within the Office of the President, the council does not 
have its own budget, which places a tight salary cap on the staff. Although HSC staff 
members have significant responsibility and work extremely long hours, even the 
highest paid among them earn less than senior GS-15 civil servants elsewhere in 
government. This salary gap has added to the difficulty of recruiting the best and 
brightest to the HSC organization – a task that was already challenging, because the 
HSC is seen as having less stature than the NSC. As a result, many more HSC than NSC 
staffers have backgrounds in political campaigns rather than in national and homeland 
security issues, and frequently they are less experienced overall than their NSC peers. 
Finally, the HSC has not been particularly effective in its efforts either to lead the 
interagency in developing core strategy and guidance on homeland security issues (such 
as developing an interagency deliberate planning process) or in overseeing 
implementation of policies once they are developed (such as the range of documents and 
processes called for in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on National 
Preparedness that was signed out in 2004).  This lack of success can be partly attributed 
to the HSC’s relatively small and inexperienced staff, but it is also associated with the 
explicit preference shown by the Bush Administration for “the lead agency approach,” 
which focuses the NSC and HSC staffs primarily on coordination rather than 
development of strategy and policy.2 Historically, some presidents have structured the 
NSC to take a greater leadership role in driving foreign and national security policy; 
others have used the NSC primarily as a coordinating body.3 However, as security 
challenges become increasingly complex, and as extensive capabilities must be 
integrated from across the entire federal government, the lead agency model clearly will 
prove inadequate in many cases. During the Bush Administration, the Department of 
Homeland Security has served as the lead agency for most major homeland security 
initiatives, but in the absence of firm backing from the White House and an HSC with 
the power to quash bureaucratic disagreements, DHS has typically expended a great 
deal of its efforts on intramural struggles within the executive branch.4   
What a Merged Council Would Look Like 
Merging the two councils is the first step the new administration can take toward 
creating significantly more unity of effort in government efforts to prevent, prepare for, 
and respond to a catastrophe. A newly unified NSC and staff should be empowered to 
lead the interagency in formulating homeland security policy and overseeing its 
implementation on behalf of the president of the United States. To effect this merger, 
President Obama will need to ask Congress to amend the Homeland Security Act of 
2002 by eliminating sections 901 through 906 of the law, which essentially establish the 
Homeland Security Council as a distinct organization.5 Unifying the Homeland Security 
Council and National Security Council organizations would also require amending the 
National Security Act of 1947 to make the secretary of homeland security and attorney 
general permanent members of the NSC. The current practice of inviting other Cabinet 
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heads to NSC meetings as appropriate to the specific substantive issues under 
consideration should continue. 
The unified National Security Council would be led by the national security adviser 
(NSA) to the president, as is the case today, but the NSA would have two deputies – a 
deputy for international affairs and a deputy for domestic affairs. The national security 
adviser already holds one of the most grueling jobs in Washington, bearing the 
responsibility for a vast array of issues. Merging the two councils and their staffs would 
clearly add to this burden, but that disadvantage is more than outweighed by the 
benefits of addressing security issues holistically at the White House level. Assigning all 
security issues to a single national security adviser will ensure that the NSA has 
sufficient authority to resolve conflicts between Cabinet heads, particularly during times 
of crisis. Moreover, the two deputies would help lessen the challenge for the NSA of 
dealing with such a broad span of duties. These deputies would also need to be of 
sufficient stature to work effectively with top government officials, up to and including 
the level of Cabinet secretaries. During the Bush administration there have been as 
many as five positions labeled “deputy NSA” at one time; limiting their number to two 
would give the office more importance, bringing its holders much closer to being true 
seconds-in-command to the NSA. Moreover, should the international and domestic 
aspects of a problem seem to give rise to conflicting solutions or to require trade-offs, a 
single national security adviser with authority over the entire spectrum of issues will be 
positioned to weigh all elements and make a balanced recommendation to the president. 
Under the current model, the president has no single adviser whose job it is to weigh the 
competing domestic and international aspects of a problem and render an impartial 
judgment – overcoming the disagreements of Cabinet members, if necessary.  
Under the merged council construct, with a single NSA and two deputy NSAs, much 
of the NSC staff would be shared and would report to both deputies. Some staffers might 
report only to one deputy, depending on their responsibilities. While President Obama 
should merge the two councils and their staffs, care should be taken to ensure that the 
“new” NSC organization complements its traditional national security expertise with 
senior staff who fully understand and possess considerable experience in catastrophe 
prevention, critical infrastructure protection, preparedness, response, and recovery 
issues. A merged council that is staffed only with traditional national security experts 
will not be effective at developing homeland security policy and guidance and would 
largely defeat the purpose of the merger. 
Not only should the merged council include significant staff with expertise in 
homeland security disciplines, the council also should include staff that provide state 
and local government perspectives to ensure greater integration of these issues at the 
federal level. The National Security Education Program codified in Executive Order 
13434 provides a mechanism to bring individuals with these backgrounds on to the 
merged council staff. Through the National Security Professional Development 
Program, senior state and local officials could join the council staff for a year to serve a 
detail assignment at the NSC. Under this type of program, senior people serving in the 
counterterrorism division of the New York City Police Department could spend a year at 
the White House, working in the merged council. This type of a rotational approach 
would also create opportunities for professionals at the federal level to serve in key 
positions in state and local governments, enabling them to use those experiences to 
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inform their work when they return to the federal government. Although achieving these 
kinds of opportunities presents a host of bureaucratic challenges, their achievement 
would be a major step toward creating a truly “joint” homeland security workforce with 
vertical and horizontal integration that would enhance national preparedness. 
In addition to integrating state and local perspectives at the staff level, there are other 
means of infusing these perspectives into policy-making at the White House level. The 
next president could reinstate the Homeland Security Advisory Council established to 
provide advice and counsel to the Executive Office of the President. Re-establishing this 
council would be another way to craft sensible homeland security policies and create 
greater buy-in for these policies outside the Beltway. To avoid charges of drawing only 
on the “usual suspects” at the state and local level for input, the next president should 
allow organizations like the National Governors Association (NGA), the U.S. Conference 
of Mayors, and the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) to choose 
some of the members of the advisory council. Creating  new opportunities for state and 
local representatives to provide input into policy development at the federal level geared 
toward implementing a national integrated homeland security system would not only 
help to increase the feeling of ownership of new policies, but would also generate better 
understanding at the federal level of how homeland security needs vary by state and 
region. 
What a Merged Council Would Do 
Whatever the specific organization chosen by President Obama, to generate greater 
unity of effort the new unified National Security Council must play a much more 
prominent role in developing strategy and policy, and in overseeing the implementation 
of that policy, than either the NSC or HSC has done under the current administration. 
As integrated approaches to address future security challenges are developed, the roles 
of all relevant Cabinet agencies will not be equal. Some strategies may require that 
departments take responsibilities that are outside their traditional comfort zones; some 
resources may have to be shifted from one department to another. To ensure that clear 
policies are developed, difficult decisions are made, and turf battles are decisively 
resolved, a robust and unified NSC must act as honest broker and be empowered to 
carry out presidential decisions once they are made. 
Some have argued that a merger is not particularly necessary, because the existence 
of separate Homeland Security and National Security Councils has not led to any major 
policy failures. The existence of two separate councils may not have caused any major 
policy failures, but it has caused the executive branch to miss important opportunities to 
develop more effective homeland security policy. For example, if the National Response 
Framework outlines how the federal government will operate with its partners “to the 
right of the boom,” there is no analogue to how the federal government will operate with 
its partners “to the left of the boom” – before a catastrophe takes place. There are many 
reasons the executive branch does not yet have a National Prevention Framework, but in 
part it is because developing a prevention framework would have required staffs from 
the NSC and HSC – who come from different professional disciplines and cultures – to 
work together closely, solmething they are not used to doing. Merging these staffs into a 
single organization would bring them together and begin building a corporate culture of 
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cross-fertilization and integration during policy development, which is sorely needed in 
the broader homeland security enterprise 
Just as important as effective NSC leadership during the front-end phase policy 
development is attentive NSC oversight of policy implementation. Such oversight does 
not imply an operational role for the council and its staff; the pitfalls of an operational 
NSC were amply demonstrated by the activities of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and 
others on the NSC staff during the Reagan administration. But in light of the relative 
autonomy of the Cabinet agencies, and the frequency of hard-fought battles over policies 
and resources, the only way to guarantee effective implementation is for the NSC staff to 
closely monitor the activities of Cabinet agencies. The current HSC organization does 
not have the staff, expertise, or stature to perform such monitoring; the current NSC has 
the necessary assets but lacks the power (which must be granted by the president) to 
execute this oversight role. As a result, turf battles are fought and re-fought, policy 
initiatives languish, congressional reporting deadlines are missed, and bureaucratic 
logrolling is common. 
When a Merger Should Happen 
Although considerable progress has been made since the September 11 attacks in 2001, 
the country is still not fully prepared to deal with a domestic catastrophe. What 
ultimately matters to the American public is not how far we have come, but how far 
away we still are from being prepared for the next catastrophe. Homeland security 
received scant attention during the 2008 presidential campaign, but the task of readying 
the United States to face the threats of the post-September 11 era is an enormous one 
and poses a fundamental challenge for the new president. A merged NSC-HSC would go 
a long way towards enabling the federal government to do its part to better prepare the 
United States to face future challenges. Merging the HSC and the NSC would send a 
clear signal that homeland security issues will now be a fundamental part of President 
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Technology Strategies for Homeland Security: 
Adaptation and Coevolution of Offense and Defense 
Brian A. Jackson 
Terrorists’ technology choices are a key part of their ability to create fear in target 
populations and audiences. Terrorists’ interaction with technologies that perform key 
functions within modern society – e.g., communications or infrastructures – can also be 
strategies through which they can produce damage and fear. It is the way the terrorist 
chooses to apply technologies – to cause death and destruction – that sets him apart 
from the criminal who may be comparably armed and equipped but who uses those 
technologies for personal or material gain. For homeland security organizations,1 
responses to terrorist threats frequently gravitate toward the use of defensive technical 
systems. Significant sums of public and private funds have been allocated for 
development and fielding of security technologies and reduction of societal 
vulnerabilities.  Making good decisions about investments in defensive systems – many 
of which are costly and intended to reduce the threat of terrorist attack over the long 
term – requires understanding the interaction between the technology strategies of the 
terrorist and those of the organizations charged with defending against them.  
Technical aspects of the fight between states and non-state groups are frequently 
portrayed as a discrete interaction between the capabilities of the terrorist and those of 
the defender. The vehicle bomb is pitted against the perimeter security and any 
protective blast-resistant features built into its target; the anthrax-containing letter 
against the detectors in the mail system; the weapon smuggled in hand luggage against 
the technologies and training of airport security systems and personnel. At the end of 
this one-on-one interaction between weapon and defense, the attacker and defender 
step back to see if the terrorist was successful. Drilling deeper, however, makes looking 
at the fight as a set of discrete interactions appear increasingly artificial. Examination of 
the technological elements of terrorism invariably highlights the dynamic nature of the 
problems faced by the defense. The bomb planted by a terrorist group tomorrow will 
frequently differ from the bomb planted today: the terrorists change the explosive 
composition, modify the detonator circuitry, and alter the tactics used. The next day, the 
bomb may be discarded entirely as the group shifts to new attack modes, alternative 
weapons, and novel tactics.   
Some of these adaptations will have nothing to do with the actions taken by the 
defender, resulting simply from the desire of the terrorists to be more effective or lethal. 
Detonator modifications may be an attempt to reduce premature explosions that kill 
only the terrorists. The appearance of a new weapon may simply mean that the group is 
seizing an opportunity, i.e. through theft, purchase, or gift; the organization obtains a 
new tool and wants to use it. Frequently, however, terrorists’ adaptation has everything 
to do with the steps taken to defeat them. New remote-control initiators are needed 
because the defender is jamming the groups’ current detonator or standoff weapons are 
acquired because security measures keep the terrorists away from desirable targets.   
The opportunity for each side of the conflict to influence the other means the 
interaction between them is more complex and much richer than merely a sequential set 
of discrete clashes – and that defensive planning cannot be approached as if the 
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terrorism problem can be “solved” if simply the right defensive measure can be crafted 
and deployed. At the minimum, it is a multi-turn game involving many distinct players, 
where future clashes are informed by past actions – and by attempts to foresee future 
actions. But the depth of interaction goes further still: neither side limits its activities to 
perfecting its own future strategies based on the outcome of previous clashes, but also 
seeks to shape the environment of its opponent, even in the absence of direct 
interactions between them.   
This bi-directional interaction – the terrorist shaping the environment of the 
defender and vice versa – can be viewed as a process of coevolution.2 In nature, 
coevolution is defined as reciprocal changes that occur to species that interact in the 
same environment. Coevolution occurs between species that compete – e.g., predators 
and their prey – where changes in one produce selective pressure for changes in the 
other. In biological processes these changes are genetic and are produced through 
natural variation, recombination, and selection. Changes arise; those that are beneficial 
are rewarded with survival and those that are not die out. Similar forces can drive 
organizational change,3 with the pressures exerted by each side on the other punishing 
poor technology or other choices.   
It is our argument that thinking about the interaction of terrorist groups and security 
organizations in these coevolutionary terms is useful, particularly for analysts in 
organizations charged with designing security approaches and making investments in 
security technologies.  Building on the results of a research effort at RAND focused on 
terrorists’ technology behaviors,4 we argue that such approach would appear 
particularly valuable for understanding threats to the performance of counterterrorism 
technologies, identifying opportunities to shape terrorist behavior in ways that are 
advantageous for security efforts, and can to help identify more robust and, potentially, 
less resource intensive approaches for homeland security technology design.  In the 
following sections, we first explore terrorist choices and their implications for defensive 
thinking, and then transition to considering paths for creating “evolutionarily robust” 
defensive approaches.    
PRESSURE ON THE DEFENDER – TERRORISTS’ TECHNOLOGY 
STRATEGIES 
Choices made by terrorists are a primary determinant of the value and success of 
defensive efforts. Seeking to understand the drivers of terrorist technology strategies 
and identify likely future adaptations creates long-term challenges for security planning.  
The nature of terrorist groups poses difficulties for doing so, however. Looking across a 
range of groups and technologies, three central challenges are apparent:   
• Terrorist incentives for adopting or rejecting new technologies are rarely 
observable or obvious, limiting the ability of planners to predict terrorist 
innovation trajectories; 
• Terrorists have strong incentives to adapt well, and have identified multiple 
strategies for adaptation; and 
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• Terrorists confront defensive actions directly, degrading the utility and protective 
value of those actions.  
Terrorists Have Varied Technology Incentives 
Among analysts examining terrorist behavior, there is broad acceptance that terrorists 
adapt and evolve over time, though the forces that shape that adaptation are hardly 
transparent. This lack of transparency has provoked debate about the incentives for 
terrorist innovation, with evident uncertainty surrounding paths for future innovation. 
In considering terrorist weapons choices, many analysts have focused on the utility of 
novel and advanced weapons to terrorist groups, suggesting there will be enduring 
incentives for terrorist groups to seek them out and use them.5 Others point out that 
most terrorists appear to be “operationally conservative,” predominantly using basic 
technologies like the gun and the bomb, suggesting that incentives for innovation may 
not be particularly strong.6 Debates about the current terrorist threat and the potential 
for terrorist use of advanced or unconventional weapons can be viewed through this lens 
– where the view of terrorists as innovative or conservative frames assessment of the 
level of threat. 
Though apparently contradicting one another, these two views of terrorist technology 
decision making do not, in fact, conflict. In selecting what technologies to pursue, 
terrorists’ strategies will undoubtedly be governed by a judgment about how the benefits 
of a technology compare with what is involved in obtaining it, what risks are associated 
with doing so, and on how attractive a new technology looks compared with other 
tactical and technological options available to the group.  While terrorist groups may not 
necessarily think about these decisions in these terms, this decision process can be 
thought of as involving a comparison of the apparent costs and benefits7 of acquiring the 
new technology.8 Even if that comparison is implicit rather than an explicit, and will 
almost certainly be based on cost and benefit criteria that are idiosyncratic to the 
terrorist group, cost/benefit perceptions will underlie decision making. In this paper, we 
will use the language of costs and benefits to think through terrorist decisionmaking, 
even if actual decisions in groups may not approach anything like a formal comparison 
and may involve both costs and benefits that are unique to the groups involved. In some 
situations, the benefit of novelty will outweigh the costs and risks associated with it;9 in 
others, “tried and true” technologies will be good enough, particularly if there are many 
ways to apply those technologies in its operations.   
Given the risks inherent to terrorist activities – and the terrorists’ desire that 
operations be successful – there will always be tradeoffs between novel technologies and 
dependable alternatives. Similar tradeoffs will exist for individual technology choices, 
where the terrorists’ assessment of their costs, benefits, and risks will determine 
whether the group pursues one weapon over another, uses cellular phones for 
communication or relies on e-mail, and so on. Differences in the environments of 
individual groups, or of different factions within the terrorist organization, will shape 
assessments and determine which technology will be chosen.   
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As a result, while some generalizations about likely terrorist pathways can be made – 
e.g., analysts can assess the variety of technologies potentially useful to terrorists,  
articulate why some might be more attractive than others, and rule out some entirely – 
many possible paths will always remain. The influence of “wild card” external 
influences, such as other terrorist groups that willingly act as a source of technologies 
for others, can shift the apparent costs, benefits and risks of technologies and 
significantly influence such judgments.10 Differences in groups’ environmental 
conditions (i.e., factors that shape their decisions about technology acquisition) could 
therefore produce markedly different outcomes from the perspective of the security 
planner and make it difficult to put bounds around groups’ likely technology strategies. 
Terrorists Have Strong Incentives to Adapt Well and Varied 
Strategies for Doing So 
Returning to the evolutionary analogy introduced in the opening of this paper, when 
they are challenged by strong anti- and counter-terrorism measures, terrorist groups 
have strong incentives to adapt to maintain their effectiveness and to survive. When 
faced by a change in its environment, an organization must adapt quickly. When the 
stakes are high and the change threatens the viability of the organization, speed is 
critical. To respond quickly, one of two conditions must exist: (1) a group must already 
have solutions to problems that can be used immediately,11 or (2) it must develop 
solutions quickly. Developing solutions rapidly depends on how well the group learns 
and implements its learning.12 Groups that learn well can be proactive in shaping their 
own environment rather than reacting to exogenous change; those that cannot may be 
unable to adapt fast enough to survive the environmental shift. Looking across groups 
that have been successful in their learning efforts, we have defined three broad 
technology strategies representing different combinations of these two elements:13 
1. Versatility 
Versatile technology strategies focus on technologies that are suitable for a wide 
variety of operational contexts and tactical applications. “Guns and bombs” are 
examples of technologies that can be used in many different types of operations.  
Versatile capabilities are therefore transferable if the operations they are 
currently employed in are denied to the terrorist. This transferability enables 
rapid adaptation to certain types of environmental change. For example, it has 
been observed that many predators in nature are generalists to enable facile 
switching among prey types as environmental conditions shift.14 However, 
relying on versatility may limit the ability to adapt in other circumstances as it 
depends on the availability of substitute targets or operations where the 
technology is applicable.    
2. Specialization  
Specialized technology strategies focus on developing high levels of capability in 
specific areas.  Specialization is required to respond to some types of change. For 
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example, as a result of jamming of radio detonators for their bombs, many 
terrorist organizations have been forced to make electronic modifications to 
circumvent the countermeasures. Doing so requires a level of specialized 
understanding of those systems, and a group without that knowledge could not 
adapt.15  Specialization may therefore enable adaptation in circumstances where 
relying on versatile technologies may fail. However, it may take time – since 
adaptation may involve “opening up” and altering the technologies that the group 
is using. Furthermore, specialization requires resource commitments to develop 
expertise and knowledge. This trade between the benefits of specialization 
(getting much better at a given task) and the costs (reducing performance for 
other tasks) can be observed in natural systems as well.16 Environmental shifts 
might also eliminate the value of a specialty (e.g., a group that made the choice to 
specialize in one attack mode would pay a steep price if security measures 
subsequently made it impossible to use it on desirable targets).17  
3. Variety 
Variety-based technology strategies focus on maintaining a broad range of 
technology options to draw upon as required. In some cases, variety can be 
provided to the terrorist group by the market: when a range of commercial 
technologies for functions like communications are available, terrorists can 
switch among them as needed. Maintaining other variety can require on-going 
resource commitments (e.g., maintaining expertise in small-unit armed assault 
operations), though others may be less resource-intensive (e.g., groups returning 
to using command wire bombs as alternatives to radio detonation). The choice by 
a group to be a “jack of all trades” and maintain many different capabilities may 
limit its ability to develop high levels of expertise in any one area or technology.  
Separating technology strategies into categories does not imply that individual terrorist 
organizations choose only one of these strategies. Large organizations can pursue more 
than one simultaneously, e.g., training much of the group in versatile technologies while 
isolated elements are allowed to specialize. Similarly, how the boundaries are drawn 
around a “technology” matter – e.g., while bombs as an element of operations are a 
versatile technology pursued by almost all terrorist groups, bomb components may be 
the focus of specialization activities. 
Terrorists Take On the Defense Directly 
Though weapons choices are a key part of terrorists’ technology strategies, a key driver 
for adaptive behavior and evolution are the actions taken by the defense. Looking across 
a variety of terrorist organizations, a similar set of strategies can be identified for how 
these groups evolve in response to defensive measures: 18 
1. Altering operational practices 
By changing the ways it acts or designs its operations, a terrorist group may 
degrade the value of a security measure. Such changes frequently include efforts 
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to hide from the technologies. Such options are particularly potent for 
technologies that must be “triggered” by detection of the terrorist (versus static 
defenses that are “always on”).  The observation of such behaviors in biological 
systems has resulted in definition of a specific category of coevolution, 
“information coevolution,” capturing the efforts of organisms to hide from others’ 
detection capabilities (and the resulting pressure on the other creatures to 
heighten those detection capabilities in response.)19    
2. Making technological changes or substitutions  
By modifying its own technologies, acquiring new ones, or substituting new 
technologies for those in use, a terrorist group may be able to neutralize or 
circumvent a defense. The wide variety of applicable “off-the-shelf” technologies 
for many terrorist applications facilitates this strategy.20 
3. Avoiding the defensive technology 
Rather than modifying how it operates, a terrorist group may simply move its 
operations to an area not covered by the defense. Such displacement changes the 
distribution of terrorism and, while this may constitute successful protection in 
the area where the technology is deployed, the ability to shift operations 
elsewhere limits the influence the technology can have on the overall threat 
level.21  
4. Attacking the defensive technology 
If appropriate avenues are available, a terrorist group may attempt to destroy or 
damage a defensive technology. Groups may also attempt to exploit the 
technology to “turn it against the defender” by creating false alarms to waste 
resources, tire defenders, or desensitize the system. 
Just as the three fundamental offensive technology strategies above constitute a menu 
from which an organization can build its strategy, groups facing defensive pressures can 
deploy these strategies in response. Extending the coevolutionary analogy, these 
mechanisms represent the way the terrorist selectively pressures the defender.   
IMPLICATIONS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIES 
From the perspective of defensive planning, the variation in terrorists’ technology 
strategies means that homeland security organizations will always face a heterogeneous 
threat. For any given terrorist cell or group, local influences on costs, benefits, and risks 
of new technologies will make it difficult to generalize about likely technology strategies. 
Contemporary shifts in the structures and characteristics of groups – for example, 
terrorism inspired by broader movements (e.g., global jihadist, radical 
environmentalism, and others) – reinforce the likelihood of variety in technology 
decisions as weapon and other technology selections are based on idiosyncratic 
rationales.22 For large enough movements, this could produce dynamics not dissimilar 
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from evolution by natural selection: disaggregated decision making by individual cells 
producing extremely broad variation in technology strategies, with counterterrorist 
efforts exerting selective pressure on the results.   
Terrorist interaction with defensive measures means that defenders face an 
additional and varied threat to their own actions and the defender is at a disadvantage.  
To plan its actions, the defense must attempt to predict the terrorists’ responses.  
Particularly if defensive measures are open to observation,23 the terrorists need only to 
wait and craft appropriate countermeasures. The terrorists are largely in control of 
when they interact with defensive measures – they get “last move advantage.” For 
systems that allow repeated interaction at an acceptable level of risk and, therefore, the 
chance to test them and experiment with countermeasures, this advantage can be 
important. There are also asymmetries in resource requirements: defensive actions, 
particularly for large and populous nations like the United States, are frequently costly 
and require long lead times. Those costs make attempts to defend everything against 
every threat untenable, while the terrorists’ efforts potentially create a high price for 
making flawed decisions about how and when to defend specific potential targets. 
Given the difficulties posed by terrorists’ adaptive behavior, actions to limit such 
groups’ ability to adapt and learn are often one goal of counterterrorism action.24 Given 
the breadth of the terrorist threat, it is unlikely that such action will significantly reduce 
the heterogeneity in the threat faced by defenders. How should homeland security 
organizations responsible for defending the country against terrorism respond to the 
breadth of terrorists’ technology strategies and their capability to evolve over time? Our 
recent research suggests three possible paths.25 
1. Focus on defensive strategies that can adapt, therefore making it possible to 
counter adaptation by terrorist groups.   
2. Accept that terrorist organizations adapt over time, and seek to influence the 
direction of that evolution. 
3. Seek strategies where defensive performance is robust in spite of changes in the 
terrorists’ strategy or tactics. 
The defender has the freedom to pursue one or more of these options when designing a 
defensive technology strategy. The following sections examine each path and example 
strategies. 
Designing Defenses That Can Adapt When Necessary 
The risk that adversaries will find ways around defensive measures clearly means that 
technology design efforts should include focused efforts to identify vulnerabilities that 
might be exploited and address them before the defenses are deployed. However, just as 
it is impossible to protect every target from every threat, resource constraints mean it is 
impossible to make every defensive technology impenetrable. As a result, a prudent 
homeland security technology strategy will recognize the potential for even well-
designed defensive technologies to be circumvented. In that case, the burden is pushed 
back on the defender and reconstituting protection will depend on the defense’s ability 
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to learn and adapt. How well it can do so depends in part on the organizations 
maintaining the defense and the characteristics of the defensive technologies they have 
installed.  
In natural coevolution, how effectively organisms change and respond is framed by 
how readily they vary, reproduce, pass on valuable traits, and how effectively nature 
eliminates individuals with poor characteristics. In comparison, organizations can have 
advantages and disadvantages in the speed and effectiveness of adaptive behavior. 
Organizations that can spread and implement proven strategies can speed their 
adaptation, without having to wait for the passage of time or attrition to reinforce good 
ideas. Conversely, organizations can also choose not to change. Bureaucratic friction, 
inertia, and politics can produce resistance to the spread of advantageous strategies and 
many organizations lack strong selective pressures to dispassionately drive poor 
strategies into extinction.26 As a result, choices and organizational characteristics that 
limit adaptive ability become disadvantages.   
Given that terrorists will seek to learn their way around defensive measures, 
technology strategies should be designed in a manner that recognizes this goal. This 
applies both to individual defensive technology systems and defensive technology 
strategies. If the characteristics of a technology system are essentially fixed, it is a static 
target for terrorist adaptive efforts and, once circumvented, may produce little defensive 
benefit. A focus on ways to build adaptability into defensive systems is therefore an 
absolute necessity. Similar arguments can be made for flexibility in the way 
organizations carryout their activities – e.g., how information is analyzed and deployed 
to counter the terrorist threat – to enable adaptation as circumstances change. Shifts in 
the ways that terrorists are applying technologies, such as the scenarios explored in our 
analysis of networked information and communications technologies,27 also will require 
agility to expand or change defensive technology portfolios in response. 
Forces that limit adaptability must also be considered and hedged against. Decisions 
that necessitate technological “lock in” and static properties will inevitably produce 
some vulnerability. The challenge in those situations is to manage that vulnerability to 
keep it within acceptable limits. Beyond the characteristics of specific technologies, 
choices made in how technologies are produced and used can also create vulnerability.  
Increasing dependence on individual systems for detection or communication might be 
problematic, for example, if a terrorist group learned how to deceive, spoof or penetrate 
the systems. If the capabilities provided by the technologies are woven too tightly into 
many preparedness and response systems, it might not be possible to “pull the plug” on 
the systems if they were compromised. The scale of investments made in specific 
technologies can similarly produce lock-in that constrains future adaptability. If the 
defense is pushed into making large-scale investments in a few defensive systems, the 
sunk costs, associated organizational structures, and commitments that coalesce around 
major programs may foreclose future alternatives. Depending on the nature of the 
threat, limiting the scale of current investments could be a strategy for preserving 
flexibility and adaptive agility.   
The argument for flexibility can be made both with regard to individual technologies 
and to expenditures on security in total. Because the commitment of resources to 
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security is a major impact of terrorism on targeted nations, preserving the flexibility to 
scale back security expenditures as circumstances warrant is also important. Decisions 
that lock-in resource commitments produce friction limiting their movement to other 
areas (whether for security against other threats or to other more productive 
applications) and, therefore, significantly limit adaptability and agility.  In nature, the 
tradeoff between commitment of energy and resources to defense versus 
growth/reproduction is particularly brutal – and devoting too much to defenses can 
produce negative outcomes as certainly as devoting too little.  As a result, organisms are 
observed to “give up” defensive behaviors or traits because of competing selective 
pressures to grow and reproduce. 28   
Just as use of a “variety” strategy by terrorist groups can help them adapt more 
rapidly to changing circumstances, having a variety of defensive options and diverse 
technologies available can provide versatility to the defender. In an extended conflict 
against a given terrorist organization, the terrorist may eventually overwhelm or 
circumvent even the most adaptable defensive technology. If and when that occurs, new 
options will be needed. Given the potential for such “adaptive destruction” of individual 
security approaches, planning must consider defensive technologies as a portfolio, 
maintaining possibilities for alternative approaches in the event currently effective 
technologies are neutralized. Such a strategy should ideally be applied to organizational 
capabilities broadly, rather than narrowly in the technology realm.29   
Building such a “palette” of capabilities will rarely be easy. While it may be simple 
enough to put certain types of technology “on the shelf” to be called upon if needed, 
capabilities that rely on individuals’ specialized expertise are more difficult to maintain. 
Preserving capabilities that are not currently high profile may also be difficult given 
pressures to use resources efficiently. However, this is one area where governments 
potentially have an advantage over non-state adversaries: large government 
organizations are more likely to have the resources needed to build and maintain a 
prudent portfolio of capabilities that can be called upon when needed.  
Understanding and Seeking to Influence Adversary Evolution  
Research on terrorist behaviors has shown that, even when defensive efforts do not fully 
“shut down” the activities of a terrorist organization, the nature and deployment of 
defenses strongly influence the perceived costs, benefits, and risk associated with 
possible courses of action. In response to defensive changes, groups have aborted 
operations and shifted their attention elsewhere, pursued new weapons procurement 
efforts, and instituted major security efforts to protect themselves from infiltration and 
arrest. This ability to influence behavior is at the heart of why an analogy to 
coevolutionary processes is useful and demonstrates that defenders have leverage to 
shape terrorist activities.   
To adapt and evolve, terrorist organizations have specific needs for information, 
capabilities, and other resources. If strategies are devised to prevent fulfilling those 
needs, their ability to adapt effectively can be blunted. For example, security 
organizations should consider whether the efficacy of a defensive technology hangs on 
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the ability to “keep secrets” about how it functions, how such secrets might be 
compromised, and whether a terrorist group could discern them from the outside.  
Technologies which rely on such approaches can be fragile. Technology designers should 
also consider whether testing – such as action-reaction challenging by adversary probes 
– could provide vulnerability data, whether groups willing to sacrifice low-level 
operatives in exploratory operations against the system can learn how to evade it, and 
whether the system’s characteristics are sufficiently observable that an adversary might 
see how its capabilities might be saturated and overwhelmed. To the extent that features 
can be incorporated that defeat or degrade the ability to gather such information, the 
ability of the technology to deter or defeat terrorist operations will be bolstered. 
The defense must also remain cognizant of other changes that might facilitate 
adaptation. For example, our examination of technology-transfer activities between 
terrorist groups demonstrated that such interactions can be significant influences on 
group capabilities and that a variety of incentives exist for groups to interact with one 
another. New technologies can facilitate group evolution as well. The integration of 
technical components in weapons systems that reduce the need for training and 
expertise before the systems can be used effectively could make the systems easier for 
non-state groups to use and increase their attractiveness. Shaping the incentives of 
potential knowledge sources is therefore important to limit how readily capabilities can 
spread among non-state groups. Such strategies do not apply where terrorists have 
many “commercial technology options,” such as information and communications 
technologies, as the broad availability of these technologies will defeat most attempts at 
control. 
However, the general conservatism observed in most terrorists’ choices of weaponry 
and acceptable levels of operational complexity – i.e., reliance on “tried-and-true” 
firearms and explosives applied in straightforward ways – suggests a sensitivity to costs 
and risks that could also be used to shape terrorists’ behavior. Traditional counter-
proliferation measures and efforts to deter specific types of attacks apply this strategy, 
seeking to limit the availability of key technologies and weapons, or increase the 
perceived costs and risks of particular courses of action. Our examination of next-
generation conventional weapons suggests opportunities for actions to influence 
terrorists’ calculus about the attractiveness of specific systems.30 In contrast to weapons 
they manufacture for themselves, commercial weapons are inherently “black box” 
technologies for terrorists: without a full understanding of their electronics and other 
components, the user must trust that the weapons will function as expected. 
Incorporating technical controls into such weapons (e.g., that provide positional 
information on the weapon or restrict its functioning to permitted geographic areas 
through the global positioning system) could increase perceived risks31 and deter their 
use. To the extent that such controls can be designed to force terrorists into “all or 
nothing bets” – the terrorists are uncertain that the weapon will function until it is 
deployed at the intended target – the deterrent value is likely to be greatest.32 
Similarly, defensive measures that force terrorists to make focused investments in 
individual areas can “lock them in” and limit their future options. One advantage the 
terrorist group has is the ability to walk away from choices that are no longer 
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advantageous – but, the larger the investment and greater the expertise a group has 
developed in a specific area, the harder it is to do so. Furthermore, design of defensive 
technologies that cannot be defeated by a group through a “one time investment” – e.g., 
even if an adversary develops a countermeasure, implementing it requires ongoing 
action and commitment of resources – are superior. Depending on the magnitude of its 
available resources, such a “drag” could constrain the group’s violent activities. 
Finally, defensive organizations have to foresee, to the extent possible how defensive 
choices might change the adversaries’ future incentives. Paradoxically, a group’s efforts 
to adapt and survive when faced with defensive actions can help it become a more 
potent threat than before the defenses were deployed. The most basic manifestation of 
this effect is the selective pressure technologies and other security measures exert on 
terrorist groups, eliminating the less talented individuals and reducing a group to a 
hardened core. But defensive measures could also direct terrorists’ choices in directions 
that are negative from the defenders’ perspective: if a particular security measure 
pushes terrorists toward attack modes for which no good defensive options exist, a 
country might be better off not implementing those measures or doing so only 
selectively–while pursuing the groups through other means that might be less likely to 
produce negative adaptation on the terrorists’ part. 33 To the extent possible, these later-
stage evolutionary pathways should be considered in the design of defensive 
technologies to ensure that short-term gains in security are not offset by the creation of 
larger long-term vulnerabilities.   
Although the use of defensive measures to shape terrorist behavior could be a useful 
part of a broad-based homeland security effort, doing so requires that we assess the 
success and failure of security efforts differently than usual. When used to shape 
behavior, the goal of technology may not be to prevent every terrorist operation; in some 
cases technology may explicitly allow certain types of activities by groups as part of an 
effort to shape their future behavior. From this perspective, “scoring” the conflict 
between the defender and attacker should not be done based on binary success or failure 
in preventing individual operations, but on the long-term evolution of terrorist groups 
and their ability to pose a significant threat to the nation. 
Identifying Robust Defensive Strategies 
The heterogeneity inherent in the terrorist threat means that homeland security 
organizations must craft a defensive technology strategy to be robust across a wide 
threat spectrum, rather than optimized for the threat posed by some particular terrorist 
group. To the extent that robust solutions can be identified that are not directly tied to 
the nature or specific characteristics of the threat, defenses will also be less sensitive to 
any changes individual terrorist groups make that shift the level or type of threat they 
pose.   
Examples of strategies that might provide “cross-resistance” to many threats include 
the design or retrofitting of fault tolerance and robustness into target systems so that 
damage will be minimized if attacks are carried out. Similarly, investments in rapid 
response and repair capabilities to provide resilience if a successful terrorist operation is 
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carried out provide another option. Such approaches have a number of advantages when 
viewed with terrorists’ technology strategies in mind. Increases in the robustness and 
resilience of systems can be implemented via changes that fundamentally alter the 
characteristics of a potential target – e.g., a critical infrastructure network – and it is 
therefore difficult for the terrorist to counter the system’s defensive value. Many such 
measures may in fact be invisible to terrorist efforts to gather targeting information and 
may deter attack across the system because of the increased uncertainty in outcome. For 
example, rapid repair of a damaged bridge, which the terrorist hoped would cause 
severe disruption in transportation systems, will deny the adversary his intended 
outcome and significantly reduce the effect on the nation, even if the attack itself is not 
prevented. In circumstances where the outcomes the terrorists desire can be denied, 
even without acting against or seeking to disrupt the terrorists’ actions directly,34 the 
threat posed by the organization can be neutralized without providing it with clear 
incentives or signals about how to make future attacks more successful. 
Beyond general-purpose response strategies, building robustness into defensive 
strategies can also be achieved by considering individual defensive approaches within an 
overall “systems view” of homeland security. Though individual defensive approaches 
may be vulnerable to the counter-technology strategies described above, layered 
combinations of approaches and measures may be far less so. Implementing this 
approach requires consideration of the full set of defensive capabilities that can act to 
defeat or blunt the impact of terrorist action to assess how those capabilities will 
function as a composite defense. When added together, the effectiveness of defenses 
should no longer depend on “single links in a chain” – e.g., identification of a suspected 
terrorist at a border checkpoint or early detection of the release of a biological agent – 
where successful evasion by the terrorist or a single missed signal negates the value of 
the entire system. Instead, a focus on how even imperfect performance of multiple 
layers might reinforce one another and provide successive opportunities to detect and 
frustrate terrorist action can provide a more fault-tolerant defensive approach. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Thinking about terrorist and counterterrorist conflicts in a dynamic way is superior to 
viewing them as single, static engagements between adversaries.  However, simply 
saying such a conflict is dynamic and observing that terrorists adapt and change over 
time helps security planning only modestly.  It is indeed true that terrorist threats are 
heterogeneous and will shift over time, but planners shouldn’t therefore conclude that 
the answer is that they must protect every target from every conceivable attack mode.  
Such a strategy would quickly collapse either under weight of the resource levels 
required or by spreading defenses so thinly that the performance of the entire security 
effort was put at risk. 
In this discussion, we used coevolutionary theory and examples from the natural 
world to set up a different way to think about such dynamic conflicts.  The central 
advantage of approaching the problem this way is that it helps to break the tendency – 
particularly in the design of technical systems – of viewing security measures as 
JACKSON, TECHNOLOGY STRATEGIES FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME V, NO. 1 (JANUARY 2009) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
13 
“solutions” to particular and static security problems or assuming that a technology that 
is effective in some part of that problem space now will be effective indefinitely.  This 
sets up different ways of thinking about the efficacy of defensive measures – in terms of 
the opportunities they provide to shape adversary behavior, the value of defenses being 
adaptive so they can be retargeted or modified to address changing threats, and the 
importance of seeking out defensive strategies whose performance is less sensitive to 
whether terrorist groups evolve or how they do so.  Whether pursued singly or in 
combination, these strategies can each contribute to building overall homeland security 
policies that are more robust in the face of the “adaptive destruction” threatened by 
terrorist groups coevolving under the selective pressures those measures exert on them. 
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The Terrorist Threat to Inbound U.S. Passenger Flights: 




Seven years have elapsed since Richard Reid, a British citizen partially of Jamaican 
extraction, tried to detonate a shoe bomb aboard an American Airlines flight departing 
Paris and bound for Miami. The flight was diverted to Boston after his attempt failed. 
Reid has since been tried and convicted of attempted mass murder; evidence presented 
at his trial indicated that he was an al Qaeda operative who acted with technical and 
logistical help of others in that organization. He had, in fact, proclaimed his allegiance to 
Osama Bin Laden, had traveled to Pakistan and Afghanistan during the previous year, 
and has been identified as an al Qaeda trainee, at the least.1 He had also, apparently as 
part of his efforts for al Qaeda, earlier assessed air security procedures in Israel and 
reported that security measures were too stringent to expect a high likelihood of success 
in an attack on a plane there. So he (and his collaborators) decided to attack a U.S.-flag 
carrier, departing Charles DeGaulle Airport in Paris. Reid used a now famous, home-
made chemical explosive – triacetone triperoxide (TATP) – as a detonator, but the main 
charge in the shoe was composed of pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN), commonly 
used as both a military and a commercial explosive. 
Because of his bizarre behavior and strange travel plans (e.g., no luggage for a 
transatlantic trip), Reid had been blocked from boarding the flight on December 21, 
20012 by the personnel of a security company hired by American Airlines. He had been 
interrogated for some time, but security personnel could find no incriminating evidence 
or other reason to persuade the carrier to deny him boarding rights, and so he was 
permitted to get on the same flight on the following day. He then tried to destroy the 
aircraft in flight with his bomb. That he failed was not due to classic security measures 
or systems but rather to the bravery of a flight attendant (who detected his efforts) and 
several passengers who assisted her in subduing the criminal. 
It was unfortunate that French airport security had no explosives detector at hand 
that could have found the telltale traces of chemicals on Reid or his clothes. If they had, 
they probably would have detected at least the PETN on Reid’s shoes, if not on other 
parts of his body or clothing. We know this because traces of this chemical were found in 
considerable quantity on the inside wall of the aircraft where Reid sat and against which 
he placed the bomb – his shoe – while trying to set it off. These traces were easily found 
three weeks after the fact, even following cleaning of the aircraft.3   
This essay asserts that the terrorist threat to global civil aviation continues to exist 
and that the United States aviation system remains a principal target, particularly of al 
Qaeda. Historical evidence will show that this threat is currently more serious overseas 
than it is domestically and that the terrorists’ modes of operation often include the 
introduction of explosives aboard aircraft by passengers. Noting that explosive trace 
residue detection technology, currently deployed in the United States, could help 
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mitigate this threat, this essay urges that the United States require the application of 
such technology overseas on flights inbound to the United States. In the past, the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has been reluctant to act in this direction, 
probably out of concerns for the sensitivity of the sovereignty of other nations. However, 
taking note of the fact that the United States already imposes aviation security 
requirements on inbound flights, and has done so for years, this essay argues that 
diplomatic means already exist to improve our response to aviation terrorism overseas 
and that these means should be applied. 
The Historical Problem 
Since Richard Reid’s attempt, there has been one other similar and major aviation 
security incident with a less fortunate result. This was a successful pair of attacks on 
commercial aircraft in which explosives were brought on board by passengers. Chechen 
women carried bomb vests on two Russian domestic aircraft on August 24, 2004, 
detonating them in flight and killing all eighty-nine persons on board the two airplanes. 
No trace detection systems were in place or used on departure; the women had 
reportedly bribed air security personnel not to inspect them too closely or demand to see 
identification.  
Attempts to simultaneously destroy many U.S. aircraft simultaneously, with the likely 
hope of eliminating global commercial air travel for many weeks, date further back, at 
least to 1995 and the “Bojinka” plot in Southeast Asia. This plan was organized in part 
by terrorist mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (identified by U.S. authorities as the 
main organizer of the 9/11 attacks), along with his nephew, Ramzi Youssef, who also 
organized the first attack in the World Trade Center in 1993.4 A stream of known 
incidents since 9/11 confirms the interest of terrorists in targeting civil aviation.5  All of 
these incidents had their origins in other countries, not in the United States. The 
London bomb plot of August 2006 is perhaps the best known of recent cases. In 
addition, there was the June 30, 2007 attack on Glasgow airport itself, carried out by 
Islamic extremists. This latter was not an attempt to bring explosives on an aircraft but 
did demonstrate the intent to target civil aviation. 
Although major aviation-targeted incidents have not come to light every year since 
2001, we should not be lulled by the sporadic nature of low statistics. As noted here, and 
in the endnotes, such incidents have occurred in 2002, 2004, 2006, and 2007. In the 
field of terrorism, an absence of reported activity for a year or two does not mean that 
we do not have to worry. Further, government officials may well have more information 
on the terrorist threat to civil aviation, both at home and overseas, than is publicly 
available. One may glean this, for example, from worries expressed in a 2002 statement 
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation5 and in the much more recent statement of 
Secretary Michael Chertoff before the National Press Club on September 10, 2008.6 The 
focus on civil aviation as a terrorist target is also consistent with al Qaeda’s somewhat 
unimaginative and obsessive-compulsive practice of repeatedly using an attack tactic – 
if it appears to them to be a good idea – even when it does not succeed at first.7  
In the seven years post-Reid and four since the Chechen attacks, the U.S. government 
– that is, the TSA – has apparently not acted to assure that passengers on all foreign 
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commercial flights into the United States be subject to screening for explosives, using 
chemical trace or vapor detectors. This is in spite of the fact that, for years, the TSA has 
deployed thousands of pieces of such equipment for use in U.S. airports. 
Standard risk assessment and risk mitigation formalism indicate that, given 
equivalent consequences, one should generally try to reduce vulnerabilities where 
threats are higher. The apparent inaction of the TSA in regard to flights originating 
overseas appears to violate this principle. Threats to civil aviation are most likely greater 
overseas than they are in the United States, but the vulnerabilities of U.S.-bound 
overseas flights to terrorist attacks are greater than threats to domestic flights, not less. 
This is because equivalent technical security measures applied to civil aviation in the 
United States are not required for the overseas, inbound flights.  
Where is today’s technology relative to that of the recent past? If anything, today’s 
trace chemical detectors, used in domestic U.S. airports, are even more capable than 
those of several years ago. They are able to detect TATP, in addition to other explosives 
and oxidants that have often been used (or planned to be used) to construct terrorist 
bombs for detonation aboard aircraft. 
These detectors are relatively inexpensive ($25,000-40,000 each), quick to acquire, 
widely used in United States airports, well understood by aviation security authorities, 
and easy to operate. Any traveler flying commercially in the United States since 9/11 has 
almost certainly seen these detectors: they are mostly the size and shape of a breadbox – 
although some more experimental walk-through portal “puffers” are now being tested – 
and are located at security checkpoints. The breadboxes are characterized by the sad fact 
that they are used quite rarely.  
Furthermore, even though the 2006 plot against U.S. commercial jets was London-
based and involved attacking flights originating in the United Kingdom, newer models 
of detectors devised by the TSA to counter that particular threat are being pilot tested in 
the United States but are not (as of this writing) being tested abroad. It would appear 
that the United States is reluctant to deploy effective technologies outside the country, 
even on a test basis. Unfortunately, at the risk of being repetitious, outside is where the 
greatest threat currently dwells. 
Use of this trace detection technology would have two effects. First, when properly 
applied, it could effectively detect attempts to bring explosives onboard aircraft. Second, 
the deployment and use of such equipment would at least deter terrorists from using 
this pathway to attack civil aviation. In the past, terrorists have used “dry runs” to test 
the effectiveness of aviation security. The 9/11 terrorists, in particular, ran many such 
trials. Therefore, yet another advantage of deploying trace detection technology would 
be that security authorities could then look for attempts by terrorists to probe the 
effectiveness of this new technology overseas, thus providing another means to counter 
attempted terrorism. 
The Institutional Problem 
Why has the TSA decided not to provide passengers on U.S.-bound flights from foreign 
airports with the same explosives detection equipment required for securing domestic 
air travel? The answer is unclear. Some reports, mostly from private statements by 
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government officials, indicate a fear of diplomatic resistance from other nations, who 
would, it is said, object to the imposition of American security requirements. If true, this 
concern may be based on a misunderstanding of U.S. ability to impose security on 
flights into the U.S. from elsewhere. It is true that the sovereignty of other states 
certainly could become an issue. However, this sovereignty can be and has been 
respected while, at the same time, assuring desired levels of protection. The U.S. 
government has taken steps to enable this. 
Following a spate of terrorist attacks in the Middle East in the 1980s, including the 
hijacking of TWA Flight 847 after departing Athens, the U.S. Congress passed the 
International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, which, as reflected in 
49 U.S. Code Section 44907 – Security Standards at Foreign Airports – requires the 
government to assure desired levels of security on flights into this country. If foreign 
governments do not agree to the employment of such measures, paragraph (d) (1) (D) 
specifically states: 
The President may prohibit an air carrier or foreign air carrier from providing 
transportation between the United States and any other foreign airport that is 
served by aircraft flying to or from the airport with respect to which a decision is 
made under this section. 
The authority for U.S. government action unquestionably exists. 
On the other hand, perhaps the government feels that, eventually, this problem will 
be solved by the voluntary actions of foreign airport security authorities. It is true that a 
few nations have, on their own, begun to use trace detectors on outgoing flights, at least 
on an occasional basis. But there is no guarantee, or even likelihood, that these detectors 
will be required by foreign authorities for all U.S.-bound flights in the near future. Nor is 
there any evidence that the U.S. government has taken steps to assure widespread 
overseas deployment of such equipment.  Such steps should be taken. 
In a related context, the TSA has made public its reticence to interfere with the 
aviation security practices of other nations. It recently stated explicitly, in a report by 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO), that it will not “impose its security 
requirements on foreign countries.”8 This is in reference to a different but equally 
disturbing security gap – one that continues today, domestically as well as overseas – 
having to do with inadequate screening for explosive devices in cargo aboard passenger 
aircraft. Congress has required 100 percent screening of such cargo for explosives by 
August 2010. TSA is now taking steps to meet this mandate for flights originating in the 
United States, but not for those originating overseas.9 This method of attack – placing 
explosives in cargo – has been attempted by terrorists in the past.  
Somewhat in contradiction to the TSA statement cited above is the recently 
announced “Joint Statement of Purpose on Coordination of Efforts to Enhance Air 
Cargo Security” between the TSA and the Energy and Transport Commission of the 
European Union.10 While not specific in technical detail, this accord does express an 
agreement with other nations to develop “compatible standards and practices to 
enhance civil aviation security,” aiming at the “rapid introduction” of detection 
technologies for air cargo security. Thus, at least on this level of generality, and dealing 
with air cargo, there is a demonstrated willingness on the part of TSA to engage our 
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overseas aviation partners. Similar efforts could and should be devoted to the use of 
appropriate technologies for the screening of passengers. 
Any reluctance to require other countries to impose U.S.-approved security measures 
is not ruled by precedent; in fact, it runs counter to past practices. Over the past several 
decades the U.S. government, through the Federal Aviation Administration, has 
negotiated bilateral security agreements with several countries hosting the “last point of 
departure” of a commercial flight into the United States. These accords were usually 
arrived at in fairly collegial fashion. The hidden, but well-understood leverage for the 
FAA was the knowledge that, if an agreement were not reached, the United States could 
and would eventually prevent aircraft from the country in question from landing at U.S. 
airports. This approach worked quite well in terms of negotiating agreements with a 
minimum of fuss and discord.  
The U.S. government has taken action against some nations for lax security 
standards. The International Security and Development Cooperation Act, cited earlier, 
was invoked when flights between the United States and the Murtala Muhammed 
International Airport in Lagos, Nigeria, were banned between 1993 and December 22, 
1999.11 Milder forms of sanctions have been imposed on other countries from time to 
time: for example, warning notices have been posted on occasion in U.S. airports to 
inform passengers bound for Haiti and Indonesia of security concerns there. Similar 
concerns over airport security – which could have led to such postings – were expressed 
to the government of Greece in 1996.  
Another example of the ability of the United States to affect aviation security 
practices overseas is secondary screening (that is, screening in addition to that 
employed at the standard airport checkpoint) on U.S.-bound flights. Such screening has 
been arranged in the past through FAA-proposed modification of bilateral agreements 
and practices. This occurred, for example, following the destruction of Pan Am 103 by 
Libyan-supported terrorists in 1988. The screening was performed by air carrier 
personnel in some locations and by local authorities in others, where local laws required 
the use of local nationals in such security roles.  
Indeed, in the case of U.S. carriers operating inbound flights, no particular agreement 
is even needed with the host country: TSA and FAA regulate these carriers when 
operating either domestically or overseas. Security plans governing overseas security 
measures for U.S. carriers operating overseas, known as Air Carrier Standard Security 
Plans (ACSSP), were explicitly approved by the FAA for the U.S. government. Today’s 
analogous version, with TSA now the cognizant authority, is the Aircraft Operator 
Standard Security Plan, under 49 CFR Part 1544. Foreign air carriers flying inbound are 
not de jure regulated. But, de facto, they must submit to U.S. security requirements in 
that their security measures, listed in Model Security Plans (MSP) must be “accepted” 
rather than “approved” by TSA if the foreign carrier wishes to land in the United States 
(under 49 CFR Part 1546). 
Additionally, bilateral agreements with foreign partners can formalize and indeed 
already have formalized security arrangements that the United States desires on 
inbound flights. This is usually done with respect to assuring practices consistent with 
recommendations and standards in Annex 17 (Aviation Security) of the Chicago 
Convention of 1944 on International Civil Aviation and agreed to by the International 
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Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). Inspectors from the TSA (formerly from the FAA) 
are based overseas and visit airports in other countries to assess, for the U.S. 
government, whether the security practices there conform at least to ICAO standards. In 
some cases, the standards of Annex 17 are exceeded, following specially negotiated 
bilateral agreements between the United States and certain countries hosting inbound 
flights. 
There is thus no question that the United States has diverse legal and political means 
at its disposal to protect its citizens and visitors on inbound commercial aircraft. The 
only question is exactly what these requirements will be and whether the U.S. 
government will insist on increased protections when justified by threat assessments, 
based on past incidents and on present information. What should be required is a set of 
security measures and technologies equivalent to the ones imposed on air carriers and 
those practiced at airports domestically. These should include the widespread 
application of trace chemical detection to (at least) a subset of selected passengers, both 
for deterrence and as a protective measure. They should also include the 
congressionally-mandated 100 percent cargo screening on flights into the United States, 
as well as on domestic flights. 
ISSUES 
This discussion may be summarized by addressing several questions.  
Is there still a terrorist threat to civil aviation and is the international threat more 
serious than the domestic threat? 
Yes and yes. Disrupted plots, incidents that appear to be tests of aviation security 
systems and actual attempts of various types on civil aviation, have occurred persistently 
since 9/11. Most of these incidents involved the use or planned use of contraband items 
smuggled on board by passengers. Occasional statements from official sources, such as 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secretary of Homeland Security, indicate 
that intelligence sources consider that aviation continues to be a terrorist target. 
Reasonable people would conclude that the threat is real and current.  
Nearly all disrupted plots involving U.S. civil aviation were planned to originate 
overseas (e.g., in London and Paris). A series of bizarre events, referenced in note 5, that 
appeared to be tests of security systems occurred overseas (Sweden, Pakistan, Morocco, 
and France). Attacks or planned attacks on aircraft have originated at overseas locations 
(Kenya, France, United Kingdom). None of these events occurred or had its planned 
origins in the United States. Jihadi terrorist cells have been broken up in the United 
States in the past, but no serious round-ups have been reported for several years. Far 
stricter immigration controls and visa requirements have been imposed in the United 
States since 9/11. One concludes that the major threat to civil aviation continues to be 
external to the United States, in great part because of the difficulty terrorists have in 
developing a strong presence here. This is not surprising given the intensive effort 
devoted to detecting terrorists and keeping them out – an effort aided by the long 
distances and logistical problems most terrorists face in getting to the United States. 
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Of course strategies should not be confined to fighting the last battle or, equivalently, 
the last mode of terrorist attack. We have to think ahead and plan to protect against new 
and plausible modes of attack against civil aviation or, more broadly, against the United 
States and the rest of its critical infrastructure. Nevertheless, we should not leave the 
last terrorist attack type inadequately defended against, especially since our current 
adversaries have a tendency to repeat themselves and maintaining inadequate defenses 
would be an open invitation to strike. 
How many people fly into the United States every year?  
Approximately 6 percent of total U.S. passenger traffic on U.S. air carriers is on 
international inbound flights. For the first four months of 2008, this amounted to about 
15 million persons, assuming half of international flights are inbound and half are 
outbound and both halves have roughly the same capacity. It is likely the yearly total 
would be nearly 50 million persons, with a large percentage of these U.S. citizens.12 
There are also a large number of passengers on inbound flights aboard non-U.S. 
carriers. Although representing only a fraction of the total number of air passengers in 
the United States, 50 million+ people constitutes a very large number of travelers to put 
at unnecessary risk.  
Are there currently available detection technologies that could reduce the terrorist 
threat to international civil aviation? 
There are several such technologies, not only in existence but also widely deployed in 
the United States. These include computerized tomography scanning systems for 
checked baggage (which is not required of inbound flights from overseas) and for some 
cargo; use of canine olfactory capabilities; and various explosive trace residue and vapor 
detectors for passengers, carry-on baggage, checked baggage, and cargo. Other nations 
do use some of these techniques, but the United States does not require their use on 
incoming flights to provide equivalent levels of security to those that exist domestically. 
The United States could require use of such technologies on incoming flights of foreign 
origin, as it has for years required other security procedures on such flights.  
How much would it cost it cost to deploy and operate sufficient trace detection systems 
to screen passengers at all last points of departure to the United States? Is this cost 
practicable? 
The cost would be approximately one percent of the cost of deploying checked baggage 
screening systems within the United States, as was correctly and well done by TSA 
following 9/11. A few tens of millions of dollars in capital cost would suffice, plus several 
million (conservatively, on the order of ten million) additional dollars per year for 
operation and maintenance. In comparison, solving the checked baggage problem 
domestically – an essential step – cost several billion dollars in capital acquisition over 
several years. Of course, additional diplomatic effort, including discussions with other 
nations, would have to be expended as well, with resources to this end probably taken 
out of ongoing operational government funds. The U.S. has supported an overseas civil 
service infrastructure for years, which maintains aviation security liaisons with nations 
from which flights to the United States originate. 
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Are there legal and diplomatic mechanisms available to the United States to ensure the 
implementation of additional security measures for inbound flights? Have such 
measures been employed in the past?  
Existing legislation and past practices in this regard are cited above. The answers are: 
yes and yes. 
CONCLUSION 
There is a continuing terrorist threat to commercial civil aviation. The threat is global, 
but the United States remains a principal target of such attacks. Many threats, past and 
future, revolve around the scenario of weapons or explosives brought onto aircraft by 
passengers. Chemical trace detection equipment, relatively inexpensive and quite 
effective, could be applied to reduce this threat significantly, both by actual detection 
and by deterrence. Such equipment is widely deployed domestically by the United 
States, but it is not broadly used in other countries.  
The United States can and should require the use of such equipment to screen 
passengers on all inbound flights, to avoid repetitions of Richard Reid-type attacks in 
the future. It should, in fact, take broader steps to require the application of security 
measures equivalent to those used in the U.S., including the use of appropriate 
technologies, on inbound foreign flights at their last points of departure.  
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1 See, for example, M. Elliott, “The Shoe Bomber’s World,” Time Magazine, February 16, 2002, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,203478-4,00.html.  
2 Perhaps not accidentally, this was the 13th anniversary of the destruction of PanAm Flight 103, by Libyan 
agents, which killed all 259 persons on board as well as eleven more on the ground in Lockerbie, Scotland.  
3 The author, while a government official, took the samples on the aircraft and had them analyzed at a 
competent laboratory. 
4 The Bojinka plan, discovered only following an inadvertent fire in the conspirators’ apartment in Manila, 
envisioned destroying over ten U.S. aircraft in flight from various ports in the region to the United States.  
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A practice run, on a domestic Philippine Airlines flight to Manila in 1995, succeeded in placing a small 
bomb under a seat on the aircraft. The passenger in the seat was killed, but the explosion narrowly failed 
to bring down the aircraft. 
5www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/12/24/attack/main534164.shtml reports an FBI warning, on Christmas 
Eve 2002, of attempts to bring down aircraft through bombs brought on board by passengers. Moreover, a 
spate of incidents in the late summer of 2002 may indicate an interest, at that time, in testing aviation 
security on a global level. Best known were an arrest of a Muslim Swedish citizen, on his way to a Salafist 
conference, for carrying a pistol onto a plane (charges later reduced to a weapons violation) that was 
scheduled to fly from Vasteras, Sweden to Birmingham, England, (August 29, 2002); an Afghan headed 
for the United States arrested in Karachi when trying to board an aircraft with a weapon (August 26, 
2002); and a quantity of PETN, found during a random test by canines in Nancy, France, aboard a Royal 
Air Maroc jet that had just landed there on a flight that had originated in Morocco (Sept. 25, 2002). There 
have been other attacks on aircraft in the interim, including a failed surface-to-air missile attempt against 
a commercial Israeli aircraft in Mombasa, Kenya, in November 2002. The most famous event since then 
has been the disruption of the London bomb plot in August 2006 by British M.I.5. Different, liquid-based 
explosives were planned for this effort, but seven aircraft departing London were apparently targeted for 
detonations in rapid succession. The detonating chemical in this case was allegedly HMTD (rather than 
TATP), which is also susceptible to trace detection. Hydrogen peroxide would be similarly detectable. This 
was another chemical component of the planned explosive device. See E. Sciolino, “In ’06 Bomb Trial, a 
Question of Imminence,” New York Times, July 15, 2008. Three participants were convicted in 2008, see 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/europe/09/08/bomb.verdict/index.html. 
6 In response to a question, Chertoff stated, “Al Qaeda continues to focus on the aviation system as an area 
where they want to target,” http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/sp_1221138850495.shtm. 
7 Examples of al- Qaeda or al Qaeda-related personnel behaving in this way are multiple. The attack on 
the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000 followed a failed attack some months earlier on the U.S.S. The Sullivans, 
both in Yemen. The London bomb plot recalls the Bojinka effort. The attacks on the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 followed a crackdown on terrorists in the area a few months before. And 
finally, of course, there is the World Trade Center as target, attacked unsuccessfully by terrorists including 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed – later an al Qaeda operative – in 1993 and attacked again in 2001. There are 
other examples where repeated, similar attacks occur; some actually succeeded, such as the London train 
and bus bombings following the Madrid train attacks. Experts debate how closely all these efforts are 
related in terms of planning and direction. For the present discussion, this issue is irrelevant: whatever 
the specific provenance of the attacks, whether by unitary direction or simply by example, repetitious 
modi operandi do characterize recent jihadist terrorism. And another leitmotif that constantly recurs is 
the commercial aircraft as target. 
8Noted in Government Accountability Office, “Aviation Security: Transportation Security 
Administration May Face Resource and Other Challenges in Developing a System to Screen All Cargo 
Transported on Passenger Aircraft” GAO-08-0959T, (U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC, July 15, 2008), Summary Page.  
9This is a result of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, which 
became Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 1602, 121 Stat. 266, 477-80 (2007), codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g). 
10 Signed on September 30, 2008, a press release describing the agreement was put on the DHS website in 
early November 2008, http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1225466242156.shtm. 
11 Federal Register / Vol. 64, No. 250 / Thursday, December 30, 1999, 73596. 
12 See, for example, Bureau of Transportation Statistics Press Release, “April 2008 Airline Traffic Data: 
Four-Month 2008 System Traffic Up 0.4 Percent from 2007 but Down 2.8 Percent in April,” July 10, 
2008, Tables 7 and 13, 
http://www.bts.gov/press_releases/2008/bts034_08/html/bts034_08.html#table_07, shows passenger 
enplanements on international and domestic flights for the first four months of 2008.  
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Just How Much Does That Cost, Anyway? An Analysis of the 




The purpose of this article is to identify the financial costs relative to the benefits of the 
“no-fly” list. Numerous scholars, security experts, lawyers, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), journalists, and bloggers have commented on the well-known 
flaws in the current terrorist watch list system. Lawyers have pointed out the many 
civil liberty issues associated with the list and its hindrance of due process.1 The 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has repeatedly published the many flaws it 
sees in the way that the list is administrated.2 Bruce Schneier, a popular security 
columnist and blogger, documents the various reasons why the no-fly list serves no 
benefit at all, providing only “security theatre” rather than actual protection.3 Each of 
these analyses is useful and contributes to an understanding of whether or not the no-
fly list is, in aggregate, helpful in protecting citizens against terrorism, and at what 
social and civil liberty cost.  
What is missing, however, is an analysis of the no-fly list from a financial 
perspective. This article is interested in understanding the monetary costs of the 
program. As such, it seeks to answer some basic and fundamental questions that have 
not yet been answered (or asked): How much does the no-fly list cost to create and 
maintain? What are the costs of the consequences, both intended and unintended, of 
the list? How many resources, both governmental and private, are involved in the 
operation of the list? And, what are the benefits, both tangible (i.e. monetary) and 
intangible, that the list provides? This is an important set of questions because without 
understanding the monetary costs of a protection program relative to the benefits, it is 
difficult to assess whether or not the program is worth the costs. Further, without such 
an understanding it is impossible to intelligently decide how anti-terror money should 
be allocated. It is surprising that, given the importance of these questions, they have 
not been asked and addressed in a systematic fashion.  
Consequently this article represents a “first take” at addressing these questions by 
assessing the financial costs of the no-fly list program. It does not, however, seek to 
serve as a comprehensive answer to the question of “is the no-fly list worth the money 
we are putting into it?” The reason is that one cannot begin to conduct such an analysis 
without aggregating the costs and benefits first and then placing the no-fly list in 
context of the other anti-terror programs and their associated costs. The no-fly list 
might very well be worth the expense if it is the government’s only tool in preventing 
terrorist attacks. It might also be the case that the list is less valuable given redundancy 
in the “layered security” model of securing air travel. These are important questions 
and ones that can only be addressed after having identified the financial costs and 
benefits of the program. Thus this article should be viewed as the first step in what will 
hopefully become a systematic and comprehensive approach to understanding whether 
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or not the no-fly list provides added value in the context of the government’s anti-
terrorism campaign.  
As will be analyzed below, it is estimated that the costs of the no-fly list, since 2002, 
range from approximately $300 million (a conservative estimate) to $966 million (an 
estimate on the high end). Using those figures as low and high potentials, a reasonable 
estimate is that the U.S. government has spent over $500 million on the project since 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Using annual data, this article suggests that 
the list costs taxpayers somewhere between $50 million and $161 million a year, with a 
reasonable compromise of those figures at approximately $100 million. Clearly the no-
fly list is a program that is not without substantial cost. It represents, at least 
financially, a large part of the government’s protection of air travel.4 In order to begin 
to analyze whether or not the benefits are worth the costs, both must be identified and 
analyzed. It is that task to which the article will now turn. 
METHODOLOGY 
Source Material and Estimation Error 
One likely reason for why a financial cost/benefit approach has not been conducted, at 
least in an unclassified manner,5 is that it is difficult to do. The biggest reason for the 
difficulty is that the government does not publish the aggregated costs of programs 
such as the no-fly list. As will be illustrated below, the no-fly list is a product of 
numerous government agencies and private sector involvement and thus represents a 
rather diffuse network of resources working together for common cause. This ensures 
that a variety of perspectives and sufficient technical expertise are aggregated into the 
program, but it also means that the no-fly list is not one program represented by a 
single line-item in a budget request. Rather, it is made up of pieces of multiple 
programs spanning public and private spheres, many of which are classified and 
unknown to the public. 
The second reason why conducting a financial cost/benefit approach is difficult is 
that much of the information pertaining to the list is classified. Sources I spoke to 
between November 2007 and January 2008, who are close to the list, could only 
provide general feedback and guidance – anything remotely specific would fall under 
the classified domain. While this guidance was extremely useful, and constitutes one of 
my main methods of vetting the figures contained in this article, it meant that the data-
gathering phase was done without much insight or help from those close to the 
program. Conducting a cost/benefit analysis when the details of the program are 
intentionally hidden from taxpayer view is challenging. 
The approach taken in this article is to estimate the costs based on what is available 
and then have individuals close to the list, to the extent that they are able, validate that 
the estimates are reasonable (or, in some cases, too high or too low). As such, many of 
the estimates contained in this article are based on data culled from press reports, 
public interviews with government officials, Congressional testimony, and occasionally 
specific budget requests and reports. These estimates were then provided to 
individuals in the private sector security field who proffered limited, but extremely 
helpful, feedback. 
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One of the valuable criticisms of such an approach is that it is subject to much 
subjectivity. That is, choosing one number to represent an estimated cost requires the 
analyst to pick among many possible variations of cost and use that number to 
represent an aggregate cost. In anticipating this criticism, costs are estimated across 
three tiers: low, medium, and high.6 This is common practice in cost-benefit analyses 
as well as actuarial assessments and estimations.7 The low tier represents a 
conservative estimate, the medium tier represents a reasonable estimation, and the 
high tier represents a possible estimation. It should be noted that the high tier is not 
simply an inflated cost that attempts to account for all possible permutations of cost. I 
have tried to keep even the highest tier within a reasonable range. In cases of a 
particularly high number of unknown variables, I have tried to err on the side of 
conservative estimation so as not to inflate the costs due to extreme estimation error. A 
consequence of this move is that if there is estimation error in this article, it is likely to 
be biased towards the more conservative tier.  
Choosing a Cost-Benefit Framework 
There are a number of cost-benefit frameworks available to social science scholars.8 
Many are derived from economics and focus on largely tangible (typically monetary) 
costs and benefits. The difficulty with choosing a framework for this article is that we 
are dealing with explicit financial costs but both tangible and intangible benefits.9 That 
is, we can estimate what the monetary costs of the system are, but in comparing them 
to the benefits we have both monetary benefits (such as the future realized value of 
preventing a plane crash) and intangible benefits (such as the ability to monitor 
potentially dangerous individuals). The two are alike in that they both benefit the U.S. 
government and citizenry, but unlike in that one can be measured in dollar terms and 
the other can not. Nevertheless, as Arrow and others argue, in such cases where cost 
and benefits are assessed in different terms (value in money vs. value in social policy), 
cost/benefit analyses can still be helpful, and indeed, should be mandatory if not 
binding.10  
The Office of Management and Budget, in realizing the importance and difficulty in 
assessing government policies, has published its own recommended framework for 
conducting cost/benefit analysis. It is useful for our purpose because it explicitly 
addresses this problem of tangible and intangible benefits:  
Both intangible and tangible benefits and costs should be recognized. The 
relevant cost concept is broader than private-sector production and compliance 
costs or government cash expenditures. Costs should reflect the opportunity 
cost of any resources used, measured by the return to those resources in their 
most productive application elsewhere.11 
 Thus, the OMB framework serves as the main methodological framework for this 
article as it explicitly addresses governmental policy, on the one hand, and intangible 
as well as tangible costs and benefits on the other. 
Defining Terms 
Finally, before conducting an analysis of the costs of the no-fly list program, it is 
important to define precisely what it is that is being investigated. The no-fly list is 
essentially a “watch list” that prevents watched individuals from flying on commercial 
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aircraft. The list itself dates back to the 1980s in a very limited fashion (on September 
11, 2001 only sixteen names were on the list).12 After the 9/11 attacks the number of the 
names on the list grew tremendously, with some reports suggesting that the list grew to 
755,000+.13 It is now believed that the list contains roughly 40,000 names after a 
sustained effort to reduce the list to “key” individuals by scrubbing it of duplicates, 
reasonably certain safe flyers (such as U.S. Senators), and the like.14 While the 
government does not publish how names are put on the list, the public record suggests 
that the names are compiled from classified evidence conducted by a variety of 
government agencies.15 While the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
maintains the list, various agencies (see below) have input into it.16 It is important to 
note also that in popular speech the “no-fly list” is often equated with the “selectee 
list.” The two should be disaggregated. The selectee list is the Secondary Security 
Screening Selection that randomly selects passengers for additional screening and 
inspection. These individuals are allowed to fly after they have been cleared through 
security. Individuals on the “no-fly list” are not allowed to fly until they are cleared 
from the list and this requires more than a simple x-ray and body search. This article is 
interested in the costs of the no-fly list in particular, but future work should include an 
analysis of the selectee list as well. 
The broad mechanics of the list have been made available for public consumption. 
The government sends an updated version of the list to airlines on a regular basis. It is 
the responsibility of the airlines to check passenger names against the list.17 It has been 
noted that TSA has long had plans to take on some of the responsibility of name-
checking (particularly of names that are too sensitive to be sent to the airlines), first 
through the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-screening System (CAPPS II) program 
and now through a similar program entitled “Secure Flight.”18  Development of this 
system has been delayed and it is unknown when it will be operational. Finally, the 
government is also developing a program entitled “Registered Traveler,” a 
public/private partnership between TSA and the Registered Traveler Interoperability 
Consortium (RTIC), which allows those individuals who pose a minimum security risk 
to submit themselves to background checks and subsequently submit to an easier and 
more streamlined airport security checkpoint experience. Having outlined the key 
aspects of the no-fly list, the article will now turn to estimating the costs of creating, 
maintaining, and dealing with the consequences of the list itself. 
ESTIMATING NO-FLY LIST COSTS19 
Establishing a Federal Government Resource Burn Rate 
A burn rate, or the cost of a given policy/program in terms of (1) the number of 
individuals involved, (2) their billing rate, and (3) the number of hours devoted to the 
project, is a useful way of estimating costs over time. Government agencies require 
potential contracting firms to provide an estimated burn rate in their response to 
proposals,20 and the OMB notes in their literature on conducting cost-benefit analyses 
the importance of identifying incremental costs over time.21 Calculating a burn rate for 
the no-fly list relies on estimating the number of individuals involved in the day-to-day 
operations of the list, those responsible for dealing with the consequences and 
ancillary effects of the list, and their respective billing rates. These individuals are 
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drawn from both the government and private sectors and constitute no-fly list 
resources. 
Estimating the number of individuals associated with the list is difficult because 
there is no one central agency or contracting firm responsible for its implementation. 
Sources in the security community and government documents from the U.S. GAO 
note that there are individuals drawn from over ten government agencies and multiple 
private firms.22 The non-exhaustive list includes: the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), Transportation Security Administration (TSA), National Security 
Agency (NSA), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), National Crime Information 
Center (NCIC), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), National 
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA), and various private government contracting firms such as 
Acxiom Corporation.23  
Given the broad scope of involvement and complexity of integrating the efforts 
among the various entities listed above, security professionals estimate that it is likely 
the number of individuals working on the list on a full-time basis is at least 250, with 
another 500 involved in some capacity on a partial-time basis. This represents the 
conservative or low estimate. Individuals I spoke with at various government 
contracting firms note that mid-range figures are likely in the 500 full/1000 partial 
range, with some estimating that the numbers could exceed 1000 full/1500 partial.  
Having estimated the number of individuals involved with the list, the next step is 
calculating their billing rate and amount of time devoted to the project. Turning to 
rates first, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) provides a yearly salary 
scale ranging from approximately $17,000 to $124,000.24 A conservative figure that 
estimates the cost of government employee benefits is approximately 50 percent (Cox 
& Brunelli, 1994).25 That is, if the salary of a federal employee is $50k/year, the 
adjusted cost to taxpayers, inclusive of benefits, is approximately $75k/year. Sources 
in the security community note that among federal employees working on the no-fly 
list, there are very few at the lower ends of the pay scale, with most falling somewhere 
in the top third. On the private side, government contracting firms typically bill out 
their resources somewhere in the $100k-$500k/year range. This number varies 
depending on the expertise of the contractor, the profit margin of the firm, the type of 
work being conducted, etc. For the purposes of this article, it is worth using a 
conservative blended billing rate precisely because there are a large number of factors 
that lead to billing rate fluctuation. A conservative figure of $100k/year, inclusive of 
both government employees with benefits and private firm contractors, is a reasonable 
estimate, but is potentially much higher and not likely to be much lower. 
Finally, not all employees mentioned above spend their full-time working on the no-
fly list. The nature of the list suggests that there are likely a large number of individuals 
who do spend most of their time devoted to it, either in creating technology programs 
to support it, dealing with name removal requests, etc. There are a larger number of 
individuals, however, who work on the list part-time as needs arise. The FBI, TSA, and 
DHS, for instance, often collaborate on suspected individuals in order to determine 
whether or not they should be placed on the list. This type of activity does not consume 
an employee’s entire day, but does require time and effort. Consequently, part-time 
no-fly list employees can spend varied amounts of their day working on various list 
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activities. In order to estimate this amount of work, gradations of time spent on the list 
will increase as estimates of low/medium/high increase. At the conservative end, it is 
estimated that partial-time employees spend 25 percent of their time working on the 
no-fly list; the medium range figure is 50 percent and the high range figure 75 percent. 
This estimate allows considerable variation in the amount of time required of 
resources and seems reasonable among the security professionals that have reviewed 
the numbers.  
Having identified the major components of the burn rate and estimated their value, 
a simple calculation yields burn rate figures for the low, medium, and high estimates. 
At the conservative end, the burn rate is estimated to be $7.5 million per year. The 
middle-range figure is estimated to be $20 million per year and the upper-range figure 
at least $43 million a year.26 Importantly, these figures only represent the personnel 
burn rate.27 They do not include other costs, such as technology systems, costs to non-
government employees or costs to the private sector. It is to those costs that we now 
turn.    
Technology Product Costs 
The no-fly list operates both as a database of names and a system for ensuring that 
those named individuals do not board airplanes. The first component, the database, is 
maintained by DHS and TSA. The second component, the method of cross-checking 
passengers with the database, is maintained by the individual airlines.28 The 
government supplies the watch list to the air carrier whose automated information 
technology (IT) systems screen passengers. According to the GAO, 99 percent of all 
passengers on domestic flights are screened through the use of these computer 
systems; the other remaining 1 percent of passengers are “manually screened” because 
the airlines do not have an automated system.29 Finally, for international flights, air 
carriers are required to provide a list of passengers to Customs and Border Protection 
before take-off.30  
These two components can be disaggregated and their costs estimated individually. 
On the government side, the Associated Press in 2006 reported that the TSA had spent 
more than $200 million on three aspects of the no-fly list: Transportation Worker 
Identity Credential (a program for allowing “safe” individuals access to secure port 
areas), Secure Flight, and the Registered Traveler Program (a program that allows 
individuals to submit themselves to background checks in order to receive less 
thorough screenings at airports).31 Once Secure Flight was suspended, in February 
2006, Leslie Miller of the Associated Press reported that the total cost of the program 
was $200 million.32 Estimating the cost of the government side of the equation then is 
relatively straightforward. The $200 million in investment of Secure Flight since 2002 
presumably includes human resources as well as the technology product, so the cost 
must be discounted slightly. A conservative estimate of the government’s technology 
costs for this program is $150 million. A mid-range estimate is $200 million, the 
quoted cost according to the Associated Press. Finally, an upper-range figure is $250 
million which would include any updates and new developments since the AP’s story 
broke in early 2006. 
The airline technology products used to cross-check passenger names with the 
government-supplied no-fly list is more difficult to estimate because the air carriers 
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have not published their compliance costs.  Steven Lott of Aviation Daily, a trade 
journal for the airline industry, notes that as of July 2006 there was no uniform way 
for airlines to transmit their passenger lists to CBP, which accounts for the numerous 
in-air diversions and delays (to be discussed below) caused by airlines transmitting 
passenger lists after takeoff.33 In order to correct this problem, DHS has asked the 
airlines to adopt one of two systems. The first would have airlines transmit passenger 
information individually when each passenger checks into the flight, up to fifteen 
minutes before departure. Lott estimates the cost of this system to be $189 million in 
the first year and more than $600 million through 2015. The other solution, called 
APIS 60, is similar to the current system of sending passenger lists in bulk, but would 
cost more money to implement as a standardized process. It would require all 
passenger information to be sent to the government sixty minutes before plane 
departure. This would likely have an effect on check-in times, requiring passengers to 
be checked into their flights early in order to provide the sixty-minute window for 
name processing. Lott estimates $250 million in the first year for this and up to $1.9 
billion over the next ten years. On August 9, 2007, DHS announced that the two 
options had been adopted as a rule and airlines would have to begin procedures to 
comply.34 These figures, as part of Lott’s analysis, help us to understand the potential 
costs associated with compliance, but they also provide a benchmark to estimate 
current costs. Lott notes that APIS 60 is similar to what airlines currently do, but is 
more expensive. Given that the more expensive, standardized version is $250 million – 
for the first year alone – a very conservative estimate for what it has cost the airlines to 
comply with no-fly list passenger screening to date is likely something well above $50 
million. A middle range estimate of $100 million seems more likely, given the six years 
that have elapsed since 9/11 and the need to get systems up and running quickly across 
the industry. An upper range figure of $250 million would assume that the one-year 
cost of setting up this new system, while higher than the current system, is roughly 
equivalent to six years of running a less costly system.  
False Positives 
One of the recognized problems with the no-fly list is that, until very recently, the list 
was exceedingly large and false positives were quite common. In the last few years, 
stories of Senator Ted Kennedy and a host of other non-terrorist individuals being 
flagged by the no-fly list and not allowed to fly have appeared in the local and national 
news.35 The reason for this is largely because the no-fly list does not list individuals; it 
lists names, which can lead to the misidentification of individuals. This is most clearly 
seen in dealing with Arabic names that have a number of English transliterations: in 
many cases, multiple derivatives of a name are put on the list in hopes of matching a 
particular individual.36 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), in attempting to 
prevent the high number of false positives and attacks on civil liberties, sued TSA and 
the FBI in April 2003 on behalf of Rebecca Gordon and Jan Adams, two individuals 
who were not allowed to fly because their names appeared on the no-fly list.37 TSA and 
DHS eventually settled for $200,000 in damages and attorney fees. An additional 
outcome of the case, however, was that it brought into court many previously hidden 
documents about the inner-workings of the list. One of these documents noted that, in 
November 2005, TSA indicated that 30,000 people in the previous year alone (from 
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2004 to 2005) had contacted the agency to have their names removed from the list.38 
This suggests that, at least until 2005, roughly 30,000 individuals a year had been 
identified as false positives. As the ACLU complaint points out, the only way that one 
can find out if one is on the no-fly list (other than filing a lawsuit to bring the records 
into court) is to attempt to fly.39 If one is on the list and attempts to fly, he/she is 
stopped at the airport by local law enforcement and airport security. Having identified 
how many false positives there are in a given year, we can begin to make sense of the 
associated costs. 
Estimating the cost of these false positives involves a number of disparate activities: 
the cost of the passenger being detained at the airport and missing his/her flight; the 
cost of airport security/personnel detaining the passenger; if a false positive, the cost 
of arriving at the airport early each time one flies to allow time to be cleared; the cost of 
not flying in order to avoid the hassle; and the cost of attempting to get off of the list 
once one has been identified as a false positive. Before estimating these costs, however, 
a burn rate for passenger time needs to be established. Similar to the burn rate 
conducted above for government resources, a similar rate is needed for passengers 
since their time is valuable as well.  
Unlike the difficulty in assessing governmental resource burn rates, doing so for 
airline passengers is relatively straightforward as the airlines themselves have devoted 
many research resources evaluating the costs of delays. One estimate is that, on 
average, airline passenger time can be valued at approximately $50/hour.40 With this 
rate established, we can estimate cost by examining how long each false positive 
requires of an individual. With respect to the time spent being detained by the local 
authorities, it is difficult to account for the significant variability in experience. Some 
individuals report being held for hours in airport back rooms while others are able to 
leave relatively quickly.41 If we assume, for a very conservative figure, an average of two 
hours dealing with airport security, then we can begin to estimate cost. 30,000 
passengers a year who are identified as false positives and spend on average two hours 
dealing with this hassle, translates to roughly $3 million a year. If we assume, however, 
that there are fewer false positives now that the list has been scrubbed over the last 
year, we can discount the yearly figure to roughly $2 million a year. A middle range 
figure would account for a longer experience in dealing with the false positive because 
a two hour delay with airport security would undoubtedly mean a missed flight and 
presumably increased cost. Assuming a longer period of five hours dealing with this 
problem extrapolates to $7.5 million a year. Finally, a higher range figure of ten hours 
dealing with each false positive – from the passenger’s perspective – is possible, given 
the added expense and hassle of missed flights, being forced to fly the next day, etc. 
Such a figure results in a cost of $15 million a year. 
In addition to costs from the passenger perspective, there are also airport/local law 
enforcement costs in dealing with false positives. When a name is flagged on the no-fly 
list, local airport security is called in order to detain the passenger in question.42 There 
are approximately 450 commercial airports in the United States, plus approximately 
200 international airports with flights bound for the U.S. that would all have local law 
enforcement in place to deal with false positives on an “as-needed” basis. We can 
estimate this cost by assuming a standard airport security salary of $35,000/year on 
the conservative end, plus security officials working on no-fly related issues, including 
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false positives, on a part-time (25%) basis. This equates to approximately $5.5 million 
a year in no-fly list associated costs for the use of airport security personnel. 
Finally, a large cost associated with false positives is passengers attempting to be 
removed from the list. One of the criticisms of DHS has been that if a passenger is 
placed on the no-fly list mistakenly, it can be a very laborious process getting off of the 
list. There are reports of individuals being asked to sign notarized copies of documents 
and letters, producing birth certificates, copies of passports, and – reportedly – even 
voter registration cards.43 There is a cost entailed in producing each of these 
documents, but the largest cost undoubtedly is the time required to gather the 
respective documents. DHS does not publish how many individuals attempt to be 
removed from the list each year, but given the known number of false positives, we can 
base cost estimates on that figure. If, for instance, 10 percent of the 30,000 individuals 
on the false positive list attempt to be removed from the list, and gathering the 
required documents takes approximately ten hours per individual, the cost translates 
to approximately $1.5 million/year. A less conservative estimate of the number of 
individuals attempting to be removed from the list is a quarter of this number, or 
7,500. This translates to a cost of $3.75 million/year. Finally, if we estimate an upper-
range figure of approximately 50% of the false positives pursuing the process of name 
removal, the cost is $7.5 million/year.44 Granted, there is undoubtedly fluctuation in 
these estimates because it is unclear whether or not the 30,000 false positives 
represent distinct individuals or some individuals being flagged more than once in a 
given year. This estimate, however, does provide an approximation of the cost at the 
three probability levels. 
Flight Diversions and Delays 
One of the ramifications of the no-fly list over the last several years has been the 
number of flight diversions and delays due to list operations. A KLM flight from 
Amsterdam to Mexico, on April 10, 2005, is a representative example. The plane was 
en route from Amsterdam to Mexico and was due to cross over U.S. airspace. The U.S. 
government ordered the plane to return to the Netherlands before reaching the United 
States because it said two of its passengers were barred from entering U.S. territory.45 
The plane had been in the air for more than four hours before returning to Europe and 
caused 278 passengers delays of approximately twenty-four hours. The Washington 
Post reported, in July, 2005, that the two men removed from the flight were 
questioned but not arrested. In sum there have been seven total diversions, and 
presumably countless delays, due to no-fly list processing incidents that are not 
reported. The aim of this section is to assess the costs of these delays. 
One of the better estimates of the cost of flight diversions comes from the medical 
community. Medical events constitute the major recurrent reason for flight diversions. 
From heart attacks to seizures, passengers routinely get sick on airplanes and the 
aircraft diverts to a close airport in order to seek medical attention for the sick 
individual. A study of neurological sickness diversions estimates that the cost of each 
diversion is somewhere between $15,000 and $893,000, depending on the route 
(international vs. domestic), the length of the delay, whether or not fuel must be 
dumped to achieve optimal weight before landing, etc.46 For our purposes a reasonable 
range for the cost of diversions is likely $500,000-$893,000, as all seven known 
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diversions have been on international flights. Extrapolating a conservative figure of 
$500,000 per diversion, this results in a total cost of $3.5 million since 2002 
($500,000 x 7 diversions). A medium-range figure of $700,000 per diversion results 
in a cost of $4.9 million. Finally, at an upper limit of $893,000 per diversion, the total 
cost due to the no-fly list is roughly $6.25 million. As discussed above, these figures 
only represent actual diversions, instances where the plane was forced to land 
somewhere other than its intended destination. The figures do not include delays due 
to no-fly list processing, as that data is not published by the airline industry. 
Other Costs 
Finally, there are other costs associated with the no-fly list that will not be examined 
thoroughly here because assessing a financial figure for each of them is difficult. 
Lawsuits against U.S. government agencies, typically DHS, TSA and the FBI, with 
respect to no-fly list related issues (such as harassment) are numerous and presumably 
quite costly for both sides of the case. A recent search in the WestLaw database 
identified fourteen disparate case filings against the U.S. government regarding the no-
fly list. One prominent case, filed by the ACLU, resulted in a settlement of $200,000 
by TSA and DHS for the victims of unnecessary harassment and detainment.47 It is 
unknown how many resources are spent responding to these cases, but the numbers 
are likely significant48 and a potentially fruitful area of further research. 
ANALYSIS OF NO-FLY LIST BENEFITS 
The government’s cost-benefit framework suggests that just as costs can be tangible 
(such as money spent on a particular product) and intangible (such as opportunity 
costs), so too can the benefits of a particular policy. Therefore in analyzing and 
assessing the benefits of the no-fly list, it is important to cover not only the financial 
returns, or tangible benefits to taxpayers, but more intangible benefits as well, such as 
the use of the list as a deterrent to committing terrorist acts with airliners. Arguably 
the intangibles of the no-fly list provide greater benefit, since the aim of the list is 
prevention and not necessarily a monetary return on investment. It is to those 
intangible benefits that we shall turn first. 
Stopping/Deterring Potential Plots 
If the no-fly list is successful in what it aims to do, the largest benefit to the country is 
stopping potential plots that are in the works by not allowing dangerous individuals to 
board airplanes and commit terrorist attacks on/with the aircraft. The argument is 
straightforward: if the current implementation of the no-fly list existed on September 
11, 2001 and the would-be hijackers were on the list, it would have been impossible for 
them to fly. This is the argument that is made by Kip Hawley, TSA Administrator. In an 
interview with Bruce Schneier, Hawley noted that the no-fly list is worthwhile “because 
it works.” Hawley further pointed out that “[TSA does] not publicize how often the no-
fly system stops people you would not want on your flight. Several times a week would 
low-ball it.”49 Two questions immediately arise from these comments: is it true that the 
no-fly system works in preventing would-be terrorists from boarding airplanes, and, 
what is to be made of the claim that “several” potentially dangerous individuals are 
prevented from boarding airplanes a week?  
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The problem with the first claim, that the no-fly system works, is that it is relatively 
easy to bypass the system with a little ingenuity. For instance, the no-fly list’s core 
mechanism is a matching a name to photograph identification.50 As noted above, the 
process is for a passenger’s name to be cross-checked against the list and then verified 
as the name matching the individual by checking photo identification. This process 
assumes a number of key points. First, an assumption is made that the ticket was 
purchased using the passenger’s real name. If a would-be terrorist knows that he or she 
is on the no-fly list, the next logical step would be to purchase the ticket under an 
assumed name that is not on the list. Second, the process also assumes that the photo 
ID is real and represents the true identity of the individual in question. It would be 
relatively easy, for instance, for someone to make a reservation under an assumed 
name and either manufacture an ID or use the real identification of the assumed 
individual. Third, this process is made easier by the increase in “print-at-home” 
boarding passes, which are easy to forge and allow would-be terrorists to put any name 
they like on the boarding pass. These three aspects of the no-fly list make it simple for 
an individual to purchase a ticket under someone else’s name, use a real ID to enter the 
boarding terminal with a forged boarding pass, and then fly on the ticket that has 
someone else’s name.51 Some security experts have gone so far as to create a “fake 
boarding pass generator” on the Internet to illustrate how easy it is to forge a boarding 
pass.52 Importantly, this is not just a theoretical exercise. A CBS affiliate in Kansas 
City, in an undercover investigation, was able to enter the TSA secure area by 
producing a fake ID.53 The undercover individual was not stopped or asked any 
additional questions. Thus, if the no-fly list is stopping individuals who wish to commit 
terrorist attacks, those individuals have not employed all of the strategies that are at 
their disposal; this should raise questions as to whether or not the no-fly list achieves 
the benefits its administrators claim. 
The second claim made of the no-fly list is that it does stop terrorist events, or at 
least dangerous individuals, on a routine basis; we do not hear about them because the 
government keeps that information close to the vest (except when questioned, such as 
in the Schneier interview). Three questions arise from this claim. First, why would the 
government want to keep such information secret? Perhaps more importantly, why 
does the empirical record of other terrorist prevention activities suggest that the 
government’s strategy is very often the opposite? It lets everyone know about potential 
activities before they are well formed. Finally, if what Hawley claims is true, are there 
many more potential terrorists in this country than is commonly believed (since they 
are being stopped several times a week) or is the no-fly list ineffective at stopping 
terrorists? Is it casting a much wider net and catching non-dangerous individuals as 
well?  
With respect to publicizing no-fly list successes, it would seem that as a deterrent 
mechanism the government would want would-be terrorists to know that the no-fly list 
works; that it catches dangerous individuals, and therefore, it is not wise to try to fly if 
you have thoughts of committing a terrorist act. This is particularly true given the 
amount of information available on the Internet about how to bypass the no-fly list, 
such as the forged boarding pass generator. If the government wanted to counteract 
the effect of that type of information being available, it would seem reasonable to show 
the public that despite these apparent flaws, the no-fly list works well in stopping 
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dangerous individuals. A response to this argument is that there is greater benefit 
derived from keeping the successes of the list relatively secret because it keeps 
terrorists continually guessing and unsure about how effective the government is at 
tracking them and preventing their action. This argument might have some merit, but 
the empirical record of the government with respect to publicizing potential terrorist 
threats and foiled plots suggests that they do not subscribe to the secrecy strategy. 
There are numerous examples of the government pursuing a strategy of publicity 
rather than secrecy when it involves letting the country know about terrorist plots and 
threats. Two examples, one from a small-scale potential attack and one from a large-
scale potential attack, should illustrate the point. In June 2005, the U.S. government 
held a press conference in Lodi, California to make public a foiled terrorist plot that 
involved Hamid Hayat and his father Umer, who had allegedly had connections to 
Pakistani terrorist camps.54The FBI chief of Sacramento said in the public statement 
that Al Qaeda was active in the Lodi, California area and it included “individuals who 
have received terrorist training abroad with the specific intent to initiate a terrorist 
attack in the United States.”55 The subsequent investigation and trial did not elucidate 
any specific intent, but rather revealed an individual who may or may not have been 
sympathetic to Islamic jihad. Nevertheless, in this case the government, without any 
direct knowledge of a specific threat or imminent attack, made public the information 
they had, thus belying the argument that secrecy over publicity is the preferred 
strategy of deterrence. 
The second example is drawn from a much larger potential terrorist attack 
originating in the United Kingdom. From August 9 to August 10, 2006, British 
authorities arrested twenty-four suspects alleged to have been plotting an attack 
against the United States using U.S.-bound aircraft and liquid explosives. A day later 
Michael Chertoff, head of DHS, called the plan “sophisticated” and “imminent,” with 
the plan “getting really quite close to the execution phase” and “in the final stages of 
planning before execution.”56 The subsequent investigation of the plot revealed that 
the government had no solid evidence the plan was close to execution. Specific planes 
or a date had not been set, a number of the suspects did not have passports, and, 
perhaps most important, British authorities had been monitoring the group for months 
and were confident that an attack was not imminent.57 Nevertheless, as was the case 
with Hamid and Umer Hayat, the government came forth before all of the facts were 
available and noted that a potentially very serious threat had been thwarted. 
These two examples of the government making public potential threats before they 
are imminent raises the question of why there is a disconnect between the no-fly list 
secrecy strategy, as verbalized by Hawley, and the publicity strategy pursued during 
other cases. It could be that the government makes the secrecy/publicity decision on a 
case-by-case basis and thought there was value in notifying the public of the first two 
threats, but not no-fly list threats. It is conceivable also that the government only 
wants to alert the public to specific threats. That is, someone being stopped at the 
airport because he/she might be dangerous can be conceived of as a threat, but it is a 
diffuse threat. There are no specific plans or intentions that are automatically divined 
by stopping someone from boarding an aircraft; the individual may or may not have 
had intentions of wrongdoing even though they were on the list. Yet the empirical 
reality seems to suggest that the government sees value in making anti-terror successes 
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public. Given the two examples above, one could reasonably come to the conclusion 
that if the no-fly list had stopped a significant threat, we would have heard about it. 
The more confusing aspect of Hawley’s statement is that the no-fly list stops 
“several” individuals the government does not want flying a week. This would suggest 
that there are potentially would-be terrorists attempting to board aircraft on a routine 
basis. Empirically this is difficult to reconcile with the FBI’s own admission that they 
have found zero terrorist cells in the United States since 9/11,58 and Al Qaeda 
operatives seem to be focusing their energies on Iraq.59 Presumably, if these 
individuals who are being stopped are terrorists, the FBI’s statement would no longer 
be correct. If terrorists are prevalent enough to be boarding aircraft multiple times a 
week, then is it still reasonable to assert that zero terrorist cells have been found in the 
U.S.? Another explanation for the high-number of individuals being stopped is that 
they are on the list, but not necessarily terrorists. As noted above, even with the 
“scrubbing” that has occurred, the list is still quite long and it is not entirely clear that 
everyone on the list poses a threat to the US. Thus, while it might be true that the no-
fly lists stops individuals on a routine basis, the extent to which those individuals 
posed a danger to the aircraft they were about to board remains in question. 
Finally, with respect to stopping potential plots, the effectiveness of the no-fly list is 
questionable because of the unknown danger posed by those on the list. As Bruce 
Schneier points out, the no-fly list is “a list of people so dangerous they cannot be 
allowed to fly under any circumstance, yet so innocent we can't arrest them even under 
the Patriot Act.”60 This is a real and important critique. If the individuals on the no-fly 
list are dangerous, and we have information to suggest that they are dangerous, why 
aren’t they arrested and at least brought in for questioning? Again, the empirical 
record suggests that the government’s approach when dealing with potential terrorists 
is to bring them into custody in order to figure out how real the threat is. This is what 
occurred with the Hayats and the would-be U.K. bombers. This remains an important 
question about the benefits of having the no-fly list: how dangerous are the individuals 
on the list? Presumably if they posed an immediate threat to the United States they 
would be arrested and the government would not wait for them to turn themselves in 
by attempting to fly. One response to this question is that a benefit of the no-fly list is 
not just in arresting individuals, but rather tracking their movements.  
Keeping Individuals In/Out  
One argument for the potential benefit of the no-fly list is that it allows the government 
to track and keep individuals inside the United States. If an individual is believed to 
have connections to terrorist training camps in Pakistan, there might be value in 
preventing that individual from going to Pakistan to be trained, aid in training, or 
otherwise conduct dangerous activities. The problem with this argument is that it is 
belied by actual law enforcement experience. Sources in the security community note 
that, in general terms, it is better to have dangerous individuals outside of the United 
States rather than inside. While the government might be able to keep better track of 
individuals within its borders, the individual’s ability to conduct terrorist activities 
against the U.S. is hampered if that person is residing outside its borders.61 From this 
perspective the no-fly list does not provide substantial benefit by keeping individuals 
in the country, since it is preferable to keep terrorists out, not keep them in. The 
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corollary to this argument is that keeping terrorists out of the country is beneficial. A 
no-fly list, operationalized in international airports with flights bound for the U.S., 
might help to keep dangerous individuals from reaching U.S. soil.  
Further, even if those on the no-fly list do not pose an immediate and credible threat 
to the U.S., there might be value in the government’s ability to keep track of potentially 
harmful individuals. For instance, if there are individuals living in Western Europe 
who are believed to harbor resentment against Western society,62 there is value in the 
United States being notified of their movement and intent. If one of these individuals 
arrives at an international airport attempting to board a flight to the United States, the 
threat may not be specific to that particular flight or any particular plot against the 
country of departure, but nevertheless information about the movement of individuals 
on the list is worthwhile. High-level government officials and security experts routinely 
discuss the merits of layered-based security.63 By building and maintaining movement 
information on suspected individuals, the government is able to derive an additional 
knowledge-based layer of security. This would seemingly serve a real benefit in the 
government’s campaign to better know and understand the enemy.  
Psychological Benefits of Security 
Finally, as alluded to earlier, some analysts have argued that the no-fly list and other 
aspects of airport/flying security provide an intangible psychological benefit. Bruce 
Schneier64 has termed this concept “security theatre.” Schneier argues that security 
countermeasures utilized by the government after September 11 have been intended to 
provide the feeling or perception of improved security, without doing anything to 
actually improve tangible security. Given the criticisms that have been levied at the no-
fly list’s effectiveness, particularly as it relates to the rise of print-at-home boarding 
passes and the ability to use fake IDs, etc., the no-fly list is, according to Schneier, an 
excellent example of security theatre. 
From a psychological perspective it may be that security theatre serves a legitimate 
function in what scholars have called “ontological security.”65 Ontological security is a 
mental state derived from the feeling of continuity and stableness in one’s life. Just as 
humans require physical security with our bodies, so too do we require that our day-to-
day existence not be scarred by outlying events. It is possible to conceive of security 
theatre as a mechanism for providing ontological security to flyers and the general 
public. If individuals are convinced by the security they see that they are safe, they 
might be more likely to feel protected and go about their business than if their 
ontological security is threatened.  
Further, security theatre can also theoretically deter actors from taking certain risks. 
If, for instance, would-be terrorists perceive significant security measures in place, 
they might be less likely to follow-through with terrorist acts. In this example the 
security need not be “real” in any meaningful sense; it must only present a feeling of a 
securitized situation that would create a level of risk for a would-be terrorist. Retail 
stores have long adopted this stance, using such things as fake video cameras to 
dissuade shop-lifting, for instance.66 
This is not to say, however, that security theatre provides only positive psychological 
effect. As Schneier argues, security theatre can lead to increased perception of risk.67 
Consider, for instance, visible measures of security such as armed guards. While this 
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might reassure the public, from an ontological security perspective, it might contribute 
to a sense that there is a real risk associated with the activity they are engaged in. With 
respect to the no-fly list this might obtain from the existence and public knowledge of 
the list itself; given that there are individuals the government does not want on 
airplanes, this might imply that flying is a risky endeavor. 
Tangible Benefit: Preventing a Costly Attack?  
Having identified many of the potential intangible benefits of the no-fly list that are 
difficult to assess financial value to (such as the ability to track suspected individuals 
and deter potential attacks) it is worth considering what tangible benefit the list might 
serve if it is effective. There are a number of reasons to question whether or not the no-
fly list is able to deliver on the intangible benefits, as outlined above, but assuming that 
it can, what tangible savings might the country realize? 
One way to assess the tangible benefits of preventing an attack is to estimate what it 
would cost the country if the no-fly list was not in place and terrorists were able to 
easily board an aircraft and bring it down. While this represents a scenario that is less 
likely to occur since September 11, 2001, as airline security has increased, it is 
nevertheless worth investigating as a middle-range possibility in terms of cost.68 The 
RAND Corporation, in a 2005 paper investigating the cost and benefits of aircraft 
missile defense systems, estimated that the direct costs of an airliner being attacked in 
flight would approach $1 billion.69 The indirect costs, which are more difficult to 
estimate because predicting state response to the attack is difficult (such as whether or 
not air travel would be shut down for a significant period of time as it was after 9/11), 
are estimated at close to $15 billion when all potential long-term effects are accounted 
for.70 This number would, of course, increase substantially if more than one aircraft 
was involved in an attack. While the tangible cost of a potential airliner attack is useful 
in its own right in providing a sense of what type of benefit the no-fly list might 
provide, it can only be evaluated fully by assigning a probability to the attack, 
computing the probable tangible cost of the attack, and comparing that figure to the 
cost of maintaining the list. It is to that final task that the article now turns.  
BRINGING COSTS AND BENEFITS TOGETHER: CONCLUDING 
THOUGHTS 
Assessing whether or not the no-fly list is valuable or “worth” the money being spent is 
a difficult endeavor because ultimately it is a subjective one without a clear and 
objective answer. By way of conclusion, however, the article will end with a question in 
hopes that it will spur additional research and discussion on the topic. Comparing the 
intangible benefits to costs is difficult because a quantitative approach is not sufficient; 
assigning a financial figure to intangibles is difficult, and any qualitative approach 
would necessarily be muddied by subjective arguments about the relative merits of the 
intangibles. For instance, some might find high value in the government’s ability to 
monitor and track individuals, while others see this as an ancillary, or indeed (if it 
infringes on the civil liberties and rights of those being monitored) negative “benefit.” 
Tangible benefits are seemingly easier to compare to costs because we can attach a 
financial figure to each benefit, but the probability of realizing those benefits is quite 
subjective. To answer any question regarding the worthiness of the no-fly list the first 
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question that must be answered is: how likely is it that there will be an attack attempt? 
The answer to this question is inherently subjective depending on one’s own sense of 
security, how one perceives world events, and how closely one pays attention to world 
politics. Recent polls demonstrate this subjectivity by illustrating the diversity of 
opinion as to whether or not Americans are likely to witness another terrorist attack in 
the near future.71 
Nevertheless, with tangible benefits we at least can compare the realized return to 
the costs of implementation across a range of probabilities. A common methodology 
for assessing cost effectiveness is to multiply the costs of an event by the probability 
that event will happen and then compare that to the costs of a system in place to 
prevent the attack from occurring. For instance, if one perceives a 1 percent chance of 
individuals boarding a plane and bringing it down each year, with the costs of such an 
attack reaching $15 billion, per the RAND study cited above, then one theoretically 
could argue that $150 million (0.01 * $15,000,000,000) should be spent, each year, in 
attempting to prevent such an attack. Similarly, if one considers the probability of an 
attack to be 0.1 percent, then one could argue that the no-fly list is “worth” $15 million 
in prevention of such an attack. Given the costs identified in this article, a first-cut 
reasonable estimate of the probability of an attack needed to justify the cost of the no-
fly system is somewhere between ~ 0.3% and 1.1%. It is important to note, however, 
that this analysis is true only if the no-fly list alone could stop the attack.  
More likely, the no-fly list reduces the likelihood of an attack by adding another 
layer of security to air travel. How much value it provides in reducing the likelihood of 
attack is a subjective measure that relies on the probabilities assessed by the analyst. 
Clearly assessing the probability of attack is difficult. From there assessing what role 
the no-fly list would play in a “non-event” is even more so. Precisely because the no-fly 
list serves as a deterrent, success is defined not by what happens but what does not 
happen. This makes analysis of whether the no-fly list is “worth it” a subjective call. 
Making that call, however, requires data of the type presented in this article. 
On the other hand, there have been recent attempts to quantitatively value human 
life and compare the costs of saving those lives to the cost of losing them.72 Mark 
Stewart and John Mueller, in looking at the cost and benefits of hardening cockpit 
doors and the air marshal program in Australia, use a quantitative approach on both 
the cost and benefit end. They note that if human life is calculated to be between $1 
and $10 million, based on Australian government guidelines, then the cost of the 
cockpit door hardening is less than the expected benefit in terms of historical fatality 
numbers and the risk associated with terrorists entering cockpits. Using the same 
calculation, the air marshal program fails. They note that even if their estimates are in 
error by 100 percent, it would not change the conclusions with respect to the program. 
Similar calculations, using the data provided in this article, could be used in answering 
the “is it worth it” question.  
Such attempts at quantitatively assessing the value of human life will likely cause 
some to pause. Should we be placing monetary value on human life or if security 
measures have the potential of saving even one life, should we pursue them? These are 
not easy philosophical questions to answer. However, conducting analyses of the costs 
and benefits of security measures do allow us to understand where resources are going 
and what they might be preventing. We can then compare these expenditures to the 
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potential of using the resources elsewhere, perhaps in vaccinations, health programs, 
road safety, etc., which can also be used productively to save lives. The goal of this 
article is not to make this assessment but rather to provide some tools and data such 
that a conversation can begin with respect to where our security dollars should be 
spent. It is hoped that the investigation this article has taken, of the costs and benefits 
of the no-fly list, will spur additional work in attempting to elucidate educated relative 
probabilities of various no-fly list-related scenarios. It is only then that the cost-
effectiveness, and the financial worth of the list, can be thoroughly assessed.  
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were made to correct an editorial oversight on the part of Homeland Security Affairs.
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Appendix A – Consolidated Table of No-Fly List Costs 
 
Players/Costs Low Estimate Medium Estimate High Estimate 
    
DHS, TSA, NCIC, 
NSA, DARPA, FBI, 
CIFA, Private Firms, 


















$5.5 million/year $5.5 million/year $5.5+ million/year 
Passenger False 
Positive Airport Time 
 
$2 million/year $7.5 million/year $15+ million/year 
Passenger Removal 
From List Costs 
 
$1.5 million/year $3.75 million/year  $7.5+ million/year 
Airline Diversion 




$0.4 million/year $0.66 million/year $1+ million/year 
Lawsuits Against US 
Government 
 
$1 million/year $2 million/year $5+ million/year 
 
Total Yearly Cost 
 
~$51 million ~$89 million ~$161 million 
 
Total Since 9/11/01 
 
~$300 million ~$536 million ~$966 million 
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New Directions in China’s Quest for Intangible Property and 







 Some enterprises do not hesitate to use illegal means to collect intelligence from their 
competitors, making trade secret protection increasingly challenging and urgent. 
—China Business Training Course on Competitive Intelligence Practices 
Shanghai, Oct. 17-18, 20081 
 
Chinese executives’ intense desire to succeed globally, combined with the Chinese 
government’s encouragement and support,2 has driven some companies to develop 
corporate competitive intelligence (CI) programs that increasingly rely on illegal human 
and technical intelligence collection methods 3,4 to acquire intangible property from U.S. 
companies and government agencies. The plethora of industrial espionage cases 
involving Chinese companies in recent years reveals extensive Chinese government 
involvement in such activity5 and the role of CI in facilitating the transfer of U.S. 
proprietary technology from civilian to military uses.6 Against this backdrop, the United 
States faces a rising national security threat from Chinese corporations that employ 
robust CI programs to enhance illegal company- or government-directed espionage and 
intellectual property (IP) theft and infringement. The complicated and global character 
of this phenomenon 7  requires that the U.S. government rethink the traditional 
intelligence community (IC) approach to collection and analysis of intelligence on China 
and the implications for homeland security. 
This article draws upon a body of Chinese literature on CI to explore the role of CI in 
helping China to conduct industrial espionage and acquire U.S. IP and illustrate how the 
study of Chinese CI can help the U.S. government and business make sense of future 
trends in Chinese industrial espionage. Chinese CI theory and practice is pushing 
Chinese intelligence in new directions; 8  however, this trend has gone relatively 
unnoticed in the U.S. intelligence and academic communities, probably because CI is 
largely viewed as the domain of private sector and professional organizations in the 
United States.9 Despite Chinese corporations’ growing reliance on CI, and the significant 
role it has played in corporate successes, many U.S. companies remain relatively 
unfamiliar with the state of Chinese corporate intelligence and the evolving risks for U.S. 
corporations.   
INTANGIBLE THREAT 
The 17th Century French missionary Louis Le Comte wrote in his memoirs that trade and 
commerce “is the soul of the (Chinese) people” and “the primum mobile of all their 
actions.”10 China’s trade and commercial genius has certainly played a major role in the 
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spectacular rise of China’s economy and its integration with the U.S. economy over the 
last several decades. Some observers view China’s growing stake in America’s economic 
system as an extremely positive development for the United States, while others see 
Beijing as a military, economic, and technological threat. Most would probably agree, 
however, that China’s growing economic power11  and massive annual trade surplus with 
the United States – $250 billion and growing – puts China in a position to affect the 
United States economy in ways considered improbable in the past.12   
Chinese firms’ increasing involvement in corporate spying and IP theft in America 
raises the stakes of the trade deficit problem with China and is the source of a great deal 
of concern for U.S. homeland security. Chinese corporations that use IP theft and 
infringement as components of their overall business model, and effectively employ 
corporate intelligence programs to that end, are damaging the foundations of the 
American corporate world: intangible property. 
Most of the value in corporations, particularly in America, remains in intangible 
property. The term “intangible property” is generally used to refer to the following non-
physical assets, such as intellectual property (e.g., patents, copyrights, trademarks, and 
trade secrets), legal rights (e.g., leases, contracts, and licenses), relationships (e.g., 
supply and custom distribution chains) and brands. According to a 2006 Brand Finance 
report in 2006, 62 percent of the value of corporations around the globe is based on 
intangibles ($19.5 trillion of global market value).13  U.S. corporations have 75 percent of 
their value tied up in intangibles.14 Not surprisingly, intangible property accounts for 98 
percent of the U.S. technology sector.15   
Intellectual property receives a lot of attention because its misappropriation can 
devastate companies, especially those in IP industries, and can have a disproportionate 
impact on countries like the United States, where IP factors so prominently in the 
overall economy. U.S. IP industries, for example, have been responsible for 
approximately 40 percent of the total growth of the U.S. economy.16  The International 
Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA) released an economic study in 2007 that assessed 
U.S. copyright industries (e.g., entertainment software, motion picture, business 
software, and recording) as contributing more job growth, gross domestic product 
(GDP), and foreign exports and sales to the U.S. economy than any other industry; they 
contributed about $1.38 trillion to U.S. GDP, employed 11.3 million workers, and 
accounted for approximately $110.8 billion in foreign sales and exports in 2005.17   
OVER 300 HUNDRED YEARS OF COUNTERFEITING EXCELLENCE 
Le Comte extolled Chinese merchants for their commercial genius, but suggested they 
focus much of their “labor and natural industry” on dishonest business practices and 
counterfeit “almost everything they vend.”18 He writes: “(Chinese merchants) counterfeit 
Gammons of Bacon so artificially, that many times a Man is mistaken in them; … It is 
certain a Stranger will be always cheated, if he buy alone, let him take what care he 
will.”19  
Remarkably, Le Comte’s observations from over 300 years ago remain valid today, 
and manifest themselves in the intractable problem U.S. companies encounter doing 
business with China: how to take advantage of China’s vast trade and commercial 
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potential without losing much of the intangible value of their corporations to 
counterfeiting and other forms of infringement. 
Chinese counterfeiting and piracy levels are extremely high.  According to the IIPA’s 
2008 Special 301 Report, Chinese copyright piracy cost U.S. copyright industries almost 
$3 billion in 2007; piracy levels reached 90 percent of published records and music, 80 
percent of business software and 95 percent of entertainment software. According to the 
U.S. trade representative’s report to Congress on China’s World Trade Organization 
compliance in 2004, the value of Chinese counterfeit products brought into the U.S. 
market reached $134 million. Chinese counterfeiting also limits demand for legitimate 
U.S. IP products globally, which damages company revenues and, by extension, the U.S. 
economy. The U.S. Department of Commerce, for example, reported that Chinese 
counterfeiting cost the U.S. economy about $20-24 billion in 2004. 
Counterfeiting is not limited to Chinese street merchants. Chinese multinational 
corporations (MNC) are significant contributors to the overall counterfeiting of high-
tech products. Cisco Systems filed an IP infringement claim in 2003 against Huawei 
Technologies (a powerful Chinese MNC that produces telecommunications and 
networking equipment) for copying patented Cisco technologies, user manuals, and the 
source code used for Huawei’s counterfeit routers. In a 2005 interview with 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Warren Heit, a partner at White & Case, states that display 
cases at some of Huawei’s offices contained ‘perfect’ knock-offs of Cisco telecom and 
Polycom equipment.20  
Some Chinese MNCs view both legal IP development and illegal IP theft and 
infringement as extremely important components of their business models and key to 
their long-term profitability and survival. Huawei’s business model, for example, is 
partly based on selling counterfeit products in developing countries with poor IP 
protection. As Heit suggests: “Huawei is saying to itself… ‘I am going to knock (Cisco) 
products off and to the extent the IP law allows me to practice in these areas, I’m going 
to go there…Cisco, maybe you can have the U.S., but I’ll take you everywhere you 
haven’t gone.’”21 
Chinese corporations’ counterfeiting of high-tech equipment and IP theft raises 
concerns beyond economic loss. Counterfeit computer components from China, for 
example, could be used to compromise U.S. corporate and government computer 
networks and cause military systems to fail.22 The U.S. government in early 2008 seized 
$76 million worth of counterfeit Cisco routers, switches, WAN interface cards, and 
gigabit interface converters, which were purchased by the U.S. Naval Academy, U.S. 
Naval Air Warfare Center, General Services Administration, U.S. Naval Undersea 
Warfare Center, and defense contractor Raytheon, among others.23  Melissa Hathaway, 
director of the Director of National Intelligence’s (DNI) cyber security office, 
commented on the government’s seizure of over 400 counterfeit routers: “Counterfeit 
products have been linked to the crash of mission-critical networks, and may also 
contain hidden ‘back doors’ enabling network security to [be] bypassed and sensitive 
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COUNTERFEITER, HACKER, SOLDIER, SPY 
Chinese espionage directed against U.S. government and corporate targets is well-
documented in the recent literature. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
officials have investigated over 540 instances of illegal technology exports to China, 
which often involve Chinese corporations. The Washington Post published an article in 
April 2008 describing twelve cases of Chinese espionage that have occurred since March 
2007. The charges range from illegal export of warship technology and source codes for 
simulation software for the precision training of fighter pilots, to theft of trade secrets 
from two companies on behalf of a Chinese military program. Joel Brenner, the head of 
the counterintelligence office of the DNI, states: “Espionage used to be a problem for the 
FBI, CIA and military, but now it’s a problem for corporations…It’s no longer a cloak-
and-dagger thing. It’s about computer architecture and the soundness of electronic 
systems.”25   
The U.S. Defense Department and IC claim that China is America’s most serious 
cyber security threat.26  The Office of the DNI, in response to a Business Week inquiry, 
stated that computer intrusions have been successful against a wide range of 
government and corporate networks across the critical infrastructure and defense 
industrial base.27  A recent Business Week special report revealed Chinese hackers may 
have recently sent an e-mail attachment containing the malicious computer code to an 
executive at Booz Allen Hamilton, a $4 billion U.S. corporation, in an attempt to infect 
the company’s computer network and acquire sensitive information. According to the 
report, hackers have launched numerous similar attacks on U.S. companies and 
government agencies for the last several years; the Departments of Defense, State, 
Energy, Commerce, Health and Human Services and Treasury, and corporations Boeing, 
Lockheed Martin, General Electric, Raytheon and General Dynamics, are some of the 
known victims. The U.S. government reported the occurrence of 12,986 cyber intrusions 
and other cyber security events on government and defense contractor networks; U.S. 
military networks experienced a 55 percent increase in attacks.28 O. Sami Saydjari, a 
former National Security Agency (NSA) official, suggests the scale of organized Chinese 
hacking activities – much of which involves the Chinese military29– is having a 
devastating impact on U.S. government and corporate computer networks.30   
A number of Chinese companies aggressively employ intelligence collection methods 
that cross the line of propriety and legality, and some of them are also IP infringers.  
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. auto-parts manufacturer Metaldyne, 
one of only two corporations in the world capable of transforming powdered metal into 
high-performance engine components, was seriously damaged when one of its former 
engineers gave proprietary information to potential Chinese competitors. A Huawei 
employee illegally took photos of Fujitsu circuit boards at Supercomm in 2003; Business 
Week speculated that the employee may have also collected proprietary information 
from AT&T, Cisco, Lucent, Nortel, and Tellabs.31 The U.S. software maker 3DGeo 
Development Inc. caught several trainees of the Chinese state-owned oil company Petro 
China Co. trying to access 3DGeo’s secure computer systems; one was sentenced to two 
years in prison in 2004.32  As a result of the increased incidents, the FBI decided in 
2007 to identify the ten highest-value U.S. corporations (including General Electric, 
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DuPont and Corning) in the respective areas of the FBI’s fifty-six field offices 
throughout America and brief those corporations on the threat. 33 
Chinese government research institutes are also actively involved in trade secret theft.  
The FBI and other U.S. government agencies recently identified about 150 individuals 
and businesses involved in illegally transferring aerospace and weapons technology to 
China and Iran; the espionage may have benefited Chinese government’s space 
program.34 Most notably, the FBI arrested physicist Shu Quan-sheng, the president of a 
National Air and Space Agency (NASA) subcontractor, for allegedly exporting restricted 
U.S. technology to China to assist the development of China’s Long March V heavy 
booster. According to the federal claim, Shu allegedly transferred sensitive data on the 
components of a specialized cryogenic hydrogen tank to the People’s Liberation Army’s 
General Armaments Department and its 101st Research Institute. In a separate case, the 
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reported in June 2008 that China’s Naval Research 
Center acquired Quantum3D Inc.’s Mantis 1.5.5 and viXsen trade secrets – software 
programs used to simulate real world motion and train military fighter pilots – from 
Xiaodeng Sheldon Meng, a Chinese software engineer and former employee of 
Quantum3D Inc.35 
STRATEGIC ROAD AHEAD:  CHINESE CORPORATIONS MUST 
LEAD THE WAY 
The late Professor Zheng Chengsi, father of IP in China and former director of the 
Intellectual Property Office of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), declared China’s 
economic growth in the 21st Century will largely depend on its ability to manage 
intangible property and produce enterprises capable of successfully engaging in global 
IP competition.36  Zheng’s work at CAS persuaded the State Council to develop China’s 
first National Intellectual Property Strategy – promulgated in June 2008 – and his 
intellectual imprint is reflected in the Strategy’s emphasis on transforming the way 
companies create and acquire IP overseas.37  Section 2 (12) of the Strategy emphasizes 
the importance of making the corporation “the principal entity in the creation and 
utilization of intellectual property.”  The Strategy also bears the mark of China’s 
national security experts in that it calls upon government agencies and enterprises to 
make more effective use of IP for national defense and encourages the development and 
use of civilian IP for military purposes.38   
The Strategy highlights the importance of improving China’s capacity to create IP 
and Chinese-developed standards,39  in which increased research and development 
(R&D) plays an integral role.40 On this front, Beijing has been very successful in 
inducing most large U.S. high technology firms to invest heavily in R&D in China – 
largely in the form of high-technology R&D programs and centers in exchange for 
market access and financial incentives – which is gradually helping China close the gap 
between basic research and bringing inventions to market. In addition, U.S. R&D 
activities in China not only help Chinese subsidiaries improve their own R&D 
programs,41 but could also indirectly help China’s defense-modernization efforts.42  
[L]ocal Chinese employees working at foreign R&D centers may gain an in-depth 
understanding of how foreign technologies are developed and function. In some 
instances, R&D activity has included integrating foreign technology with local 
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systems or making foreign technology compatible with Chinese technical standards. 
This latter form of knowledge transfer (systems and standards integration 
capabilities), in particular, could be of potential use to China’s defense 
modernization goals, especially in developing asymmetric capabilities. For this and 
other reasons…extensive knowledge transfers through R&D in China could pose 
risks for long-term US security as well as economic interests. 43 
China spends heavily on R&D to improve China’s capacity to rapidly absorb and adopt 
foreign technologies that can advance civilian and defense technology and IP 
development. According to the 2007 OECD report, China has become one of the most 
R&D intensive countries in the world, second only to the United States; China’s R&D 
spending in 2007 surpassed Japan’s for the first time. China’s R&D spending could 
increase 24 percent in 2008 to $216.8 billion, which is roughly 18 percent of R&D 
spending worldwide.44  China’s total R&D spending in 2007 reached approximately $175 
billion (an increase of nearly $155 billion in R&D spending since 2003). U.S. and 
Japanese spending during that same period totaled about $353 billion and $143.5 
billion, respectively. 45  The European Commission recently assessed that, if China 
continues to increase its R&D spending at the current pace, China could match the EU 
in R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP by 2009. 46 It is important to note, however, 
that government-sponsored R&D focuses primarily on applied research and technology 
development (the government used less than 6 percent of total R&D funding for basic 
research in 2002 and 2003).47 
Chinese corporations are becoming the most important contributors to the R&D 
spending in China. According to the Research Institute of Industrial Economics and 
Orebro University in Sweden, Chinese companies conducted about 68 percent of China’s 
total R&D in terms of spending in 2005, which highlights the dramatic shift from a 
government-centered to a corporate-dominated innovation system.48 
Comparisons of China’s R&D expenditures with developed countries do not account 
for the large disparities between China and the West in the quality and cost of research 
staff. As Dr. Xu Zhijun, chief marketing officer of the Chinese multinational 
telecommunications giant Huawei argues, because of China’s low labor costs and access 
to high-quality researchers, Huawei may have spent only $1.1 billion in R&D last fiscal 
year, but that is equivalent to about $4 to $5 billion spent by western rivals such as 
Cisco.49  
As suggested later in this article, the global economic downturn has important 
implications for Chinese corporate R&D programs. Chinese companies will have to 
make hard choices about R&D funding, and many of them will probably choose to focus 
exclusively on combining in-house R&D with imported technology to avoid the high 
costs and risks associated with basic and more innovative research. (This R&D strategy 
has been heavily used by legitimate companies and counterfeiters in the past for reverse 
engineering purposes). 50      
THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE  
Beijing’s push to make IP the strategic imperative of government agencies and 
corporations, as manifested in the Strategy,51 has had a significant impact on Chinese 
companies. Many Chinese executives, seeking to fulfill the government’s desire that 
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their enterprises become the driving force behind China’s technological innovation and 
IP creation, have established new competitive intelligence (CI) units or expanded their 
existing programs.52 Chinese companies have reportedly intensified efforts to hire 
qualified Chinese CI personnel to fill a growing number of CI collection and analysis 
positions.53  
Zhong Tianwei, the Guangzhou branch manager of Beijing TRS Information 
Technology Company, 54  notes that many domestic enterprises can attribute their 
successes to CI.55 Competitive intelligence can help companies determine competitors’ 
R&D capabilities, keep informed of competitors’ product developments, assess 
competitors’ product performance, design new technologies and products, assess a 
competitor’s management strategies and decision-making capabilities, plan and manage 
R&D activities, create advanced S&T-based strategies, identify competitors interested in 
strategic alliances, and improve a company’s capability to protect its intellectual 
property from illegal human and technical collection.56  
The Mandarins’ Perspective on Competitive Intelligence 
Chinese government officials, scholars, and business strategists have written extensively 
about CI and recognize how it can help China (as it did Japan) achieve its IP goals and 
eventually become an economic superpower.57 China’s vigorous promotion of CI, and its 
subset competitive technical intelligence (CTI), have helped make these important 
topics of concern in China.58  The Chinese Ministry of Ordnance Industry’s Intelligence 
Research Institute, National Defense Science and Industry Scientific and Technical 
Intelligence Bureau, and the State Science and Technology Commission initiated a study 
comparing domestic and foreign intelligence research and held a series of seminars on 
strategic intelligence research and development from 1991 to 1994, resulting in a change 
in the direction of Chinese intelligence research work: competitive intelligence became 
its new focal point.59   
Since the mid-1990s, a growing number of Chinese PhD dissertations have focused 
on CI and the use of intelligence to advance China’s national interests.60 Many of these 
students have gone on to become influential in business, government, and academia, 
and have helped push the theoretical development of corporate intelligence in China.  
Dr. Chen Feng, for example, who received his PhD from Beijing University and wrote his 
dissertation on CI in China with the assistance of his advisor Liang Zhanping, director of 
China’s Institute of Information Science and Technology, is now a CAS associate 
researcher and senior consultant to Ding Lu Management Consultants, Ltd. and has 
advised Chinese high-technology firms how to set up CI programs.61 
U.S. and Chinese scholars have provided a myriad of definitions of CI and CTI.  
Corporate CI can generally be defined as activity related to the collection, processing, 
exploitation, analysis, and dissemination of information and finished intelligence on 
corporate competitors and pertinent industries that could impact a firm’s competitive 
situation. How narrowly or broadly a corporation defines the term depends on the 
company’s mission and the goals of its intelligence programs; generally, more resources 
and funding are required to meet intelligence goals that are broader in scope.  W. 
Bradford Ashton of Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Richard Klavans of the 
Center for Research Planning define CTI as “business sensitive information on external 
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scientific or technological threats, opportunities, or developments that have the 
potential to affect a company’s competitive situation.”62 
Chinese scholars have generally accepted the above definitions, but have added 
caveats of their own. Chinese and U.S. scholars also agree that corporate intelligence 
does not and should not include unethical or illegal forms of intelligence collection, such 
as unauthorized monitoring of phone and internet communications, trade secret theft, 
etc. However, some Chinese scholars concede that a gray area exists in CI, where reverse 
engineering and IP transfer may take place without necessarily breaking the law and the 
benefit to public interest may override the ethical considerations.63  
Chinese academics point out that company intelligence efforts are necessarily 
proprietary and need to be protected. The company’s sources and methods of collecting, 
processing, and analyzing information, and the intelligence derived from such activities, 
is confidential and usually well-guarded because unauthorized disclosure could 
negatively impact the company’s competitive position. This is primarily why Chinese 
companies are so interested in “anti-competitive intelligence” (also referred to as 
counterintelligence) programs: to help protect against IP loss in the “gray area.” This is 
discussed with some frequency in the Chinese literature.64 (As will be suggested later in 
this article, U.S. companies could also benefit from increased emphasis on 
counterintelligence programs.) 
Chinese Competitive Intelligence in Practice 
Chinese corporate intelligence in practice can differ substantially from how it is 
described in scholarly works. Although Chinese scholars stress that corporate 
intelligence programs must employ ethical and legal intelligence techniques and 
methods to produce intelligence, mounting evidence suggests Chinese firms are 
increasingly using their intelligence units to enhance the effectiveness of their illegal 
activities.  Chinese espionage cases involving IP theft from U.S. companies since 2007 
indicate the emphasis China places on illegal corporate intelligence, the great risks 
China is willing to take to acquire U.S. IP, and the disregard it has for the global IP 
system (note that the Chinese government denies any illegal conduct).   
As discussed, Chinese executives and managers hope to transform their companies 
into global competitors (86 percent of Chinese executives interviewed for a McKinsey 
survey in 2008 indicated they had global ambitions). They view the development of 
corporate intelligence programs as a means to improve strategic management and help 
identify struggling U.S. firms to purchase. This ambition can drive them to turn 
otherwise ethical CI programs into illegal collection platforms. ‘The Chinese are out to 
develop a modern economy and society in one generation,’ notes Joel Brenner. ‘There is 
much about their determination that is admirable. But they’re also willing to steal a lot 
of proprietary information to do it, and that’s not admirable.65  
The most robust Chinese corporate intelligence units are likely located in R&D 
centers overseas (often called “listening posts”), where the company can most effectively 
collect intelligence from its competitors and leverage the deep expertise of its many 
high-quality and relatively low-cost scientists and engineers to analyze and evaluate the 
technology and IP the company purchases or steals.66 The Chinese literature suggests 
the intelligence units’ internal processes are generally similar to those described in some 
of the most prominent works on corporate intelligence in the west.67 The organization of 
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some of the units may differ somewhat from those in the West, but they likely combine 
personnel with formal intelligence training and those who are experts in their given 
technical or scientific fields to conduct intelligence collection, processing and 
exploitation, analysis, production, and dissemination.68 Personnel assigned to listening 
posts can use their legal collection and analysis of patents, standards, business and 
market data, and information to inform illegal collection activities and vice-versa. They 
can also rely on scientific and technical assistance from their company headquarters, 
some of which are located in high-technology science parks in China and so have direct 
access to world-class government research institutes and universities (many of which 
employ scientists, engineers and academicians who have undoubtedly developed a 
corpus of useful knowledge and techniques related to obtaining proprietary and 
classified information from U.S. corporate and government laboratories).69, 70   
These listening posts – some of which may receive Chinese government intelligence 
and military financial support and collection guidance71 – may also employ illegal 
technical collection techniques (such as hacking) in the United States to obtain 
proprietary information from key U.S. competitors.  Brenner claims Chinese hackers, on 
behalf of a Chinese corporation, hacked into “a large American company” to obtain 
sensitive company information prior to an impending business negotiation between the 
U.S. and Chinese companies. In a National Journal article, Brenner recounted the 
following incident: “The [U.S. business] delegation gets to China and realizes, ‘These 
guys on the other side of the table know every bottom line on every significant 
negotiating point.’ They had to have got this by hacking into [the company’s] systems.”72 
Chinese illegal technical collection threatens U.S. corporate facilities worldwide and 
puts U.S. R&D centers operating in China at risk. In late 2007, Jonathan Evans, the 
director general of Britain’s domestic intelligence agency MI5, warned 300 firms 
operating in the UK of growing evidence that state-sponsored Chinese hackers were 
attacking corporate networks and stealing proprietary information.73  Although U.S. 
technology firms likely have physical and operational security procedures in place in 
their facilities inside China, they are probably no match for China’s corporate and 
government intelligence services – among the most effective in human and technical 
intelligence collection in the world.74  Microsoft Corporation, which intends to invest 
one billion dollars in China R&D over the next three years, will undoubtedly be a target 
for domestic Chinese competitors. 
RETHINKING THE INTELLIGENCE PARADIGM 
Roger George, senior analyst at the CIA’s Global Futures Partnership, argues the 
traditional intelligence paradigm, which was relatively successful in dealing with state-
centric problems, is less effective at collecting and analyzing global and transnational 
phenomena. These emerging challenges are ‘blind spots’ that are difficult for analysts 
operating under traditional organizational and functional constraints to identify and 
understand.75  The global character of Chinese corporate espionage challenges the 
effectiveness of traditional U.S. intelligence and law enforcement efforts.76  An analysis 
of recent studies and press reports also suggests the U.S. IC and law enforcement 
communities still lack sufficient resources and expertise to effectively collect and 
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analyze data and information on Chinese espionage activities directed against U.S. 
companies worldwide. 
Although the Cox Report was written a decade ago, many of its findings are relevant 
today. The report acknowledges the U.S. government cannot “completely monitor PRC 
activities in the United States” because of the scope of China’s “decentralized collection 
efforts.”77 According to the report, the CIA, Department of Commerce, FBI, and DoD 
never considered Chinese technology acquisition an intelligence priority. They failed to 
establish collection requirements to obtain information on Chinese government or 
commercial efforts to acquire U.S. technology companies, identify and obtain advances 
in U.S. technology, or establish business relationships with U.S. high-technology 
companies. Nor did U.S. agencies establish requirements to examine commercial 
affiliations between Chinese foreign nationals and U.S. companies. 78  The Select 
Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives determined U.S. government agencies 
only conducted “narrow” or “reactive” monitoring of Chinese business activities rather 
than taking more proactive measures.79  “[T]here is little or no coordination,” states the 
report, “within the U.S. Government of counterintelligence that is conducted against the 
PRC-directed efforts to acquire sensitive U.S. technology.”80   
The IC’s scientific and technical (S&T) intelligence framework – an outgrowth of the 
Cold War  which largely collects and analyzes key S&T data and information within a 
classified system81 to understand foreign weapons platforms and identify emerging S&T 
threats,82 remains ill-suited to adequately handle evolving Chinese corporate espionage 
focused on IP theft and infringement. Under this S&T paradigm, Chinese CI would not 
likely be considered relevant for S&T collection and analysis (the IC would probably 
view it as a business or management issue) and IP would be treated primarily as an 
economic, legal, and trade-related matter. Chinese academics, government, and 
industry, however, encourage greater collaboration between government and industry 
intelligence programs83 and largely view S&T and IP as inseparable, whether from an 
intelligence or economic perspective.   
Dr. Rob Johnston, in his 2005 study on analytic culture in the IC, suggests there is a 
separation of the domains of S&T and economic intelligence and expertise within the 
analytic community.84 To the extent that situation now exists and is not mitigated 
through collaboration, some S&T and economic analysts, who are looking at data and 
information from the perspective of their areas of focus and expertise, may overlook 
critical IP and R&D data and information that directly impacts analytic judgments on 
S&T developments in China.85  An economic analyst who has spent a career learning the 
tenets of economic analysis may not understand how unique IP and R&D data and 
information could inform S&T intelligence analysis, 86  or consider how Chinese 
corporate intelligence impacts trade and innovation. If such issues are not overlooked, 
they would probably fall under the purview of analysts working on transnational matters; 
those analysts may or may not have extensive scientific, technical, or economic expertise, 
or even speak Chinese (RAND suggests the IC’s expertise and focus on S&T analysis and 
the assessment of foreign R&D programs has decreased).87 88  
The lines between Chinese intelligence, military, and commercial activities are not 
truly ‘blurred.’ The blurring of the lines cited in the Cox Report89 demonstrates how the 
IC has tried to apply a Western construct to understanding Chinese business and 
intelligence practices. As suggested from the evidence in previous sections of this article, 
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there are no strict legal lines separating Chinese intelligence activities from the 
corporate world as exist in the United States.  Chinese corporations are always subject to 
extensive government influence and control, and many companies prefer having close 
links to the government for protection and access to resources and information that can 
give them a competitive advantage. 
The barrier the IC has created between S&T and IP could create an imbalance in the 
allocation of resources and funding for collection and analysis of the issues. This could 
influence which U.S. agencies handle certain requirements and how IC offices are 
organized and staffed to deal with particular analytic problem sets; it could hinder 
collaboration and increase analytic error.90   
The IC lists its intelligence collection priorities in the National Intelligence Priorities 
Requirements Framework (NIPF), which emphasizes about twelve priority intelligence 
targets, countries, or issues out of 150, according to a 2008 study by the RAND 
Corporation.91  The NIPF ranking of the relative importance of these priorities affects 
government resource allocations and those of the most critical importance to the 
country receive more funding for collection and analysis. 92  The RAND study 
characterizes priorities such as terrorism, WMD proliferation (an S&T intelligence issue) 
and China as NIPF “crosscutting problems or theme-areas.”93  The study points out the 
“NIPF has great value for many uses, but it also provides an incentive to reduce 
spending resources on all but the hottest current priorities, often at the expense of 
deeper assessments of longer-term challenges.”94   
Many U.S. policymakers tend to look to organizations such as the Department of 
State, DOJ, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark office for expertise on IP and other IP-
related issues. Trade secret theft – one area of IP most often discussed in the 
intelligence context – is largely seen as the purview of agencies dealing with domestic 
counterintelligence matters, such as the FBI.95 Because of this, some other IC agencies, 
which are in the position to assist the FBI, might not be doing so because of cultural or 
institutional barriers.   
It is also difficult for the U.S. government to impress upon companies the seriousness 
of the threat and persuade them to respond appropriately. Some U.S. corporations 
might be unwilling to assist the FBI or Department of Homeland Security (DHS) – for 
example, by revealing the fact a Chinese corporation has stolen proprietary information 
through human or technical intelligence collection methods – to avoid potentially 
negative repercussions for their business interests in China or damage to shareholder 
confidence.96   
There are also indications that U.S. companies are still not taking the Chinese 
seriously. A recent McKinsey survey suggests that while U.S. executives view Chinese 
corporations as a significant threat, few (28% of respondents) have taken sufficient 
steps to counter the threat because of a perception that Chinese firms are relatively weak 
in product quality, marketing, and brand development. The report observes: “This 
lackluster reaction to the global ambitions of Chinese companies raises the question of 
whether business executives elsewhere are setting themselves up for some unhappy 
competitive surprises.”97 
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THE COMING STORM 
Chinese leaders have made it clear that they want to reinvent China’s role in the world 
economy and move from dependence on foreign technology and direct investment to a 
country that rivals the United States in terms of industrial and technological power.  
They recognize that this requires promoting and rewarding scientific discovery and true 
innovation, increasing IP ownership, developing new technology standards, and making 
it possible for Chinese corporations to play an even greater role in foreign technology 
acquisition and IP transfer. China has made considerable advances in developing 
favorable national and local S&T, IP, and business policies, and has increased its 
emphasis on education and R&D.  
Chinese companies have shown they can effectively absorb and adopt U.S. technology 
and IP to push innovation. According to Curtis Carlson and William Wilmot of SRI 
International, the company that pioneered innovations such as the computer mouse and 
robotic surgery, China is working with preeminent partners around the globe to create 
the future technologies, attaining parity with the United States in some areas such as 
nanotechnology. 98  Along these lines, Frans van Houten, CEO of the European 
semiconductor company NXP, states China is now home to about 400 semiconductor 
firms that design chips and some of these companies will rapidly become top-notch 
innovators.99 Motorcycle suppliers, designers, and manufacturers, in Chongqing, China, 
have collaborated to develop a unique entrepreneurial network and business model 
called ‘localized modularization’, which allows manufacturers to request parts from 
suppliers without specifying details; i.e., makers note the size and weight of the parts in 
their orders and suppliers decide what parts to provide. This push to innovate is 
contributing to the rapid expansion of China’s patent system: Chinese domestic patent 
applications grew from 165,773 in 2001 to 470,342 in 2006.100 
Some observers are very optimistic about China’s largely untapped capacity to 
innovate. The National Science Foundation estimates China could graduate about four-
times more engineering PhDs than America in the next several years. Based on their 
observations of the work of Chinese scientists, engineers, and researchers, Carlson and 
Wilmot believe the Chinese are just as creative as their Western counterparts; there is 
ample evidence of creativity and entrepreneurial ambition in Chinese firms.101  Many 
Chinese engineers and scientists who received their PhDs in the United States, some of 
whom played important roles in successful innovations in U.S. high-tech firms, are now 
returning to China.102  
At the same time, Chinese industrial espionage and IP misappropriation, often done 
with the support or knowledge of the government, shows China is also willing to 
disregard the traditional rules of the game when convenient and take great risks to 
acquire U.S. government secrets and corporate proprietary information to the detriment 
of U.S. national security. As demonstrated earlier, a number of the most well-known and 
powerful Chinese corporations actively engage in IP misappropriation, theft, and 
reverse engineering and solicit IP transfer from their foreign competitors’ former 
employees. To date, intense U.S. corporate and government pressure on the Chinese 
government to improve the enforcement of IP rights has had limited results. Clearly, the 
blowback for Chinese espionage has not been severe enough for some Chinese 
companies to stop their illegal activities.   
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Against this backdrop, one wonders how long U.S. technology firms – despite their 
current comparative advantage in S&T and IP – will be able to withstand Chinese 
competition. Many U.S. scholars and business leaders might argue that most U.S. firms 
will not succumb to Chinese competitive pressure until China improves its capability to 
innovate and strengthen its IP base vis-à-vis the United States. This could take several 
decades at a minimum. However, some of these same U.S. observers (perhaps due to 
bias, mirror imaging, apathy or hubris) fail to take seriously a question that weighs 
heavily on the minds of many Chinese executives with global aspirations and 
government leaders who want to turn China into a superpower: “How can we further 
improve the effectiveness of our CI programs, whether it be through legal or illegal 
means, to continue to close the IP gap with U.S. companies?”  
ECONOMIC DOWNTURN CREATES OPPORTUNITIES  
The global economic crisis is having a major impact on Chinese companies and trade.  
Chinese President Hu Jintao recently told members of the Communist Party that the 
global economic downturn is hurting China’s competitive advantage in trade and 
threatens Party legitimacy and ability to rule. 103  Chinese leaders are growing 
increasingly concerned that the economic crisis, which has significantly reduced 
demand for Chinese exports and played a major role in the collapse of over 68,000 
small Chinese companies, will leave millions of workers unemployed and lead to 
widespread domestic unrest.104   
As the situation worsens, the pressure for Huawei and other MNCs to gain a 
competitive edge over U.S. and European competitors grows. Huawei’s CEO called on 
his employees in July to prepare “psychologically” for the impending downturn; 
employees must work in “crisis mode” to ensure growth and innovation.105  The pressure 
of working for Huawei is well-known in China, and employee depression and suicides 
have been on the rise this year, according to Chinese press reports.  A Huawei employee, 
speaking on condition of anonymity, said that overtime is part of employee evaluations 
and the corporate culture encourages overtime to shorten product cycles and remain 
competitive vis-à-vis international giants.106  
Huawei and some other large Chinese companies view the crisis as an opportunity to 
invest in the United States and acquire Western IP at an excellent value.107  Recent press 
reports, for example, suggest Huawei will continue to expand in the U.S. market in 
2009.108  China Mobile Ltd. also intends to set up its first R&D center outside of China 
(in California’s Silicon Valley in 2009) to assist its work on Internet and 
telecommunications integration. Donald Straszheim, an economist and vice chair of 
Roth Capital Partners, which has handled the financing of Chinese companies, states: 
“In the global recession, Chinese companies are looking around the world to acquire 
knowledge.”109 Chinese employees of Frog Design, a consulting firm that develops 
innovative products for Fortune 500 companies, take the following view of the crisis: 
In China, the rule of the game is always "Stay One Step Ahead of Your 
Competitors”…[W]hen Chinese businesses run out of initiatives in which to invest 
their capital or when their investments stop…they make a concerted effort 
to…invest in research and development. In fact, senior executives in some 
companies have said publicly that in the near future they would either invest in 
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their own health and personal happiness, or they would increase R&D budgets in 
their businesses to invest in better products to prepare for a new run when the 
downturn ends…This puts a premium on vision and strategic planning instead of 
short-term financial risk taking.110 
Some companies, which lack funds for R&D because of the credit crunch, may simply 
decide to engage in IP theft to maintain an edge over competitors.  Michael Kump, a 
lawyer specializing in IP law, contends:   
As economic conditions tighten and people start looking for ways to cut corners 
and gain an advantage, some will cross the line…in an illegal manner. One of the 
classic shortcuts is to steal competitors’ intellectual property. It can be quicker to 
target key employees at a successful competitor and try to get those employees to 
come over to your side than to invest in process and grow your business the right 
way.111  
PriceWaterhouseCoopers notes that established Chinese companies can greatly benefit 
from employee IP transfer; former U.S. technical specialists can receive financial 
support to establish start-up companies that rely on the proprietary knowledge obtained 
from their U.S. employers.112   
As the global economy continues to weaken, Chinese corporations will likely seek to 
expand their CI and R&D activities in the United States to increase productivity and 
improve their competitive positions. This growth will include acquiring struggling U.S. 
technology firms or their R&D centers, which could result in windfall IP transfers to 
Chinese firms. Jin Chen, a professor at Zhejiang University, asserts that Holly, a Chinese 
conglomerate, used its wholly-owned subsidiary in the U.S. to identify and acquire the 
Code-Division Multiple Access R&D unit from Phillips Electronics, which gave Holly 
rights to all IP at the facilities and many experienced engineers. The acquisition allowed 
Holly to improve its mobile telephone chip designs and position in the Chinese 
telecommunications market.113 Other notable examples include Lenovo’s purchase of 
IBM’s personal-computer business, the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation 
acquisition of Rover technology to create the Roewe brand,114  and Huawei’s purchase of 
Marconi to tap European markets and relationships with local carriers.115   
The list of high technology companies that are reducing their technical staff is 
growing. Sun Microsystems Inc. announced in early November 2008 that it would lay 
off about 6,000 employees. Teradyne Inc., the leading maker of microchip test 
equipment, stated it would release about 185 workers worldwide. National 
Semiconductor Corp., which makes chips, decided to lay off 330 employees and Applied 
Materials Inc., a manufacturer of chip equipment, announced it would cut 1,800 
positions.116  Some Chinese companies may increase efforts to hire recently laid-off 
employees of U.S. high technology firms, which could be a growing source of IP 
transfer.117 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The following recommendations are provided for the consideration of the U.S. 
government: 
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Take Steps to Encourage the Chinese Government and Industry to Stop 
Illegal Industrial Espionage and Large-Scale Intellectual Property Theft 
Thus far, complaints from the U.S. government and industry to stop this illegal behavior 
have either been met with Chinese government denials, abject disregard, or half-hearted 
enforcement efforts. Although U.S.-China trade agreements have had some success in 
curbing IP infringement, U.S. IP industries claim Chinese IP infringement is still 
occurring at unacceptable levels.  It would be neither fair nor accurate to attribute all 
industrial espionage and IP misappropriation to the Chinese government, or state that 
all Chinese firms are engaged in this sort of behavior. However, the mounting evidence 
of Chinese illegal activities is creating a dark cloud of mistrust regarding Chinese 
business practices that fuels the more pessimistic views of Beijing’s plans and intentions. 
U.S. government representatives should impress upon their Chinese counterparts 
that this behavior could have a long-term negative impact on U.S. public perception of 
China. In addition, given the level of Chinese industrial espionage, the U.S. government 
should consider enacting laws that would impose more severe sanctions on Chinese 
companies whose employees are caught stealing U.S. technology and IP. 
Closely Review Proposals of Chinese Companies to Purchase R&D Centers 
of U.S. High-Technology Companies   
Huawei proposed to purchase its U.S. competitor 3Com last year, which would have 
given it access to technology supplied to the Pentagon.118  Although this was clearly a 
case in which national security interests were at stake, a closer examination of future 
high-technology purchase proposals may reveal security implications that are not quite 
so obvious.  
Make CI a New Strategic Theme in the IC  
The IC should consider designating CI as a new ‘strategic research theme’ to help 
identify and monitor new trends in foreign intelligence that could impact homeland 
security. 119    China has made CI the center of its intelligence studies and, as mentioned, 
this is having an impact on Chinese government intelligence research. CI exerts an 
important influence on the evolution of intelligence programs in other countries as well.  
In France, for example, CI “involves all levels of government, numerous support 
organizations from the private and public sectors as well as public private partnerships 
and quasi-governmental organizations, like the Chamber of Commerce and Industry…or 
the Agency for the Diffusion of Information and Technology.”120   
Develop Programs on IP and CI at U.S. Government Civilian and Military 
Colleges and Universities   
The extensive Chinese literature on CI has provided a window into a side of China that 
one is otherwise hard-pressed to find: a detailed discussion of Chinese government 
intelligence and counterintelligence operations. CI gave the Chinese a vehicle through 
which they could once again openly discuss intelligence and operations within the 
politically safe context of international business. At the same time, U.S. literature and 
understanding on the subject is relatively inadequate, with few books having been 
written on the subject of Chinese intelligence operations. Against this backdrop, the U.S. 
government should develop courses and sub-discipline programs at government civilian 
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and military colleges and universities to train and educate students and professionals in 
IP and CI matters.  
Devote More Funding to Collection and Analysis   
As part of this effort, the IC should devote more resources and funding to collection and 
analysis of the Chinese S&T and IP collection issues. As S&T intelligence requirements 
are part of the NIPF (National Intelligence Priorities Requirements Framework), 
according to the RAND report IP requirements should be combined with S&T 
requirements and ranked among the ‘hottest priorities.’ The IC should also require 
Chinese S&T analysts to obtain a deeper understanding IP issues and the development 
of Chinese language skills.  S&T analysts who do not have S&T backgrounds should be 
required to obtain formal training and education in critical S&T areas.  
The IC also needs more intelligence officers to devote to the problem. Despite the 
rapid increase in cyber security incidents and illegal technology transfer activities in 
America, the number of officers available to handle these cases remains limited. For 
example, the number of FBI agents assigned to handle Chinese spying activities in the 
United States has only risen from 150 in 2001 to 350 in 2007.121  
Develop a Cadre of Analysts, Scientists, and Technical Personnel with 
Chinese Language Proficiency   
The IC also requires more S&T analysts fluent in Chinese. As suggested in some of the 
declassified National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) on China (from 1949 to 1976), the IC 
had difficulty assessing the strategic objectives, military, and scientific and technical 
capabilities of China because the IC lacked collection in some areas and was forced to 
rely on Chinese press reporting.122  Given China’s intense secrecy today, IC China 
analysts are perhaps forced to rely on Chinese open source material more than analysts 
focusing on other foreign countries. 123   
Unfortunately, only a limited number of IC analysts can read Chinese; translating 
scientific and technical Chinese documents requires specialized skill. More China 
analysts must develop the capability to read and understand scientific and technical 
Chinese. Developing this skill is especially crucial for today’s S&T analysts because of 
the great strides China is making in S&T and R&D (many key Chinese S&T documents 
and books have only been published in Chinese).  
 
The following recommendations are provided for the consideration of U.S. corporations: 
Establish or Strengthen Competitive Intelligence Programs   
U.S. corporate executives and managers also need to develop or strengthen intelligence 
and counterintelligence programs in their companies. Some Chinese companies are 
outperforming their U.S. competitors in this area, and their successes can provide useful 
lessons for U.S. companies doing business with China. The consensus in the Chinese 
literature on CI is that training and education is essential for a successful CI program.124 
Although U.S. companies also understand this is important, they lag far behind some 
Chinese companies in CI training and education. For example, while DuPont employees 
are required to complete online training regarding insider risks,125 employees in some 
Chinese companies are obtaining their doctorates in CI.126  
SLATE, CHINA’S QUEST FOR INTANGIBLE PROPERTY 
 
 




Consider Sending Employees to Outside Competitive Intelligence 
Training Courses   
Company employees could learn a great deal about CI matters by attending outside CI 
training courses in China and the United States. Chinese companies send employees to 
CI courses held in various cities in China. The Chinese Business Training Network 
(CBTN) offers CI courses in China almost monthly. The course syllabus covers the 
following selected topics: goals of intelligence and competitive intelligence collection; 
using intelligence analysis and production methods; preventing disclosure of 
proprietary information during company visits; developing insiders in competitors’ 
companies; creation of social networks to find and recruit key IT personnel; creating CI 
units within the company; establishing clear lines of communication and support with 
other departments; protecting trade secrets; identifying and neutralizing intelligence 
threats; and case studies on real espionage cases and lessons learned (including case 
studies based on traditional CIA espionage operations and Chinese corporate 
counterintelligence investigations).127 
Increase Collaboration with Government Agencies and Heed 
Government Warnings     
Although the FBI and DHS have set up official groups within which U.S. companies can 
confidentially reveal their computer network vulnerabilities to the government,128 some 
companies remain loath to do so, for reasons mentioned previously. The National 
Journal’s recent article on Chinese hacking also suggests that some U.S. companies view 
government warnings as alarmist hyperbole.129  
Strengthen Protection of Sensitive Data and Consider the Long-term Risks 
Associated with Lay-Offs of Employees with Knowledge of Critical 
Proprietary Information  
As high-technology corporations increase employee lay-offs, they must take steps to 
ensure their sensitive data is well protected. Current information storage technologies, 
such as USB drives and other devices, have facilitated the ability of employees to take 
vast amounts of proprietary information to a company’s competitors.130  Cadence Design 
Systems, a software company, developed standard operating procedures – consisting of 
strict access and document controls, enterprise rights management and 
compartmentalization – to control the unauthorized release of such proprietary 
information. Cadence also employs modular software development procedures to 
compartmentalize information when conducting R&D in developing countries. 131 
However, the potential problem with such a method is that all of the money and effort 
put into its design can be lost if only one trusted employee with access to the right 
proprietary data departs the company and works for a competitor. Many U.S. high-
technology corporations, with the sole aim of cutting costs, often release employees 
without even assessing how they could damage compartmentalization efforts and long-
term market position. 
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The U.S.-China Economic Security and Review Commission warns in its 2007 annual 
report that, as U.S. companies continue to develop new technologies in hundreds of 
high-tech factories and joint R&D facilities in China, Chinese espionage poses the most 
significant threat to U.S. technology. If the U.S. government and industry cannot 
adequately control Chinese espionage in America, they certainly cannot expect to stop 
massive IP infringement and theft from U.S. R&D centers and other facilities located in 
China. Although U.S. IP industries can continue to push for stronger legislation (in both 
America and China) that would increase the penalties for Chinese companies and 
individuals involved in espionage, they must take steps to protect their intangible 
property to maintain their competitive positions worldwide.   
China’s large-scale infringement and theft of IP hurts the U.S. economy and, at the 
same time, helps advance Chinese science and technology, improve new weapons 
systems, and develop new products and processes. If America cannot do better at 
curbing these activities, then it becomes imperative for the IC to develop more robust 
methods of following Chinese S&T developments and informing policymakers of their 
potential ramifications. As U.S. preeminence in S&T and IP begins to wane, the 
importance of tracking and understanding emerging trends – such as CI in China – 
grows. Left unchecked, Chinese illegal forms of intelligence collection will enhance 
China’s corporate intelligence programs and competitive advantage to the detriment of 
U.S. corporations and the U.S. economy. 
China must strengthen efforts to cooperate with the United States on stopping such 
illegal activities, which greatly damage China's image and could push American public 
opinion toward protectionism or economic retaliation during an extended economic 
downturn.132 As the cases of contaminated Chinese food products and toys demonstrate, 
the short term economic benefits of unscrupulous and illegal behavior is not worth the 
long-term damage to the image of Chinese corporations and their business practices in 
the United States. The majority of ethical Chinese businessmen and laborers have 
worked too hard over the last several decades to watch their many successes become 
tarnished by the refusal of the Chinese government and unscrupulous corporations to 
admit and stop such wrongdoing. 
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Community Health Centers: The Untapped Resource for Public 
Health and Medical Preparedness 
Karen M. Wood 
 
The last few years of our political history have witnessed the emergence of a national 
preparedness architecture boasting numerous plans, strategies, directives, legislation, 
and even more novel programs to address those issues identified therein. One of the 
more recent entrants to this collection includes Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive-21 (HSPD-21) also known as the Public Health and Medical Preparedness 
Strategy. On October 18, 2007 HSPD-21 was released to the public calling for a 
transformation in the national approach to public health and medical preparedness in 
the United States.   
Like most everything else in this body of work, HSPD-21 adheres to the paradigm of 
the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and the National Response 
Framework (NRF), and elaborates on a preparedness vision conceptualized in previous 
strategies. The latest deliberations, as prioritized by this strategy, are to bolster the 
nation’s ability to manage a public health crisis by stimulating improvements in the 
areas of biosurveillance, countermeasure distribution, mass casualty care, and 
community resilience; the objective being to create a much more tightly integrated 
systems-approach toward public health and medical preparedness.  Interestingly, a huge 
potential component of this proposed system is already relatively well developed and 
continues to grow, but has been unable to garner significant preparedness support in 
the government’s frenzy to develop wholly new entities and to indoctrinate skeptical 
hospitals.  
As providers of critical medical and human services to vulnerable populations in 
medically underserved areas, community health centers (CHCs) – the untapped 
resource – are often recognized as indispensable and respected authority figures within 
their communities. As federally qualified health centers (FQHCs), regulated by the 
Bureau of Primary Health Care (BPHC) in the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), 
the administrative infrastructure and accountability mechanisms are already in place to 
groom CHCs for an active and measurable role in public health and medical 
preparedness.  
This article discusses the background of the Health Center Program and the potential 
roles of CHCs in relation to the Public Health and Medical Preparedness Strategy. 
Specifically, it argues that CHCs by philosophic orientation, geographic location, and as 
publicly funded entities,1 are well-positioned to provide medical services, education, and 
other human services to prevent, prepare for, mitigate, respond to, and recover from the 
public health impact of a bioterrorist event or other biological disease outbreak. 
Ultimately, this paper contends that aggressive investment in CHCs and their 
emergency management programs is a dual-purpose investment that will (1) support 
many of the objectives identified in the Public Health and Medical Preparedness 
Strategy, and (2) create greater social equity by reducing health disparities and make 
public health emergency management more accessible to special needs populations. 
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Finally, it discusses the current state of preparedness in CHCs, identifies barriers to 
implementation, and presents essential recommendations to get our nation on the path 
to public health and medical preparedness.   
THE HEALTH CENTER PROGRAM 
A community health center (CHC) is a non-profit primary-care practice governed with 
federal support via Section 330 of the Public Health Services Act2 and is strategically 
located in a federally-designated medically-underserved area to provide high-quality 
primary and preventive health care to anyone seeking care, regardless of their ability to 
pay. The emphasis on the underserved includes the uninsured, underinsured, Medicaid 
and Medicare recipients, and those without a medical home or who otherwise lack 
access due to travel distance, hours of operation, and cultural and linguistic barriers. 
The majority of patients served would fall in the classification of indigent care including 
migrant health and healthcare for the homeless, but CHCs also provide primary care in 
rural areas where services simply do not exist. Beyond the many required services that 
health center programs must provide and/or coordinate, most CHCs (dependent on 
their resources, capabilities, and the needs of their target population) directly provide 
pharmaceutical services, translation services, substance abuse and mental health 
services, and oral health services.3 
According to the National Association of Community Health Centers (NACHC), there 
are around 1,200 community health centers with more than 6,600 delivery sites (see 
Figure 1) spread across all fifty states and U.S. territories providing primary care to 
more than 18 million patients annually.4 Fortunately, the Bush Administration has been 
fairly supportive of the Health Center Program in recent years through the President’s 
Health Center Initiative. Between 2002 and 2007, the goal of CHC expansion into 1,200 
additional communities was reached by doubling annual investments from $1 billion in 
2000 to nearly $2 billion today.5 Even with these successes, the numbers of the 
medically underserved in our nation is staggering. The number of uninsured Americans 
is projected to reach 60 million by 2010 and another 56 million Americans lack access to 
primary care simply due to a shortage of physicians in their communities.6 
STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION: THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNITY 
HEALTH CENTERS  
HSPD-21 or the Public Health and Medical Preparedness Strategy asserts that the most 
critical components of public health and medical preparedness include biosurveillance, 
countermeasure distribution, mass casualty care, and community resilience. Within 
each of these defined critical areas, CHCs have the potential to make significant 
contributions to our nation’s emergency preparedness and response efforts. 
This section discusses the variety of ways in which CHCs can support their emergency 
management networks including: biosurveillance in hard-to-reach populations, 
supporting local health departments by providing staff and/or facilities for dispensing 
countermeasures, supporting mass casualty care efforts by mitigating surge on area 
hospitals and health systems, and promoting community resilience by supporting the 
spectrum of emergency management activities. 
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Overwhelming evidence exists suggesting that vulnerable populations suffer the greatest 
during natural disasters and epidemics. According to the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights: 
A crisis exists that has left a vast number of Americans, primarily the poor, 
women, and language, racial, and ethnic minorities, unprotected and uncared for 
by our nation’s medical system. The current and very real threat of a biological 







Data Source: Health Resources and Services Administration, 2005 
 
Patterns in susceptibility to illness and disease are unevenly stratified across 
socioeconomic status, racial, and/or ethnic groups. For example, Philip Blumenshine 
and others suggest that pandemic influenza will permeate these vulnerable populations 
with greater ease and speed because of financial and social constraints like limited 
telecommuting opportunities, financial pressures to go to work, and reliance on daycare 
services for childcare.9 Ultimately these pressures create a tendency to congregate which 
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is clearly dangerous for disease containment and will result in greater affliction for these 
groups. 
Consistent with the overarching objective of CHCs to provide primary and preventive 
care to underserved populations, service delivery sites are logically nestled within these 
vulnerable populations and could be strategically utilized to enhance our nation’s 
biosurveillance capabilities in the very populations that may be the first to signal a 
public health problem. Most CHCs occupy freestanding, permanent facilities while 
others are based in public schools, in or near hospitals and tribal communities, and still 
others operate seasonal programs and mobile clinics bringing their services directly to 
the patient. CHC services and the expertise of their clinical staff, however, often extend 
even beyond the immediate facility. Many CHCs partner with or are contracted by 
nursing homes, correctional facilities, and various shelters to provide services, as well. 
With this reach in their respective communities, CHCs could be leveraged as the eyes 
and ears of the public health community in these hard to reach populations.  
The BPHC issued Program Assistance Letter (PAL) 2002-02 advising health centers 
to “utilize the CDC and other appropriate clinical information resources on bioterrorism 
to enhance the health center’s ability to recognize the signs and symptoms of diseases 
and toxic agents that may be used in a bioterrorist attack.”10 Yet for agencies that are 
dedicated to expanding patient services, at times operating very close to the margin, this 
undertaking is generally not managed in any methodical way. In 2006, Art Clawson and 
others surveyed Florida-based CHCs and revealed that of those respondents having an 
emergency operations plan, only 41 percent had written policies that addressed 
bioterrorism preparedness and only 56 percent discussed reporting suspicious 
symptoms to the county health department.11 Moreover, when prompted with the 
question of what the center would need to respond, 80 percent of respondents reported 
a high-priority need for training personnel.12 
C. Robert Kline, Jr. describes the ruinous impact of a biological attack and highlights 
the urgency of preparation when he states:   
The stresses placed on responding to disasters, of whatever source but especially 
bioweapon release, strain even the best systems, and they do so for a long time 
with both volatile perturbations and a rapidity that is often hard to grasp. 
Preplanning reduces some of the stresses. Prevention is cheaper than cure.13 
It has already been established that the public health infrastructure is overtaxed.14 
Michael A. Stoto and others warn that even the threat of a localized outbreak will 
compel a surge in surveillance in surrounding jurisdictions.15 A surge, coupled with a 
slower turnaround in investigation and diagnosis for uncommon pathogens, could be an 
invitation for a costly recovery as opposed to the presumably cheaper alternatives of 
prevention and mitigation. Preparing CHCs to support biosurveillance activities and 
surveillance systems could be an inexpensive and effective means for bolstering the 
public health infrastructure during an otherwise crippling incident. All that is required 
to implement this valuable asset is training practitioners to recognize the clinical 
features of the various biological weapons agents and providing adequate and robust 
reporting channels to facilitate a rapid response.16 
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When practicable, Points of Dispensing (PODs) for countermeasure distribution even 
for one community, much less a region, should be designated in a way that provides 
comprehensive coverage for an area and ensures accessibility for residents all the while 
ensuring sufficient space between sites and within operational areas to minimize the 
challenges associated with crowd control. Steven Harrison, the assistant director of 
emergency operations, planning and logistics for the Virginia Department of Health, 
further contributes that non-traditional dispensing modalities such as drive-through 
dispensing and institutional delivery can be used in conjunction with PODs to help 
reduce the number of citizens reporting to individual sites.17  
In the event of a biological disease outbreak, adequate space for triage, dispensing, 
patient care, and counseling should be provided when possible.18 Within the POD, 
maintaining order through validated procedures would be necessary to ensure efficiency 
and prevent secondary infections where applicable. Personnel working in the PODs 
must be provided for in terms of their own health and safety through the provisioning of 
PPE and security as needed.   
A discussion of CHCs as points of dispensing for countermeasures and mass 
prophylaxis is not a new idea and several centers have already instituted agreements 
with officials to serve in this capacity.19 Again, CHCs are placed in a location that 
deliberately and thoroughly considers the level of accessibility to the target population. 
Many are in urban areas, are public transit accessible (where available), are proximate 
to their target populations, and most offer transportation services to fill the gap.   
According to Dr. Joseph V. Saitta, the emergency services coordinator for the 
Rappahannock Area Health District in Virginia, using the BERM model to calculate 
PODs and the number of people needed to staff them, would demonstrate that in many 
communities the typical health department could not do it alone. The health department 
would commit both its own staff and all available volunteers that it could muster from 
the Medical Reserve Corps, the regional Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster 
(VOAD), and the area’s Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT) to the 
incident. Depending on the nature, magnitude, and location of an outbreak, it is 
conceivable that a CHC might run a POD by itself, though the health department would 
make every attempt to provide staff or volunteers to help whenever possible.20 
The commitment to act as a POD, however, is not a matter to be taken lightly and 
should be preceded with a discussion of responsibilities and expectations. To be 
successful, a POD must be well integrated in relevant incident command systems as they 
will be reliant on these structures for resources and other types of support. If the CHC 
anticipates providing their own staff for such purposes, they should ensure that 
personnel are knowledgeable of the need for such measures, the threats that could 
surface, and the safety considerations that have been planned for on their behalf.  It will 
require a trained staff that can appropriately communicate with patients to provide 
necessary information and manage patient flow. It will require an exercised triaging 
system that is merely a “good idea” at this early stage of development for many CHCs 
moving towards emergency preparedness. While just-in-time training may be provided, 
preparing staff in advance for this response role may convey the importance of their 
efforts and help to alleviate the concerns that researchers have shown as contributing to 
a worker’s unwillingness to respond.21 At a minimum, CHCs serving as PODs should 
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engage in continuous incident command training for new staff, refresher training for 
existing staff, and exercises when possible to assess the site’s capabilities and improve 
coordination in the community.  Beyond these basics, personnel policies may need to be 
revised to encourage sick employees to stay home, well employees to report for duty, 
and all employees to feel secure during an incident. Clearly, sustained relationships and 
coordination with local health departments are the initial step for moving in this 
direction. Beyond these obvious partnerships, first responders as a whole would need to 
be educated on the role of the CHC-POD to appropriately direct citizens and provide 
support when needed.  
Mass Casualty Care 
The mass casualty care aspect of the Public Health and Medical Preparedness Strategy 
is an ambitious undertaking of the federal government and is envisioned to offer an 
“operational concept for the medical response to catastrophic health events that is 
substantively distinct from and broader than that which guides day-to-day 
operations.”22 The main components of this enterprise, to date, include the Modular 
Emergency Medical System (MEMS), the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), 
and the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC).   
The MEMS concept is based on the rapid organization of expandable patient care 
modules, and provides the structure and space to process up to 1,000 patients per day 
for each unit,23 ultimately expanding capacity and directing those in need to the 
appropriate care. The MEMS is intended for setup near local hospitals to manage the 
flow of patients in a systematic way to alleviate surge on area hospitals. The MEMS 
requires a staff of 500 persons per twelve-hour shift representing a variety of medical 
disciplines to operate at full capacity.24 It should also be noted that the MEMS has an 
important limitation of being “one practical approach to managing a major non-
communicable incident [emphasis added].”25  
The NDMS on the other hand is a volunteer program implemented with the purpose 
of augmenting the nation’s medical response capability by assisting state and local 
authorities in dealing with the medical impacts of major peacetime disasters.26 Once 
activated, NDMS response personnel are federalized and are protected by the Federal 
Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for medical malpractice claims and have recognized credentials 
in any state. 
Finally, the MRC is a community-based network of volunteers (similar to the NDMS) 
that is organized to “improve the health and safety of communities across the country by 
organizing and utilizing public health, medical, and other volunteers.”27 MRC units are 
largely composed of active medical personnel from area hospitals and healthcare 
systems and retired medical personnel who maintain their licenses and credentialing, 
among other professions. MRC units have been identified at the local and state levels as 
possible resources for meeting part of the staffing demands to operate the MEMS until, 
and if, federal resources can be deployed.    
While these programs may be a practical response to a number of incidents these 
entities could in and of themselves cause a range of unintended consequences during a 
pandemic illness. For the most part these programs rely on volunteers, which could 
present a number of challenges. For example, John B. Delaney argues that the NDMS 
will be proven futile during a pandemic disease outbreak and urges the federal 
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government, knowing of the systems limitations, to stop propagating them as a 
resource. Specifically, he points out that long deployments away from family and intense 
patient contact coupled with responders’ fear for personal safety and their family’s well-
being will be a major deterrent for these volunteers to volunteer.28 This argument 
should not be limited solely to NDMS. As a community resource, the MRC may be able 
to garner more support, but inevitably will see their resources drastically cut as well. 
Moreover, the counts for many of our emergency response assets may be inflated.29 The 
NDMS and MRC depend on volunteers to function, many of whom are being double-
counted because they belong to more than one volunteer emergency support program 
like Community Emergency Response Programs or the Red Cross.30 The resource count 
for these systems could be further diminished during an emergency because of either an 
unwillingness to respond or an inability due to professional obligations in their own 
communities.   
Pandemic by definition indicates that the response partners we would ordinarily 
expect to assist will be grappling with the same issues in their own communities.31 
Activating personnel through NDMS or the MRC would be of limited use under the 
pandemic scenario without creating undue hardship in the practitioners’ originating 
community and/or facility; this, of course, assumes that there even is interest from the 
teams. These teams may be viable under many of the national planning scenarios, but 
would still struggle to quickly meet the staffing demands of the MEMS.32     
By enabling CHC penetration, nurturing their emergency preparedness and response 
capabilities, and priming personnel for personal preparedness, CHCs can effectively and 
systematically help to alleviate surge pressures by acting as “alternate care sites” and 
tending to the needs of the “worried well” and/or “walking wounded.” In some 
instances, CHC medical practitioners could be prepared to rapidly fill a number of the 
positions that the MEMS would need to function without compromising any other 
locales, a concept more generally referred to as “community-based surge capacity.”33   
In 2007, the Office of the Press Secretary announced that it is the policy of the United 
States to ensure a “rapid public health and medical response that marshals all available 
national capabilities and capacities in a rapid and coordinated manner.”34 CHCs, as 
federally-funded entities, may be obligated to support response efforts by federal 
mandate. CHCs located within those jurisdictions having reformed their statutes per the 
Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (MSEHPA)35 may be obligated to support 
response efforts by state mandate.36 As providers of primary care services, CHCs may 
have a regulatory obligation, at the very least, to treat their rolls of existing patients.37 
Finally, those CHCs holding recognition as the sole medical provider in their respective 
communities may confront an overwhelming ethical obligation to provide care. Dr. D. 
Bradley Drawbaugh, executive director of Highland Medical Center in Virginia, further 
contributes that the healthcare system has been entrusted by the public to be prepared; 
when you betray that trust, it takes a long time to earn it back. “I’ve seen firsthand – the 
jobs lost and careers ruined when emergency preparedness is an afterthought. Crisis 
management is never good management when it commences during a crisis.”38 
In the end, the will to respond is a personal decision – volunteer or otherwise. 
However, by actively engaging in emergency management planning as a function of the 
workplace, thoroughly considering the needs of employees to execute response plans, 
and demonstrating appropriate provisions through incident command system 
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integration, a CHC may be able to provide the assurance needed to compel their 
practitioners to respond.    
Community Resilience 
Perhaps the most significant contribution CHCs can offer during a catastrophic health 
event would be promoting community resilience in the sphere of public health and 
medical preparedness. By providing citizen education, coordinated risk 
communications, community outreach, and basic medical services, CHCs as an 
organized force spanning the nation could assure the worried well, tend to the walking 
wounded, and support the special needs populations. 
The worried well can unknowingly increase infection rates by inadvertently exposing 
themselves and others by seeking unnecessary treatment.39 CHCs could serve as triage 
centers or alternate care sites for the walking wounded, consequently helping to manage 
the demand for services on area hospitals.40 Finally, CHCs could continue to provide the 
medical home their vulnerable populations have come to know and trust. Without 
adequate attention, each of these groups could needlessly overwhelm the lifesaving 
capacities that only the more advanced treatment facilities may be able to offer.41 
A recent survey administered in Kentucky revealed that a doctor’s office was the most 
frequently mentioned resource individuals would turn to for health information.42 While 
a CHC is unlikely to play a direct role in the development of needed educational and 
informational materials, it is prudent to embrace them as critical partners for the 
dissemination of such information. Dr. Karen Remley, the state health commissioner for 
the Virginia Department of Health, established that citizens trust their primary care 
physicians as the primary source of information. She continued, “We [the state] want 
primary care physicians to trust us as the primary source of information,” but as of yet 
the appropriate communication channel is obscure.43 Since the public-private divide 
permeates healthcare as it does most of the nation’s critical infrastructure, resolution of 
this issue may continue to be elusive. In the meantime, however, it is a reasonable 
starting point to connect with the CHCs. State and federal agencies may utilize any 
number of information networks to keep citizens informed; in the end, however, the 
public will want this information confirmed by their medical providers. 
Ultimately, CHCs may prove to be the crutch of the community by supporting the 
whole spectrum of emergency management activities to minimize the economic impacts 
and the loss of life due to a biological disease outbreak or other public health emergency. 
THE CASE FOR IMPLEMENTATION 
Strategically enlarging the Health Center Program and its preparedness capabilities is a 
dual-purpose investment: enhancing emergency preparedness by supporting the 
objectives identified in HSPD-21 and creating greater social equity. This section 
discusses the Health Center Program through a values lens and specifically considers 
the principles of health, justice, transparency, and accountability. 
Deborah Stone offers the goals of equity, efficiency, security, and liberty as crucial 
objectives of policy analysis.  She warns us however, that “these values are ‘motherhood 
issues’: everyone is for them when they are stated abstractly, but the fight begins as soon 
as we ask what people mean by them.”44 For example, ensuring security often comes at 
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the price of liberty; protecting liberty can equate to diminished security; and promoting 
equality and security through redistributive policies may, from perspectives, occur at the 
expense of efficiencies. 
This strategy is an opportunity to move toward enhanced security while keeping 
infringements on liberty as minimal as possible and moving down the path already 
envisioned and authorized in HSPD-21 and the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism 
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,45 respectively. It is the opportunity to promote 
equality while relying on the existing administrative infrastructure that has made 
proven contributions to enhancing social equity and has been documented as possibly 
more efficient than some of the alternatives. Finally, the benefits, especially during a 
pandemic, would be more evenly distributed among the population as compared to 
many of the existing initiatives. According to George J. Annas and others: 
Both history and current events demonstrate the need for a new, positive 
paradigm for pandemic preparedness, one that harnesses the talents of all 
Americans to take effective action to protect the health of all, instead of punishing 
those who fall ill.  This new paradigm should be based on four fundamental 
principles:  Health, Justice, Transparency, and Accountability.46 
The Health Center Program by creation and mission already exudes these principles. 
The contributions that they make to our nation’s healthcare and the manner by which 
they are organized and regulated lend themselves to being in near perfect harmony with 
this paradigm. 
Health and Justice 
Public discourse and academic research has established that the United States is in the 
midst of a healthcare crisis with the number of persons presenting without medical 
insurance reaching dangerously high levels and impacting service delivery and the 
accessibility of basic healthcare.47 This has created comparatively greater hardship for 
racial and ethnic minorities in this country, as was substantiated by an Institute of 
Medicine report documenting inequities in medical treatment among these groups.48 
Even when these individuals have the same health insurance and similar access to a 
health care provider as non-minorities, research indicates that minorities tend to receive 
a lower quality of healthcare (e.g. not receiving the needed services, receiving less 
desirable services) than whites.49 Much of the argument points to the need to socialize 
healthcare in some form or another to reduce healthcare costs, minimize or eliminate 
health disparities, and provide universal access to residents of the United States. While 
some individuals may not view the public financing of healthcare as desirable, the social 
and economic costs of inequities in health are a cost shared by all.50 For example, the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention indicates that costs associated with chronic 
diseases – the most common and the most costly – account for more than 70 percent of 
the $1 trillion in U.S. healthcare expenditures each year.51 Chronic diseases are largely 
preventable diseases.52 Therefore, reductions in the prevalence of disease, in any 
population, should in turn accrue healthcare cost savings and other benefits for all. As it 
happens, health disparities research demonstrates vulnerable populations suffer a 
disproportionate share of the chronic disease burden.53 
As a federal program, the CHCs have made significant contributions in this domain. 
“Health centers are a principle strategy for anchoring accessible, high quality primary 
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health care in pervasively poor and uninsured communities that, without such 
investment, could not hope to independently attract and support sufficient private 
medical care practices.”54 
The same factors of quality health care accessibility that have contributed to health 
disparities in racial and ethnic minorities will similarly surface during a public health 
crisis but could potentially result in higher consequences for these vulnerable 
populations and the medical infrastructure as a whole. The need to systematically and 
concretely conduct emergency planning to meet the needs of the socially disadvantaged 
has been advocated by numerous researchers and emergency management professionals 
and is captured in a distinct course offered through FEMA’s Emergency Management 
Institute.55 Fortunately, a niche profession of special-needs emergency planners has 
surfaced to provide leadership in this domain. Special-needs populations can be defined 
as “groups whose needs may not be fully addressed by traditional service providers or 
who feel they may not comfortably or safely access and use the standard resources 
offered in disaster preparedness, response, relief, and recovery.”56 Planning for special-
needs or vulnerable populations has received significant attention recently as evidenced 
by its inclusion in the Congressional Research Service Report, Public Health Medical 
Preparedness and Response: Issues in the 110th Congress and the Homeland Security 
Programs Grant (HSPG) guidance where it receives mention as an “area of paramount 
concern.”57 
A large portion of these special-needs populations comprise CHCs’ target populations 
and vice versa. Through expansion of the Health Center Program and dedicated funding 
to create robust emergency management programs within CHCs, the administration can 
make substantial improvements in healthcare accessibility and cost, reduce health 
disparities,58 and positively improve the nation’s public health and medical 
preparedness. With dedicated support, CHCs could be well positioned to be 
fundamental agents for these groups during a public health crisis and other 
emergencies.   
During non-emergency operations the provision of primary and preventive 
healthcare to underserved populations saves the system money in both the short and 
long term. CHCs already save the national health care system between $9.9 billion and 
$17.6 billion a year by helping patients avoid emergency room visits through better use 
of preventive services,59 but an additional $18 billion still aggregates each year from 
emergency room visits that could have and should have been managed through health 
center providers.60 The expectation during emergency operations is that care would be 
more widely available to not only the special-needs populations, but to the greater 
population as a whole through the systematic management of the afflicted and the 
concerned, ultimately ensuring that those in need of specialized care will have an 
improved chance of access by preventing and mitigating infection and subsequent surge 
up front. Even without significant CHC expansion, improved coordination and 
integration could augment medical preparedness and response capabilities. 
While risk-based programs for emergency management funding like the Urban Areas 
Security Initiative (UASI) or the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) are 
clearly warranted on some level, emergency management competencies should be 
established and maintained in a manner that provides a basic level of security for all.  
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Transparency and Accountability 
As federally qualified health centers (FQHC), regulated by the Bureau of Primary Health 
Care (BPHC) in the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), the administrative infrastructure 
and accountability mechanisms are already in place to groom CHCs for an active and 
measurable role in public health and medical preparedness. “The medical care services 
furnished by health centers are subject to extensive federal requirements, and the 
quality of care is carefully monitored in accordance with federal clinical care 
standards.”61   
Every three to five years, FQHCs must reapply for funding through “Service Area 
Competitions” managed and administered by HRSA. Within HRSA, a number of offices 
impact the overall administration of community health centers, but the greatest 
concentration of oversight and program guidance is directed through BPHC. 
Meanwhile, the Healthcare System Bureau, within HRSA, is dedicated to “the 
facilitation of the development of state, territorial, and municipal preparedness 
programs to enhance the capacity of the nation’s hospitals and other healthcare entities 
to respond to mass casualty incidents caused by terrorism and other public health 
emergencies,”62 and is further coordinated at a higher level through the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) located within HHS. In their 
article, Emergency Management Planning as Collaborative Community Work, Wendy 
A. Shafer and others warn that strictly top-down reforms “could fail to effectively 
leverage (or perhaps take notice at all of) locally based resources that could play useful, 
and perhaps critical roles in given emergency operations.”63 Perhaps the viability of 
CHCs as an integral component of public health and medical preparedness was 
somehow lost on this large, complex bureaucracy. Nonetheless, this bureaucracy is 
precisely the regulatory structure that is needed to assure transparency and 
accountability for any country-wide preparedness initiative.             
Another useful component of the Health Center Program’s administrative 
infrastructure is the Primary Care Association (PCA). Each state has a PCA at the service 
of member centers to provide training and technical assistance. HHS may be able to 
coordinate preparedness initiatives through the PCA to streamline the funding process, 
ensure consistency across programs, and actually measure progress in a meaningful way 
and on a scale that would support strategic planning. 
BARRIERS TO IMPLEMENTATION 
At this time, the BPHC has imposed a relatively ambiguous framework for emergency 
management programs in health centers. They mandate all-hazards preparedness yet 
hamper such efforts by maintaining barriers that essentially bar CHCs from progressive 
integration with the system. These barriers largely include inadequate funding, a 
restrictive regulatory environment, and ground-level integration challenges. 
Policy Information Notice (PIN) 2007-15: Emergency Preparedness and the 
Potential Role of Health Centers in Community Response, acknowledges the health 
centers’ ability to support homeland security efforts and encourages them to understand  
and institutionalize NIMS and understand the National Response Framework (NRF) 
while recommending typical emergency management concepts, e.g., interagency 
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coordination, interoperability, proactive planning, risk communications, etc.64 
Unfortunately, PIN 2007-15 stands to serve a much more symbolic, rather than 
operational, framework because funding for such preparedness activities is nominal, if 
existent at all. According to a recent study conducted by the National Association of 
Community Health Centers (NACHC), of the $1.54 billion awarded for public health and 
healthcare emergency management programs nationwide in 2006, only 0.7 percent or 
$11.1 million was awarded to PCAs and/or CHCs.65 A few CHCs have been successful 
obtaining funding and support through the risk-based programs mentioned earlier, the 
CDC’s Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) Cooperative Agreement, and the 
Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) which specifically prompts inclusion of CHCs in 
planning efforts. In Virginia, at the time of writing, CHCs have only just been formally 
approached regarding participation in the HPP. Before funding becomes a discussion 
topic, however, Virginia’s twenty-three CHCs, representing 129 service delivery sites,66 
will need to engage in extensive fact-finding accompanied by a presumably lengthy 
induction with one or more of the state’s six Regional Healthcare Emergency Planning 
Committees. With $3.5 million of the $11.1 million in funds (described above) being 
concentrated in California,67 it is safe to assume the discretionary distribution of these 
funds by each state has left more than a few CHCs planning in a vacuum. 
To complicate matters, the subsequent PIN issued by the BPHC, Policy Information 
Notice 2007-16: Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) Coverage for Health Center Program 
Grantees Responding to Emergencies, advises that FTCA coverage for health center 
employees and certain contractors providing services during emergencies on behalf of 
the health center, is limited to adjacent jurisdictions and those areas described within 
the center’s approved section 330-grant “scope of project” which specifies very specific 
sites, services, providers, target population, and service areas, but may be amended on a 
case-by-case basis.68 In essence, this means a CHC is restricted from mobilizing to 
respond to an incident. This policy gives little assurance to the health center attempting 
to integrate into this greater emergency management network, which relies on the use of 
mutual aid agreements (the sharing of staff and other resources) and commends them 
as a best practice.   
On the other hand, Program Information Notice 05-19: Federal Tort Claims Act 
Coverage for Deemed Consolidated Health Center Program Grantees Responding to 
Hurricane Katrina, established the precedent of FTCA coverage flexibility during a 
catastrophic incident by permitting some health centers to provide services at 
temporary locations with looser restrictions during Hurricane Katrina.69 While this PIN 
may provide a hint as to how things might unfold during an emergency, it is no more 
than a hint. This uncertainty is detrimental to a rigorous emergency management 
program that in theory stresses all-hazards preparedness and is evaluated by 
conducting realistic exercises.     
The Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) was 
conceptualized in response to the directive established in HSPD-8 to establish a 
comprehensive training program to meet the national preparedness goal that also 
includes training for the nation’s first responders, officials, and others with major event 
emergency management roles70 and provides a robust model for creating and sustaining 
a progressive capabilities-based training and exercise program utilizing the Target 
Capabilities List (TLC).71 Yet the investment to appropriately embrace this methodology, 
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under the described circumstances, is difficult to justify. CHCs could support a variety of 
capabilities identified in the TLC. Some of the more obvious capabilities include 
responder safety and health, mass care, emergency triage and pre-hospital treatment, 
medical surge, medical supplies management and distribution, and mass prophylaxis, 
but could extend to fatality management as well. However, the amount of time and 
money that would be needed just to navigate these complex partnerships and 
interactions is daunting in and of itself; this of course does not even begin to encompass 
the commitment to properly train and exercise staff in these capabilities utilizing the 
HSEEP framework. Most CHCs do not receive any direct federal funding for emergency 
management activities and, in 2006, only an estimated twenty states had planned to 
fund emergency preparedness and response programs in CHCs.72 
According to Robert Housman and Ed Bethune, post 9/11 preparedness mandates are 
smoking guns: “vulnerability assessments that offer long lists of potential risks, large 
numbers of documented security flaws, and large price tags to close these gaps.”73 Tort 
claims are being litigated right now clarifying the “duty to prepare” and the “duty to 
respond.”74 Steven Gravely, J.D., M.H.A., of the Joint Subcommittee Studying the 
Feasibility of Offering Liability Protections to Health Care Providers Rendering Aid 
During a State or Local Emergency in Virginia, warns of multiple suits in Canada against 
health care providers and the government stemming from the failure to use infection 
control measures during the SARS outbreak and similar suits against providers in 
Louisiana alleging the failure to evacuate in a timely manner in response to Hurricane 
Katrina.75 Other claims arising from these incidents include the failure to prepare, the 
failure to have emergency power, the failure to utilize realistic planning assumptions, 
and the failure to anticipate flooding and relocate generators accordingly.76 In light of 
these allegations, it could be argued that the BPHC mandates have left a paper trail for 
tort claims in those CHCs that fail to comply with the emergency management 
expectations outlined in the various PINS and by other relevant regulatory agencies. 
Ultimately, finger pointing could make its way back to the federal government in these 
cases because (1) the PINs arguably contradict the emergency management 
fundamentals of resource support through mutual aid agreements and consequently 
hinder the full exploration of CHCs as potential resources for incident management; and 
(2) funding for the implementation of comprehensive emergency management 
programs in CHCs often appear to be unavailable, insufficient, or amassed by other 
entities whom in turn may be either unaware of or unconcerned with the role of CHCs. 
After all, the Health Center Program is a federal initiative.  
Challenges in the CHC 
Beyond the larger policy issues, CHCs may have to overcome challenges in their 
localities as well. For a CHC to be successful in the emergency preparedness and 
response realm, it must be integrated in the local emergency management network. Yet 
achieving this needed state of integration is not always an easy feat.  
Currently, the main push for emergency preparedness and response in CHCs revolves 
around the drafting of the EOP. While it is clear that EOPs and the process of developing 
the plan is the foundation of emergency management programs, it is also becoming 
clear that this activity in and of itself may not provide the results intended. Sang O. Choi 
and Ralph S. Brower conducted a study under the assumption that appropriate persons 
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tasked with emergency management responsibilities were knowledgeable of their 
relevant EOPS, only to discover that this assumption was far from the truth. 
“Surprisingly, the majority (60.0%) of all organizations appear to understand the plan 
only a little.”77 Louise Comfort and Naim Kapucu add additional concern when they 
assert that “most public agencies have emergency plans, but they are not always 
current” (311).78 Moreover they've found integration inconsistencies with the plans 
themselves. 
Although some private companies and nonprofit organizations such as hospitals 
and schools have emergency plans, they often are not integrated with those of the 
public agencies to provide a comprehensive plan for a community, much less 
multiple communities in an affected region.79 
Without the flexibility to truly integrate, CHCs may easily become stuck in the planning 
mode and never delve any deeper into the areas where they can make the greatest 
impact: personal preparedness initiatives and training to ensure an adequate and 
“ready” workforce capable of supporting biosurveillance efforts, countermeasure 
distribution, mass casualty care, and the provisioning of community education and risk 
communications to strive for the best outcome in their communities under the worst-
case scenarios.  
FEMA offers a long list of recommended activities for NIMS implementation in 
hospitals and healthcare systems including, but not limited to: 
• The adoption of NIMS, continuous efforts to provide NIMS/ICS training, and the 
utilization of exercises to determine corrective actions; 
• Promoting and supporting mutual aid agreements, the maintenance of 
inventoried response assets, and the use of integrated Multi-Agency Coordination 
Systems (MACs); 
• The implementation of public information systems and all-hazards exercise 
programs.80     
Without dedicated personnel and funding, these activities will be extremely difficult for 
a CHC to implement and as it stands now, every dollar spent on preparedness is a dollar 
taken away from clinical programs.  
It should not be assumed that a Local Emergency Management Committee (LEMC) 
has the means and foresight to include CHCs in preparedness activities and further the 
structure and incentive to maintain and report such progress. Many jurisdictions are 
overwhelmed by the challenge of achieving even basic NIMS compliance in their 
agencies. A study by the Colorado Community Health Network (the Colorado PCA) 
found that of those CHCs surveyed, those not involved in community planning had 
actually been rejected by the community with one respondent reportedly being told 
‘We’ll call you if we need you’.81 In contrast to this interaction, Steve Harrison asserts 
that close collaboration and mutual understanding of response roles is not simply 
needed, but required, to effectively resolve many of the issues necessitating 
consideration prior to and during a public health incident.82   
Creating an emergency management program that is responsive to the needs and 
particular nuances of the individual CHC is a tall order. The resources and capabilities 
of each one can be quite varied. Some of the rural health programs, for example, may 
not have the staff to attend long trainings without completely shutting down their 
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operations. Meanwhile, as the sole healthcare provider within a particular area, their 
facility may be the one that could benefit the most from these interactions. With cuts in 
Medicaid expenditures, resulting in a higher number of uninsured people seeking 
services, more centers struggle with their day-to-day finances, which ultimately 
constrains their ability to effectively undertake emergency management planning and all 
that a quality program entails. The case of the Eastern Shore Rural Health System 
(ESRHS), the most progressive CHC in terms of emergency management in Virginia, 
demonstrates these tensions.    
In Virginia, the Eastern Shore Rural Health System (ESRHS) operates five 
community health centers along the eighty-mile stretch of land between the Chesapeake 
Bay and the Atlantic Ocean. With more than 50,000 residents, only one area hospital 
with 180 beds, and at least half of the population relying on ESRHS for their care, 
ESRHS partnered with their local health department as early as 2002 to begin 
emergency planning.83 They developed relationships with the local hospital and area 
emergency management personnel and eventually formalized these partnerships 
through the creation of the Eastern Shore Disaster Preparedness Coalition.84 ESRHS 
has been very active with the coalition and initially attempted to support community 
exercises with each of their health centers every year, but it soon became apparent that 
the time commitment to plan and coordinate these events was too much and that 
ESRHS could generally only permit one center to participate per year.  Since ESRHS is 
very well integrated with their local emergency management network and is fairly 
confident in their response roles through their local ICS, the abated exercise schedule is 
less of a concern than the possibility of losing contact during an incident.85   
The ESRHS is probably the most capable CHC in the state (at this point) for 
supporting incident response and they are actually located quite close to the Norfolk 
UASI jurisdictions. In fact, roughly 41 percent or 2,882 CHC service delivery sites are 
located within candidate urban areas queried by the Department of Homeland Security 
as part of their overall risk methodology86 (see Appendix for CHC counts by state and 
relevant Metropolitan Statistical Area). Yet FTCA guidelines would prevent them from 
quickly responding to an incident in most of the state’s UASI areas due to the coverage 
guidelines discussed previously.  
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In Biodefense for the 21st Century, the United States declared that it “will continue to 
use all means necessary to prevent, protect against, and mitigate biological weapons 
attacks perpetrated against our homeland and our global interests” [emphasis added].87 
The preceding discussion points to a means that is clearly necessary. Supporting the 
Public Health and Medical Preparedness Strategy to the greatest extent possible, 
however, hinges on a few critical recommendations:   
Remove Regulatory Barriers 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security states that the nation must develop 
“interconnected and complementary homeland security systems that are reinforcing 
rather than duplicative and that ensure essential requirements are met.”88 In 2005 DHS 
announced the national priorities, in the Interim National Preparedness Goal, one of 
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which includes the goal of strengthening “medical surge and mass prophylaxis 
capabilities by establishing emergency-ready public health and healthcare entities” and 
another calling for “expanded regional collaboration through mutual aid agreements 
and assistance compacts.”89 These goals point to the development of specific capabilities 
and specify the means for getting there. Meanwhile, CHC participation is limited 
because the current guidelines for granting medical malpractice insurance through the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) have all but ensured their paralysis. 
First and foremost, FTCA coverage must be determined in a way that supports rather 
than contradicts emergency management programs. In emergency management, mutual 
aid agreements and memorandums of understanding provide the framework for 
requesting resources during an incident response. In light of these regulations, CHCs 
may provide supplies and equipment but are quite restricted in the use of personnel. 
This equates to an underutilized asset of more than 36,900 medical care providers, 
more than 2,700 mental health providers, and nearly 105,000 personnel in total across 
the U.S., providing patient services.90 Despite this barrier, health centers treated more 
than 19,000 evacuees in Louisiana and nearly 18,000 in Mississippi after Hurricane 
Katrina – nearly 80 percent of whom did not have health insurance.91 
At a minimum, FTCA coverage should be designated in a way that permits staff-
sharing between centers and their temporary sites or provides specific assurance that 
coverage will be extended under certain circumstances. For example, the guidelines 
could state that coverage will be provided during a state declared disaster for intrastate 
practitioners responding to a Type-2 Incident or coverage will be extended if WHO 
Pandemic Phase 5 is signaled.92 This will facilitate preparedness at the local and state 
levels by instantly boosting medical response capabilities and will enhance preparedness 
at the national level by creating the flexibility and assurance for CHCs to begin 
integrated training and exercise programs with other stakeholders. Those CHCs 
formerly rejected by their LEMC, or those residing in inactive jurisdictions, could 
pursue alternative partners from a broader jurisdictional perspective and ultimately 
pursue NIMS compliance where formerly their success would have been predicated on 
their immediate community’s interest in and ability to integrate them. CHCs and their 
respective PCAs could then begin to link into Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs) 
and other multiagency coordination systems and vice versa with greater efficiency. 
Ideally, the NDMS model of FTCA coverage and recognized credentialing across state 
lines should be extended to CHC personnel to promote all-hazards preparedness. To 
reiterate, FTCA coverage for providers will only be extended when services provided are 
consistent with those identified in the CHCs’ “scope of project,” including sites, services, 
service areas, and target populations (target populations generally meaning medically 
underserved and/or vulnerable populations). Ironically, the threat of pandemic 
influenza and the looming medical response shortage raises the probability that every 
citizen will be medically underserved. During a pandemic event,  CHC personnel (after 
stabilizing their own communities) perhaps could provide temporary assistance through 
partner CHCs in those jurisdictions still struggling with the incident. 
Enable CHC Growth to Ensure an Evenly Distributed Public 
Health Response 
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The Institute of Medicine praised health centers for providing care that is “at least as 
good as, and in many cases superior to, the overall health system in terms of better 
quality and lower costs.”93 Moreover, Jack Hadley and Peter Cunningham suggest that 
CHC expansion reduces the reliance on more expensive hospital resources, ultimately 
improving delivery system efficiency and offsetting the costs of expanding CHC 
capacity.94 Aaron Katz and others describe CHCs as well situated in some communities 
to be the first line of response during public health emergencies and warned that 
reductions in public health infrastructure investments could erode newfound capacity in 
community preparedness.95 The list of various reports and research supporting CHCs 
goes on and on.96, Denise Santiago and Anke Richter, however, caution against the 
reliance on “dual-use functionality” for public health preparedness pointing to the 
obvious assumption that the concept assumes that there were sufficient resources for 
“single use.”97 The demand for services during a public health emergency will certainly 
overwhelm existing capabilities. Even future infrastructure development will falter 
during a WMD attack or biological disease outbreak. Yet until health care accessibility 
provides for a more equitable distribution there should be little reservation in moving 
forward on capacity building. “Congress and the agencies must address the fact that 
many critical systems on which the nation will rely during future emergencies are 
already overstrained. This applies in particular to health care and public health 
sectors.”98 
Use the Administrative Infrastructure to Promote Health, Justice, 
Transparency, and Accountability 
PCAs, the state-level associations for CHCs, receive funding authorized under the Public 
Health Service Act to provide “assistance to Statewide organizations in the development 
and delivery of comprehensive primary health care service in areas that lack adequate 
numbers of health professionals or have populations lacking access to primary care 
services” and “technical and non-financial assistance to community-based providers of 
comprehensive primary and preventive care for underserved and vulnerable 
populations.”99  
Training and technical assistance for emergency management is quickly being added 
to the list of services provided through the PCA, but the breadth and quality of those 
programs, if implemented, will largely be dependent on their level of funding. Costly 
consultants can easily be brought in for a quick presentation on risk communications or 
personal preparedness. The challenge though is connecting those needs to the CHC and 
the CHC to the emergency management network and the resources to the CHC so that 
those needs result in implementation actions. None of this can be accomplished in a 
significant way if done in isolation.  
The Association of State and Territorial Health Officials (ASTHO) described the 
following roles that PCAs could use to facilitate emergency preparedness and response: 
 
• Represent CHCs at state emergency planning tables; 
• Provide training and technical assistance to CHCs as they develop their 
emergency operations plan; 
• Serve as the communication link between CHCs and government resources.100 
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A more recent report by ASTHO describes partnerships forged between some state 
health agencies, PCAs, and CHCs to improve emergency preparedness. Some of these 
efforts include, but are not limited to: defining emergency response roles in California; 
enhancing surge capacity in Massachusetts, resource integration in Arkansas, 
emergency preparedness training for health centers in Maine, and infectious disease 
control in New York; and building health care coalitions in the state of Washington.101 
These successes should certainly serve as models for improving coordination and 
integration at the state and local levels.  
Working through the PCA could be a means to facilitate the coordination and 
execution of many public health and medical preparedness activities through a more 
manageable program design. It would create another layer of accountability and 
positions the CHC and the PCA to take advantage of pull and push strategies for creating 
awareness and improving integration at the local, regional, and state levels.  
CONCLUSION 
If CHCs are to be contributing partners in public health and medical preparedness, 
funding must be made available that supports a minimum level of preparedness for all 
centers. With more than 36,900 medical professionals across the nation to prepare for 
emergency preparedness, the funding is needed and has the potential to engage a 
previously untapped resource.     
As potential PODs for countermeasures and mass prophylaxis, certain personnel will 
need to take the full spectrum of NIMS and ICS training and engage in community 
and/or state exercises. To effectively contribute to biosurveillance or mass casualty care, 
certain personnel will need bioterrorism training and the opportunity to participate in 
relevant drills. Finally, to be a key player in community resilience, CHCs need the 
recognition and support from the emergency management network across agencies and 
all levels of government. 
Even though coordination, collaboration, and communication are the mantras of 
emergency management, this networked vision has yet to be achieved on a large scale. 
Public health has only recently joined the ranks of the first responders and the titling of 
whom meets this classification is still gray for many even within the emergency 
management and homeland security professions. Including CHC representation on the 
occasional advisory committee without soliciting feedback, without appropriating 
funding to them, and without publicly acknowledging their role will do little to move the 
relationship forward. “Our entire response framework is predicated on a coordinated 
response that spreads across jurisdictions and up jurisdictional channels as resources 
are exhausted.”102 Outside of local EMS resources, public health is not well organized to 
contribute to this model and certainly not in the capacity envisioned by the Public 
Health and Medical Preparedness Strategy.   
Expanding the Health Center Program and embracing these entities as critical 
partners in the Public Health and Medical Preparedness Strategy is a viable strategy by 
first striking a reasonable balance between many of our contending values, and second 
by staying within our comfort zone in terms of incremental policy change by relying on 
existing administrative infrastructure and expanding capabilities rather than creating 
new entities to achieve them. 
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The entities we do have (i.e., NDMS, MRC) cannot be held accountable to meet 
FEMA’s training and exercise standards nor the actual response needs outlined in the 
nation’s preparedness architecture. Hospitals are already running at or beyond capacity. 
According to a recent real-time congressional survey of Level I Trauma Centers, 
conducted by the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, none of the 
hospitals surveyed had enough critical care capacity or inpatient beds available to 
absorb a sudden influx from a mass casualty event (the “less severely injured” were 
included in the counts).103 It is quite possible that improved performance could have 
been realized had those “less severely injured” individuals been considered for 
treatment at nearby CHCs. Health departments have missions and responsibilities that 
delve into a wide array of programs, some preparedness related and many others not. 
Since these agencies are generally understaffed themselves, consideration must be given 
to other resources that are well-positioned to assist them in their preparedness and 
response efforts. Private physicians, medical centers, clinics, and every other healthcare 
system in existence should be incorporating emergency management programs into 
their operations to address those areas identified in HSPD-21. Unfortunately many of 
those entities do not generally have the bureaucratic structure in place to ensure 
transparency and accountability. When they do, their distribution does not generally 
reflect a system that promotes health and justice; if it did, CHCs would not exist.   
According to HRSA’s Elizabeth Duke “health centers have been identified by the OMB 
as one of the federal government’s most successful programs.”104 Through a thoughtful 
revisioning that broadens the program’s scope to include strategic emergency planning, 
CHCs – with support – can build on what they already do well to augment our nation’s 
public health and medical preparedness capabilities. 
This article is not intended to minimize the progress made over the past few years or 
to imply that CHCs have gone completely unnoticed – some are very well integrated and 
funded in their particular communities. Further, it is not intended to acclaim the Health 
Center Program as the sole solution to the Public Health and Medical Preparedness 
Strategy. The goal is to highlight the untapped resources that, through the proper 
attention to funding and development, can enhance the nation’s public health and 
medical preparedness. CHCs can provide biosurveillance in the populations that may be 
the first to signal a public health emergency, by serving as PODs in those areas that that 
are closest to special needs populations, by supporting mass casualty care efforts by 
mitigating surge at the onset and providing a supply of competent professionals 
dedicated to the public interest, and ultimately ensuring community resilience by 
leveraging their existing capabilities and relationships to ease their communities 
through a public health catastrophe. “It is the policy of the United States to plan and 
enable provision for the public health and medical needs of the American people in the 
case of a catastrophic health event through continual and timely flow of information 
during such an event and rapid public health and medical response that marshals all 
available national capabilities and capacities in a rapid and coordinated manner.”105 
CHCs can be, should be, and may be front line public health responders whether they 
are prepared or not.   
 
Is your Community Health Center Prepared? 
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NOTICE OF CORRECTION: Page 12 (the second paragraph under the heading Barriers to 
Implementation) has been modified to remove information appearing in the original publication 
of this article. The author’s personal communications with professionals from the New Jersey, 
Missouri, and Michigan Primary Care Associations were cited incorrectly. 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 1 Urban Areas 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area106 
Counties and Cities107 




Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana Area Los Angeles County 134 
San Francisco-San Jose-Bay Area 
Alameda County 
196 
Contra Costa County 
Marin County 
San Benito County 
San Franciso County 
San Mateo County 
Santa Clara County 
DC Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Area All Jurisdictions 45 























Prince George's County 











Somerset County  
Sussex County 
Union County 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 1 Urban Areas 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 
Selected for Query 
CHC 
Count 












PA Newark Area Pike County 0 










San Jacinto County 
Waller County 












Manassas Park City 




WI Chicago-Naperville-Joliet Area, IL-IN-WI Kenosha County 1 
WV Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV Area Jefferson County 1 
Tier 1 Total 1,092 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Areas 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 
Selected for Query 
CHC 
Count 
AR Memphis Area, TN-MS-AR Crittenden County 2 
AZ 
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale Area Maricopa County 
26 Pinal County 
Tucson Area Tucson County 
54 Pima County 
CA 
Santa Ana-Anaheim-Irvine Area Orange County 9 
Sacramento-Arden-Arcade-Roseville Area 





San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos Area San Diego County 101 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario Area Riverside County 
19 San Bernardino County 


















Birdgeport-Stamford-Norwalk Area Fairfield County 31 
DE Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington Area, PA-NJ-DE-MD New Castle County 5 
FL 
Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach Area Broward County 







St. Johns County 
Miami Area Miami-Dade County 







WOOD, COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER S AND PREPAREDNESS 
 




CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Areas 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 
Selected for Query 
CHC 
Count 




































HI Honolulu Area Honolulu County 28 
IN 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Areas 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 




Indianapolis-Carmel Area (continued) 
Marion County   
Morgan County   
Putnam County   
Shelby County 37 














St. Clair County 





























LA Baton Rouge Area 
Ascension Parish 
  
East Baton Rouge Parish 
East Feliciana Parish 
Iberville Parish 
Livingston Parish 
WOOD, COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTER S AND PREPAREDNESS 
 




CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Areas 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 




Baton Rouge Area (continued) 
Pointe Coupee Parish 
21 
St. Helena Parish 
West Baton Rouge Parish 
West Feliciana Parish 





St. Bernard Parish 
St. Charles Parish 
St. John the Baptist Parish 
St. Tammany Parish 
MA 







Providence-New Bedford-Fall River Area, RI-MA Bristol County 5 
MD 
Baltimore-Towson Area 







Queen Anne's County 
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington Area, PA-NJ-DE-MD Cecil County 1 






St. Clair County 
Wayne County 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Areas 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 















St. Louis, MO-IL Area 
Crawford County 
56 
Franklin County   
Jefferson County 
Lincoln County 
St. Charles County 
St. Louis City 
St. Louis County 
Warren County 
Washington County 














Norfolk-Virginia Beach, Newport News Area, VA-NC Currituck County 0 
NH Boston-Cambridge-Quincy Area, MA-NH Rockingham County 
29 Strafford County 















Buffalo-Niagara Falls Area Erie County  
4 Niagara County 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Area 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 





















































Logan County  
McClain County 
Oklahoma County 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Area 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 




















PR San Juan-Caguas-Guaynabo Area 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Area 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 
Selected for Query 
CHC 
Count 
PR San Juan-Caguas-Guaynabo Area (continued) 
Quebradillas Municipio 
32 
Rio Grande Municipio 
San Juan Municipio 
San Lorenzo Municipio 
Toa Alta Municipio 
Toa Baja Municipio 
Trujillo Alto Municipio 
Vega Alta Municipio 
Vega Baja Municipio 
Yabucoa Municipio 







SC Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord Area, NC-SC York County 5 
TN 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Area 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 














El Paso Area El Paso County 17 










UT Salt Lake City Area 









Charles City County 
Chesterfield County 







King and Queen County 
King William County 
Louisa County 
New Kent County 
Petersburg City 
Powhatan County 
Prince George County 
Richmond City 
Sussex County 
Norfolk-Virginia Beach, Newport News Area, VA-NC Chesapeake City 
  Franklin City 
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CHC Prevalence in Candidate Urban Areas under the FY 2008 UASI Program 
Tier 2 Urban Area 
State Candidate Urban Area by Metropolitan Statistical Area 
Counties and Cities 
Selected for Query 
CHC 
Count 
VA Norfolk-Virginia Beach, Newport News Area, VA-NC (continued) 
Gloucester County   
15 
Hampton City 
Isle of Wight County 
James City County 
Mathews County 








Virginia Beach City 
Williamsburg City 
York County   
WA 
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue Area 
King  County 
81 
Snohomish County 
Pierce County    
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton Area, OR-WA Clark County 
3 Skamania County 
WI 






Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington Area, MN-WI Pierce County 
0 St. Croix County 
Tier 2 Total 1,790 
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